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Chapter 1
Introduction and Literature
Overview
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 Motivation
Most major financial crises in the past three decades entailed devastating ef-
fects on real economic activities in affected countries and markets. Examples
are the Mexico crisis in 1994, the crises in South East Asia in 1997, and the
Turkey crisis in 2001.1
In particular, financial crises that comprise a sudden stop of capital flows,
i.e., a sharp negative variation in capital flows, are characterized by severe and
long lasting economic effects. For example, the Mexico crisis, characterized
by a sudden stop and a currency crisis, led to a fall of real equity prices in
CPI units (Consumer Price Index) of 29 percent, in industrial production of
10 percent, and to a plunge of 6.5 percent in private consumption.2 In 1995,
Mexico’s GDP declined 6 percent as compared to the previous year.3
1See Table 2.12 in Chapter 2 for an overview on the most severe financial crises of the last
three decades and their effects on the real economic activity in the crises countries. These
crises were so severe that they appeared in newspaper headlines around the world and are
remembered for the accompanying turmoil. Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2000) surveys
those crises that seized several economies.
2Mendoza and Smith (2006) report these values comparing late January 1995 to April
1994.
3See Table 2.12 in Chapter 2.
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Many financial crises have occurred in emerging market economies around
a few initial crises, particularly around the Mexican crisis in 1994, the Thai
crisis in 1997, and the Russian crisis in 1998, as well as in developed economies
around the breakdown of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992.
These periods of crises concentration suggest contagion effects, i.e., the trans-
mission of crises across countries beyond what would be implied by common
shocks.4
The high economic cost of these periods explains the effort in trying to
understand the factors behind the occurrence and the spread of crises. Many
researchers have analyzed factors explaining the occurrence of financial crises
and their effects on the real economy, and have thought about possible poli-
cies that may prevent crises or mitigate their effects. Just as much effort
has been exerted on exploring corresponding questions regarding the spread
of crises. The present study seeks to contribute to this effort by analyzing
one specific factor neglected so far but potentially delivering fresh insights on
policies preventing the occurrence and the spread of crises: uncertainty about
the fundamentals. In the present study, uncertainty about the fundamentals or
uncertainty refers to the disagreement of private investors about the state of
the fundamentals of an economy.5
Uncertainty about the fundamentals between private investors belongs to
the variables only recently discovered as potential explanatory factors of cur-
rency, debt, and banking crises. Its role in the transmission of crises across
countries has even been entirely neglected so far. Financial crises occurring
earlier, such as currency crises of Mexico and Argentina in the 1970s, could be
largely explained by inconsistent economic policies or bad fundamentals in the
crises countries. Later, crises such as the breakdown of the European Exchange
Rate Mechanism in 1992 appear to have been triggered by self-fulfilling beliefs
of speculators or investors. However, the Mexican crisis in 1994, and to an
even larger extent the Asian crisis in 1997, have shown that previous models
were not sufficient to explain all crisis features. In particular, the sudden stop
of capital flowing to affected countries and the spread of a financial crisis from
one market to another could not be explained by previous models. Therefore,
the search for crisis triggers has been extended to factors within international
capital markets and investor behavior, uncertainty being one of these.
4See Didier, Mauro, and Schmukler (2006) for this definition.
5This definition is widely used in the literature of global games.
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Studies modeling currency crises, debt crises, and banking crises as coor-
dination games have contributed promising approaches to the prevention of
these crises phenomena.6 This modeling approach allows for an analysis of
the effect of uncertainty. Sudden stops and contagion have not been analyzed
from this angle.
Decisions underlying the occurrence of sudden stops of capital flows are
similar to those underlying currency, debt, or banking crises.7 This renders
the analysis of uncertainty in the context of sudden stops possible. However,
factors driving sudden stops and the crisis phenomenon itself differ profoundly
from other crises phenomena. Therefore, analyzing the phenomenon of sudden
stops in terms of a coordination game between private agents promises to
generate new, insightful results.
While the spread of financial crises has been analyzed in the setup of a co-
ordination game, the literature stops short of analyzing which role uncertainty
plays in the transmission.8 In addition, the spread of stock market drops has
not yet been modeled in such a setting. However, such an analysis appears
promising. In particular, it can help in understanding the spread of crises
across countries that are unrelated in terms of their fundamentals.
Furthermore, the empirical quantification of the effect of uncertainty on the
occurrence of sudden stops and on the spread of crises is missing in previous
research. The goal of the empirical parts in chapter 2 on sudden stops and of
chapter 3 on the spread of stock market crises address this lack.
1.1.2 Aims and Scope
The overall objective of this study is to explore the effect of one particular
possible explanatory factor of financial crises and their spread: uncertainty
about the fundamentals.
6See section 1.4 for the concrete policy implications of coordination games analyzing the
effect of uncertainty such as by Heinemann and Illing (2002) in the context of currency crisis,
or by Morris and Shin (2004) on debt crises.
7Concretely, the decision of abstaining from investment in a particular country’s assets
positively depends on other agents choosing the same strategy and negatively depends on the
quality of the fundamentals in the respective economy. These features similarly characterize
the choice of attacking a currency, of abstaining from rolling-over debt contracts, or of
withdrawing bank deposits.
8See Goldstein and Pauzner (2004) for a prominent example.
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Achieving this overall objective can be split into a number of aims with
smaller scope.
A first aim is to help in understanding how sudden stops of capital flows
are triggered. In particular, I want to show how coordination failure between
private investors can contribute to the occurrence of sudden stops. I focus on
the effect of uncertainty about the fundamentals.
The second aim is then to understand the relevance of uncertainty in ex-
plaining sudden stops. The large number of factors potentially functioning
as crisis triggers requires a rigorous empirical analysis, taking into account a
large number of control variables. Moreover, the potential problem of reverse
causality running from a sudden stop towards uncertainty requires a careful
robustness analysis.
The third aim then is to provide policy implications based on a new under-
standing of the occurrence of sudden stops and their relevance. The ultimate
goal of these policy implications is to contribute to the prevention of sudden
stops and to the mitigation of their consequences.
The fourth aim is to illustrate the mechanism through which uncertainty
about fundamentals propagates financial crises across markets. In this context,
I focus on contagion of stock market crises. These crises, together with banking
crises, appear to be at the core of spreading crises.9
The fifth aim of this study is to validate empirically the effect of uncer-
tainty on the spread of stock market crises. Again, the existing alternative
factors of contagion and the risk of reverse causality call for rigorous empirical
verification and careful robustness analysis.
The sixth aim is, again, to provide policy implications in the effort to
prevent contagion and mitigate its consequences.
The following two points are relevant for clarifying the scope of the present
study. Firstly, the present study does not claim that uncertainty about the
fundamentals is the only factor either triggering or transmitting financial crises.
Rather, the purpose of my study is to explore the effect of one factor neglected
so far. As the empirical analysis here shows in both cases, in the occurrence of
sudden stops of capital flows and the spread of stock market crises, the effect
is not negligible in terms of magnitude. Additionally, analysis of uncertainty
9Portfolio flows and bank lending have been found to be particularly diversified across
countries and volatile during crises periods. For evidence, see Levchenko and Mauro (2006).
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about the fundamentals can help identify additional policy ideas that diminish
the probability of a crisis or its propagation and mitigate the consequences.
Secondly, the models in this study will not explain all crisis features char-
acterizing the recent headline crises. In particular, the models do not accom-
modate bank runs or debt crises. Both bank-run crises and roll-over debt
crises have already been analyzed in light of coordination failure. This study
focuses on phenomena shown to be especially crucial to the financial turmoil
of the recent headline crises and which have the potential to generate new
insights. This narrowed, strategic focus allows for concrete results and for
drawing concrete policy implications.
1.1.3 Outline of the Study
This study consists of three chapters. The rest of chapter 1 briefly consid-
ers relevant threads of literature. Reviewed first is the relevant literature on
financial crises. Then follows a summary of the literature on the spread of
financial crises. Finally, the first chapter concludes with an overview of the
existing literature on the effect of uncertainty on the occurrence and the spread
of financial crises.
Chapter 2 addresses the effect of uncertainty about the fundamentals on
the probability of sudden stops of capital flows, both from a theoretical and
an empirical perspective. A coordination game with private information about
the fundamentals is set up to show the effect of investment safety, of the inter-
national interest rate, and of uncertainty on the probability of a sudden stop
of capital flows. The model predicts that the probability of a crisis decreases
with an increase in investment safety. However, the crisis probability increases
with an increase in the international interest rate. Moreover, the crisis prob-
ability increases with an increase in the uncertainty about the fundamentals,
i.e., with the dispersion of private signals about the true value of the funda-
mentals. The analysis uses two data sets of Consensus Economics and WES
(World Economic Survey) forecasts for 31 developed and developing coun-
tries from January 1990 to December 2001 to test the theoretical predictions.
Applying probit estimations controlling for time and country effects makes
the validation of the theoretical predictions possible. Additionally, results are
tested for robustness across many specifications.
Chapter 3 analyzes the impact of uncertainty on the spread of stock mar-
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ket crises, both theoretically and empirically. The effect of uncertainty about
the fundamentals on investment decisions is an important cause of financial
crises propagating across countries. Firstly, a coordination game on invest-
ment illustrates the increasing effect of a surprise crisis in one country on the
probability of a crisis in a second country through higher uncertainty there. An
anticipated initial crisis generates the opposite effect. Secondly, these theoret-
ical predictions are tested empirically. Fixed effects panel estimations validate
the impact of the initial crisis on uncertainty in potentially-affected countries.
Subsequently, probit estimations confirm the positive impact of uncertainty on
the crisis probability in the affected economy. The results are robust across
various specifications.
1.2 The Occurrence of Financial Crises
The literature on financial crises is extensive. Therefore, this overview men-
tions only the most important studies shaping the understanding of these
events. A particular emphasis lies on the literature on sudden stops of capital
flows as they are at the core of interest in chapter 2 of this study. This section
only briefly revisits the literature on stock market crises. As the spread of
stock market crises is at the core of interest in chapter 3 of this study, readers
will find more detail on this literature in the literature overview on contagion
in section 1.3. In addition to reviewing relevant literature, this section puts
the present study in perspective by defining its scope in the context of the
literature.
This section is organized as follows: First, the most important types of
crises are defined. Second, the different steps in the development of crises
models are traced. Third, this section treats the literature on sudden stops of
capital flows, dividing the presentation into theoretical and empirical studies.
1.2.1 Crises Phenomena
In the literature, currency crises that have long been considered at the core
of larger financial turmoil cases are defined as substantial exchange rate de-
valuations. In the empirical analyses of currency crises, researchers have mea-
sured the devaluations by so-called exchange market pressure indices. A crisis
is defined as a significant change in the index. While a few authors consider
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changes in the nominal exchange rate exclusively10, most authors, additionally,
take into account either changes in foreign exchange reserves11 or changes in
foreign exchange reserves and in the interest rate12 to accommodate possible
policy responses to initial pressure on the nominal exchange rate.
Banking crises or panics have been accurately defined as events in which
”bank debt holders suddenly demand that banks convert their debt claims into
cash to an extent that the banks are forced to suspend the convertibility of
their debt into cash” by Calomiris and Gorton (1991). Caprio and Klingebiel
(2002) define systemic banking crises as ”much or all of bank capital being
exhausted,” which is a definition more easily measured.
Most authors understand a debt crisis as a credit event defined as a non-
repayment of pre-agreed debt service.13 Pescatori and Sy (2004) give an exten-
sive overview of the definitions of debt crises, categorizing the corresponding
credit events as sovereign defaults, large arrears, large International Monetary
Fund loans, and as distress.
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) introduced the term twin crisis to the
literature. Twin crisis describes the simultaneous occurrence of a banking and
a currency crisis. In their empirical analysis Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999)
find that the banking crisis in most cases precedes the currency crisis. This
observed order of events is often used to explain why the focus of a part of the
literature has shifted from currency to banking crisis as the core of financial
turmoil. A more recent literature also analyzes the simultaneous occurrence
of debt and currency crises.14
The term sudden stop was first introduced by Dornbusch, Goldfajn, and
Valdes (1995). Most authors define a sudden stop of capital flows as a sharp
reversal in capital flows associated with severe economic consequences. How-
ever, authors differ in their sudden stop definitions regarding the distinction
between crisis features and the consequences of the crisis. While, for example,
Calvo (2003) defines a sudden stop simply as a large reduction in the flow of
international capital considering the ensuing turmoil as a crisis consequence,
Mendoza and Smith (2006) include three stylized facts into their definition
10See Frankel and Rose (1996).
11See, for example, Berg and Patillo (1998).
12See, for example, Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) or Fratzscher (2003).
13See Sachs (1984) for this definition.
14See, for example, Reinhart (2002) or Bauer, Herz, and Karb (2007).
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of a sudden stop: a sudden, sharp reversal in capital inflows and the current
account, large declines in absorption and production, and collapses in both
real asset prices and in the price of non-tradable goods relative to tradables.
Henceforth, sudden stop in this study means the reversal in capital flows. The
study will treat the consequences separately.15
Sudden contractions in current account deficits or even current account
reversals are closely linked to sudden stops in capital flows. Capital inflows
equal the current account deficit plus the accumulation of international reserves
by national accounting, if abstracting from errors and omissions. A sudden
stop in capital inflows must be met by a lower current account deficit or by
reserve losses. As Calvo and Reinhart (2000) illustrate, both cases happen
in reality. Edwards (2004b) demonstrates that current account reversals and
sudden stops in capital inflows are highly correlated. A part of the empirical
literature uses reversals in the current account to identify sudden stops of
capital flows.16
The loss in foreign reserves is defined as a balance of payment crisis
if it is severe: Krugman and Obstfeld (2003) define it as a sharp change in
official foreign reserves sparked by a change in expectations about the future
exchange rate.17 Clearly, then, a balance of payment crisis is also closely linked
to a currency crisis that occurs when depletion of reserves is not sufficient to
buffer the shock: the currency, then, depreciates.
Practitioners define stock market crises as precipitous drops in market
prices or economic conditions.18 An academic definition is more difficult as
Mishkin and White (2003) put it: ”On the face of it, defining a stock market
collapse is simple: when you see it, you know it. However, a precise definition
is more difficult.” In this study, following Broner, Gelos, and Reinhart (2006),
a stock market crisis is defined as a significant drop in stock market returns.
15The empirical analysis in the second chapter employs two alternative measures of sudden
stops. The first measure is based on the reversal in capital flows exclusively. The second
measure, additionally takes negative GDP growth into account.
16See for example Hutchison and Noy (2006).
17See Krugman and Obstfeld (2003), p. 502.
18See http : //www.investorwords.com for this definition.
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1.2.2 Generations of Crises Models
The search for models explaining the occurrence of financial crises has evolved
in several waves or generations. These generations follow the occurrence of
financial crises not explained by previous models. The intellectual development
is stepwise, however, and relies on prior modeling work.
In the first generation models, economic fundamentals and unsustainable
domestic policies are at the core of financial crises.19 These models respond to
the currency crises of Mexico and Argentina in the 1970s. In these models, the
combination of government deficits financed with the help of seignorage and
fixed exchange rate regimes leads to a depletion of finite foreign reserves. Ex-
ternal investors generate a speculative attack when reserves fall below a critical
level to avoid capital losses in case of the inevitable collapse. This results in a
currency crisis.
In the second generation models, crises occur driven by self-fulfilling be-
liefs. The models that were developed after the severe speculative attacks on
the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992 take into account that the
attacked economies are mainly characterized by government surpluses and sub-
stantial foreign reserves. In Obstfeld (1994), for example, crises result from the
tradeoff between a fixed exchange rate and a desire for an expansionary mon-
etary policy to lower unemployment. The crisis, then, stems from investors
suspecting that the cost of defending the peg for unemployment becomes too
high for the government and that the peg may have to be abandoned. The
resulting pressure on interest rates can be sufficient to force the government
into devaluation.
In the third generation models, fragility of financial structure and insti-
tutions is at the core of the crisis. Most approaches in this generation combine
features of the first and the second generation in the sense that models are
fundamentals- and belief-driven at the same time. In particular, the Asian
crisis in 1997-98 cannot be explained by first or second generation models be-
cause, prior to the crisis, the affected economies are seemingly characterized
by sound fundamentals and, unlike the European countries prior to the 1992
crisis, by low rates of unemployment. Additionally, the 1994 Mexican as well
as the 1997-98 Asian crises both involve sudden stops of capital flows and con-
tagion. This is why the literature on financial crises broadened widely. As far
19See Krugmann (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984).
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as crises models are concerned, the papers reviewed in the following literature
overview are all part of the third generation.
1.2.3 Modeling Approaches to Sudden Stops
The theoretical literature on sudden stops of capital can be distinguished into
two broad threads. One thread features dynamic, stochastic, general equilib-
rium (DSGE) models, which can only be solved numerically. In these models,
sudden stops originate in the interaction of productivity shocks with financial
market frictions such as credit restrictions and transaction costs of assets.20
Another thread on sudden stops features crisis models based on multiple
equilibria, which are solvable analytically. In these models, the occurrence of
sudden stops stems from domestic vulnerabilities interacting with exogenous
shocks, such as terms of trade shocks or an increase in country risk.21
Dynamic, Stochastic, General Equilibrium Models
The first large thread of sudden stop literature consists of DSGE models where
the sudden stop occurs as an equilibrium outcome if financial constraints bind
and Fisher’s debt-deflation mechanism is triggered as a result.22
If the economy is highly leveraged, i.e., the ratio of debt and/or working
capital to asset values is sufficiently high, an adverse shock, i.e., a negative
productivity shock, of standard magnitude, with financial constraints being
binding, may lead agents to liquidate capital to fulfill margin calls.23 The
20See, for example, Mendoza and Smith (2006). Mendoza (2006a) delivers a survey on
this literature.
21The most important papers in this literature are Calvo (1998a), Calvo (2003), Calvo,
Izquierdo, and Mejia (2004), Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2006), and Caballero and Krish-
namurthy (2001). While the first four papers are all based on balance sheets consideration,
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) model a liquidity crisis from the perspective of private
investors within an economy subject to domestic and foreign collateral constraints. The role
of collateral constraints in the sudden models is reviewed for DSGE models. Hence, the
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) paper is not reviewed further here.
22DSGE models are a further development of small open economy business cycle models
where the most prominent examples are Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2005), Christiano,
Gust, and Roldos (2004), and Neymeyer and Perri (2004). In these models, collateral
constraints are also at the core of financial crises. The DSGE literature is the more recent
one, deserving concentration here.
23For example, in Mendoza and Smith (2006) these constraints limit external debt to
a fraction of the market value of domestic equity holdings. In Mendoza (2006b) a first
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sudden high supply of assets reduces the price of capital, thereby tightening
the constraint. This state sets off a spiraling collapse of investment and as-
set prices, which has strong real effects: The current account and domestic
absorption immediately reverse. Future levels of capital, output, and factor
demands fall due to the initial investment decline. In addition, the collapse
of the value of collateral assets can render a collateral constraint on working
capital binding, thereby inducing a decline in production and factor demands.
These types of models suggest policies aimed at preventing deflation as a
good option. For example, Durdu and Mendoza (2006) study price guarantees
on the emerging asset class that stop the debt-deflation process by introduc-
ing a moral hazard-like distortion affecting foreign traders. They find that
welfare-improving guarantees require complex state-contingent features. The
indexation of debt to GDP or to commodity prices and hard currency adoption
have also been suggested as remedies against sudden stops. Another recom-
mendation, stemming from debt-deflation models, is the build-up of foreign
reserves to minimize the long-run probability of sudden stops of capital flows.
However, as pointed out, for example, by Caballero and Panageas (2006), this
prevention strategy is a very expensive insurance against sudden stops.
One major drawback of these types of models is that they do not deliver
close form solutions. They can only be solved numerically and, therefore,
do not provide strong results. Additionally, introducing private information
about the fundamentals into these models is difficult. Thus, an analysis of
the effect of uncertainty about the fundamentals in such a setup would be
highly complicated, without the strong likelihood of producing more convincing
results. Therefore, this research builds on the second thread of the literature,
models based on multiple equilibria.
Models Based on Multiple Equilibria
The second large thread of literature consists of models where the occurrence of
a sudden stop is based on multiple equilibria. A crisis materializes in the event
of a discontinuous switch between equilibria. The mechanism through which
the sudden stop occurs in these models is the following: Before the crisis, the
economy displays a current account deficit. A growth collapse induced by an
collateral constraint limits debt not to exceed a fraction of the liquidation value of collateral
assets; a second collateral constraint limits working capital financing to not exceed a fraction
of the firms’ assets.
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exogenous shock displays sudden stop features:24 The current account deficit
discontinuously switches to zero because, in the non-monetary version of these
models, the current account deficit equals the amount of capital inflows. As
nontradable goods are normal goods, demand for them declines as net wealth
declines due to the growth collapse. This implies that less tradable inputs are
used for the production of nontradables. This, in turn, increases the marginal
productivity of tradables such that their price increases relative to the price of
nontradables, i.e., the sudden stop will be accompanied by a real depreciation.
In the monetary version of these models, in which the current account deficit
equals capital inflows minus the accumulation of international reserves assets,
the slowdown of capital inflows associated with current account deficit could be
cushioned by a drop in reserves. If the latter is high enough, this is considered
a balance of payment crisis. However, in reality the reserves often do not suffice
to buffer the shock. This implies that a currency crisis would ensue.
The literature on sudden stops identifies domestic vulnerabilities as well as
systemic capital market forces as core explanatory factors behind a crisis. The
key domestic variables are an unsustainable fiscal policy (i.e., fiscal policies
that depend on high taxes, which make after-tax revenues unattractive to in-
vestors), short term foreign debt, contingent debt (i.e., government guarantees
for private loans that only become apparent in bad states of nature), liability
dollarization, and a high leverage of the current account deficit (i.e., low out-
put of tradables relative to a high demand for them within the country, which
makes a country vulnerable to real exchange rate fluctuations). The relevant
market forces have been detected as TOT (terms of trade) shocks, fluctuations
in the world market interest rates, or loss of confidence in emerging market
economies as a whole. Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2005) and Calvo et al.
(2006) measure the loss in confidence in emerging market economies by a sig-
nificant increase in the aggregate EMBI (Emerging Market Bond Index by JP
Morgan) spread and call it substantial turmoil in global capital markets.
The policy implications from this type of model follow from the detected
vulnerabilities that economies or their governments can try to avoid. In partic-
ular, foreign-denominated short term debt is a variable that emerging market
governments can influence and should reduce.25 Governments may find them-
24In Calvo (2003) the exogenous shock, i.e., a TOT (terms of trade) shock, drives the
economy beyond a critical level of debt that is inconsistent with a high growth equilibrium.
25The discussion of foreign denomination of emerging market debt has been labeled orig-
inal sin. Various articles regarding this topic can be found in Eichengreen and Hausmann
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selves facing two major difficulties: first, the vulnerability against external
factors and, second, the difficulty in borrowing in their own currency. These
governments should consider the following two options: In the effort of mitigat-
ing crises effects or of hedging against the probability of crises, governments can
accumulate foreign reserves or they can use alternative financial instruments.
A recent discussion of reserves accumulation as policy tool in the context
of sudden stops has been subject to a series of papers. Caballero and Cowan
(2006) illustrate that self-insurance strategies such as reserves accumulation,
public de-leveraging and export promotion are inefficient external insurance
mechanisms. The authors suggest financial hedging instead. Caballero and
Panageas (2005) analyze reserves accumulation and hedging mechanisms to
mitigate the consequences of a sudden stop, whereas Caballero and Panageas
(2006) analyze the role of hedging in diminishing the probability of a crisis.
An older policy discussion emerging from these models deals with capital
controls and exchange rate management. Montiel and Reinhart (1999) discuss
advantages and disadvantages of capital inflow controls. However, the authors
find that the effects on the magnitude of flows are restricted. Calvo (2003)
discusses the incentive of a central bank to peg its exchange rate once a crisis
occurs to buffer a part of the current account adjustment. The central bank
might provoke a balance of payment crisis to be able to transfer reserves to
private agents of the economy.
Although these models generate numerous valuable insights, they are char-
acterized by a number of drawbacks and shortcomings. A first drawback of
this literature is that these models stop short of a framework to predict sudden
stops. Although these models discuss early warning indicators and determine
key vulnerabilities, they do not produce a theory that can attach a probability
of a crisis to these factors. This results from the models displaying multiple
equilibria without a theory-based selection procedure.
A second drawback concerns the lack of analysis of investor coordination.
The introduction of a representative agent eludes analysis. However, espe-
cially in the context of financial crises, what other investors in the market
do is paramount. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) have modeled bank runs as
a coordination game. This prominent and important analysis has generated
valuable insights into the occurrence of such crises and possible prevention.
(2005).
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The decision to invest or not to invest in a particular country is characterized
by strategic complementarity in the same way as the decision to keep or with-
draw bank deposits. Therefore, analyzing issues of coordination and its failure
in the context of sudden stops of capital flows is a promising research agenda.
A third drawback along the lines of the second criticism is that the current
literature on sudden stops lacks analysis of the effect of uncertainty about the
fundamentals. Based on the prominent analysis of Morris and Shin (1998) on
the occurrence of speculative attacks, Heinemann and Illing (2002) show that
speculative attacks become more probable with a higher dispersion of private
signals about the true value of the fundamentals, i.e., the dispersion of beliefs
of investors on the status of the economy. Again, the decision to invest within a
country is similar to the decision to attack a currency. An analysis of the effect
of uncertainty in the context of a sudden stop of capital flows thus appears
promising.
1.2.4 Empirical Analyses of Sudden Stops
In the context of sudden stops of capital flows, two threads of literature are
relevant: In one thread stands the literature on factors that drive capital flows
in and out of emerging economies; in the second thread stands the literature
that analyzes the drivers and consequences of pronounced crises events.
Empirical Analyses of Capital Flows
Lopez-Mejia (1999) provides a concise survey on the magnitude, regional des-
tination, reversibility, and composition of large capital flows in the 1990s. The
paper shows the heavy concentration of capital flows to China, Brazil, Mexico,
Thailand, and Indonesia in 1990-97 and the similarities of their reversibility
between the 70s and the 90s. The paper then surveys the findings of the lit-
erature on pull and push factors of capital flows into emerging markets from
developed countries and vice-versa.
The literature on pull and push factors is concerned with the relative im-
portance of domestic versus external factors in explaining capital inflows to
emerging economies. The underlying concern is that large surges in inflows
make countries more vulnerable to financial crises in the case that capital
flows are driven primarily by factors outside the emerging markets. One of the
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first papers of this literature is Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993). In this
paper, the authors examine empirical evidence for 10 Latin American coun-
tries, finding that, for the analyzed period, foreign factors, in particular the
US interest rate and GDP growth, account for 30 to 60 percent of the variance
in real exchange rates and reserves (two variables that directly reflect develop-
ments in the financial account) depending on the country. Chuhan, Claessen,
and Mamingi (1987) find a stronger effect of domestic variables. They include
Latin American and Asian countries into their analysis. They find that do-
mestic factors in their analysis such as country credit rating, secondary bond
prices, and price earning ratios in the domestic stock markets explain about
half of the bond and equity flows from the United States to a panel of six
Latin American countries. For Asia, they conclude that domestic factors ac-
count for about two thirds of bond and equity flows into the region. Building
on this, Fernandez-Arias (1996) decomposes the improvements in creditwor-
thiness found in Chuhan et al. (1987) into those stemming from a decline in
global interest rates and those arising from improvements in the domestic en-
vironment. He finds that the interest rate accounts for around 86 percent of
the increase in portfolio flows for the average emerging market during 1989-93.
In particular, the literature addresses the determinants of foreign direct
investment (FDI).26 The special interest in FDI originates from this quality:
FDI is the least volatile form of capital flows as compared to portfolio equity
investment, portfolio debt investment, other flows to the official sector, other
flows to banks, and other flows to the non-bank private sector.27 In particular,
Levchenko and Mauro (2006) find that FDI is more stable than other types of
flows during sudden stops of capital flows. Also of focus in this literature is the
question of whether internal or external factors are the main drivers of FDI.
On the one hand, Edwards (1991) shows that government size, political sta-
bility, and openness play an important role. On the other hand, Albuquerque,
Loayza, and Serven (2005), for example, analyze the dependence of FDI on
global factors or worldwide sources of risk. In a cross-country time series
data set covering 94 countries and 29 years, the authors show that developing
country exposure to global factors has dramatically increased. This analysis
26While the focus of this overview is on the literature on macro economic determinants of
FDI, another literature convincingly analyzes determinants of FDI from a finance perspec-
tive. See, for example, Schnitzer (2000).
27See Marin and Schnitzer (2006) for an insightful analysis on the question, when FDI is
counted as a capital flows at all.
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delivers strong support for the hypothesis that increased market integration
leads to increased worldwide sources of risk.
Literature on emerging country vulnerability has shifted focus. In the early
nineties the focus of the empirical literature on capital flows was on the surge of
capital inflows into emerging markets and the implied potential vulnerabilities.
Later, the focus shifted to the question why the capital flows from rich to poor
countries have such a low volume. This more recent literature analyzes which
theoretical explanations of the Lucas paradox28 are relevant. The theoretical
literature has determined differences in fundamentals such as government poli-
cies and institutions’ or international capital markets’ imperfections such as
sovereign risk and asymmetric information.
A prominent example of this literature is Kraay, Loayza, Serven, and Ven-
tura (2005). The authors first contribute to the theoretical literature by mod-
eling North-South capital flows, taking into account the interplay between
diminishing returns at the country level, production risk, and sovereign risk.
The authors then generate country portfolios and a world distribution of cap-
ital that resembles those portfolios actually observed in the data. In contrast
to Kraay et al. (2005), Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych (2005) focus
on the empirical analysis exclusively. With the help of cross-country regres-
sions for the period of 1971-1998, the authors show that institutional quality
is the most important causal variable in explaining the low amount of flows.
Additionally, they find that differences in human capital and asymmetric infor-
mation play a significant role. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) emphasize capital
market imperfections. They show that serial default among debtor countries is
a usual phenomenon. According to the authors, a key explanation for the low
volume of capital flows from rich to poor countries is the difficulty in borrowing
for countries with a history of defaults.
28Lucas (1990) compares the United States and India in 1988 finding that, if the neoclas-
sical model were true, the marginal product of capital in India should be about 58 times
that of the United States. In the face of such return differentials, all capital should flow
from the United States to India. However, such flows are not observed. Lucas questions
the validity of the assumptions that give rise to these differences in the marginal product of
capital and asks which assumptions should replace these.
1.2. THE OCCURRENCE OF FINANCIAL CRISES 17
Empirical Analyses of Discrete Crisis Events
Although, in principal, sudden stops of capital flows are simply large negative
variations of capital flows that occur in a short time period, the literature
on these pronounced crises events is distinct from the literature on capital
flows. Although observers see a large overlap of variables that explain con-
tinuous changes in capital flows with variables that explain sudden stops of
capital flows, observations also note additional forces at work that trigger the
discontinuous switch in case of a crisis.
A first branch of the empirical literature on sudden stop crises is descrip-
tive. Apart from dating the crisis events, this literature is concerned with
distinguishing sudden stops from other crises such as current account reversals
or currency crises. Calvo and Reinhart (2000) are among the first to give an
overview of sudden stop incidences. The authors present a selection of large
reversals in net private capital flows calculated as percent of GDP in the re-
spective countries. They further illustrate that many countries experiencing a
sudden stop of capital flows in the second half of the 90s witnessed large surges
in capital inflows in the first half of the decade. Furthermore, the authors as-
sess the severity of the crises by analyzing the coincidence of currency crisis,
banking crises, and financial account reversals for a sample of 20 countries
from 1970 to 1994. The authors conclude that the severity, specifically the
huge burden of bailing out the banks as well as the orders of magnitude of the
capital account reversals, has increased during the recent crises periods. While
the paper gives a good introduction into the topic, the criteria of selection of
the included capital flow reversals are not evident. This absence of selection
criteria renders the discussion of policy implications less convincing.
In a series of papers, Edwards (2004b), Edwards (2004a) and Edwards
(2005), the author systematically analyzes the occurrence of current account
reversals and sudden stops of capital flows. Using a panel data set for 157
countries, Edwards (2004a) finds that from 1970 to 2001 there is a 5.6 percent
chance of sudden stops; the chance of current account reversals is 11.8 percent.
The occurrence of the two crises events is highly correlated. Nevertheless,
many sudden stops have not been followed by current account reversals. This
indicates that, when facing a sudden stop, many countries effectively use their
international reserves to avoid an abrupt current account adjustment. At
the same time, a number of countries endure major current account reversals
without facing a sudden stop in inflows. Most of these countries were not
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subject to a large surge of inflows to begin with and had financed their large
deficits by drawing down international reserves.29
Due to the close relation between the two crisis phenomena, many explana-
tory variables of current account reversals are also relevant in understanding
the occurrence of sudden stops in capital flows. Analogously to the drivers of
capital flows, the drivers of current account reversals can be categorized into
domestic and external drivers. One of the most prominent empirical inves-
tigations on determinants of current account reversals is Milesi-Ferretti and
Razin (1998). The authors run a panel probit analysis covering 86 low and
middle income countries over a time span from 1974 to 1990. Milesi-Ferretti
and Razin (1998) find the following major determinants of current account re-
versals: domestic variables such as the past current account balance, openness
(share of exports and imports to GDP), and level of reserves, and external
variables such as terms of trade shocks, US real interest rates, and growth in
industrial countries. Using a larger data set, Edwards (2005) additionally finds
the external debt to GDP ratio, domestic credit creation, and debt services
crucial in explaining current account reversals.
In a series of papers Calvo et al. (2004), Calvo et al. (2006), and Calvo,
Izquierdo, and Loo-Kung (2006) analyze the key explanatory factors of sudden
stops of capital flows. The main focus of these papers is on the role of balance
sheet effects, i.e., the interaction of the leverage of the absorption of trad-
ables (i.e., vulnerability against real exchange rate fluctuations) and liability
dollarization, which directly follows from the theoretical considerations in the
theoretical models on sudden stops. All three papers use a sample of 32 devel-
oped and developing countries for the period from 1990 to 2001. Calvo et al.
(2004) and Calvo et al. (2006) use random effects panel probit estimations
controlling for time fixed effects.
Moreover, in addition to the significant effect of the interaction of the vul-
nerability against real exchange rate fluctuations with the liability dollariza-
tion, the authors find the two variables separately significant. Also important
is that negative terms of trade growth increases the likelihood of a sudden
stop significantly. The authors find that, controlling for dollarization, a fixed
exchange rate seems to increase the probability of a sudden stop. However,
this effect is not robust in all specifications. Other tested variables turn out
not to be significant.
29See Edwards (2004b).
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Policy Implications and Shortcomings of Empirical Literature
The policy implications of the empirical literature on capital flows and discrete
sudden stop events are that both domestic and external factors play important
roles. Strategies that lead to a stable macroeconomic environment appear to be
as relevant as policies that help to respond to external shocks, as for example
holding a sufficient amount of foreign reserves. One outcome of the empirical
literature is that balance sheet effects should be at the core of government
strategies to prevent crises, i.e., liability dollarization and vulnerability to real
exchange rate fluctuations should be a major concern. Policies regarding the
nominal exchange rate, i.e., questions of a floating versus a fixed exchange rate,
seem to play a much less important role. Capital inflow controls are analyzed
because of the observation that sudden stops are often preceded by periods
of surges of capital inflows. However, Montiel and Reinhart (1999) find that
these controls are only effective in altering the composition of capital flows,
not their magnitude.
Although the empirical literature on sudden stops provides various valu-
able insights, this same literature is also subject to a number of drawbacks.
The first drawback is the lack of analysis of the role of uncertainty about the
fundamentals.
A second drawback of a particular part of this empirical literature is the
following: Calvo et al. (2004), Calvo et al. (2006) and Calvo et al. (2006) use
panel probit estimations with random effects. The estimates will be biased
in the case that there are systematic differences between the countries that
contribute to the explanation of the occurrence of crises. Due to the limited
number of countries within the sample, justifying the use of random effects es-
timation is difficult. The use of pooled probit and logit estimations, controlling
for country and time fixed effects by introducing country and time dummies,
is a more appropriate estimation approach. A third drawback is the use of
yearly data, which leads, partly, to a small number of observations.
1.2.5 Contribution of this Study
This study contributes to both the theoretical and the empirical literature
on sudden stops. First, here follows a discussion of the contribution to the
theoretical literature, succeeded by a description of the contribution to the
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empirical literature.
The theoretical part of chapter 2 contributes to the sudden stop models
based on multiple equilibria. The first contribution consists of addressing the
topic of investor coordination. The model reformulates the setup in Calvo
(2003) as a coordination game, thereby addressing the second criticism of the
existing literature. When analyzing the problem from the angle of a coordina-
tion game, it becomes clear that, in an intermediate region of the fundamentals,
a crisis can be triggered by a coordination failure in the case that the true level
of the fundamentals is common knowledge, i.e., the crisis occurs merely be-
cause the investors cannot coordinate on the possible good equilibrium because
each investor fears that the other investors abstain from investing.
In a further step, the model in chapter 2 introduces private information
about the fundamentals. This step helps to confront the first and the third
criticism of the existing sudden stop models based on multiple equilibria. The
introduction of private information, i.e., the application of the global game
approach, leads to a unique threshold equilibrium.30 This, in turn, makes pos-
sible predicting the influence of the variables in the model on the probability
of a crisis. In this context, both internal and external factors can be examined:
the effect of internal factors such as productivity, represented by one model
parameter, and the effect of external variables such as the international inter-
est rate. Then, this work can show that within this model, an improvement
in the internal factors reduces the crisis probability, while an increase in the
international interest rate increases the crisis probability. The most interesting
result stems from the analysis of uncertainty about the fundamentals. If this
uncertainty increases, the probability of a crisis increases as well. This finding
about what can drive crisis probability has policy implications for informa-
tion dissemination strategies of governments. Governments should try to help
private investors in receiving precise private information on the state of the
economy.
Although the theory of global games has been prominently applied to var-
ious different crises phenomena, specific application of this approach is worth-
while for the problem of sudden stops. First, this modeling approach allows
predictions of crisis triggers. Second, it is not clear ex ante that the effect
of the uncertainty about the fundamentals on other crisis phenomena trans-
30The literature on global games and the analysis of uncertainty about the fundamentals
is reviewed in more detail in section 1.4.
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lates directly into its effect on sudden stops of capital flows. The strategic
complementarity in the current model arises through a different channel, in
particular a shared tax burden, than, for example, in models of speculative at-
tacks. There, the sum of the funds put to speculation must exceed reserves that
the central bank can use to defend its fixed exchange rate. From a modeling
perspective, the global game approach is also interesting because, as opposed
to most applications where the terms containing random variables enter the
optimization of the agents in the model additively, in this present study model,
the random variable terms enter as multiplicative, which leaves the solution
more challenging.
The empirical part of chapter 2 contributes to the empirical sudden stop
literature. The first contribution of this study is the provision of the missing
empirical analysis of the effect of uncertainty on sudden stop crises. Care has
been taken to ensure that this effect is distinct and present when alternative
explanative factors of sudden stops are controlled for. Thereby, this study
builds on the existing literature and the drivers of sudden stops that have
been identified.
Second, the study improves the existing empirical analyses by Calvo et al.
(2004) by dropping the assumption of random effects. Instead, this study
introduces dummy variables to control for country and time fixed effects in
probit and logit regressions. A rigorous robustness analysis validates the results
found in the benchmark setting.
Finally, this study extends the existing literature by constructing a rich
monthly data set. This allows for two improvements of the existing literature.
Firstly, the small sample size objection is addressed. Secondly, monthly data
allows for a better consideration of the problem of endogeneity resulting of
potential causality running from the crisis to its potential triggers.
1.3 The Spread of Financial Crises
The literature on the spread of financial crises or ”contagion” is as extensive as
the one on financial crises.31 Therefore, this section places particular emphasis
on the literature that is relevant for chapter 3 of this study. In particular is the
31The terms ”spread of financial crises” and ”contagion” are used interchangeably through-
out the study.
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mention of those articles that build on the insight that common creditors are
at the core of transmitting crises across countries. In addition to providing an
overview of the relevant literature, this section puts this study in perspective
and defines its scope in the context of the literature.
The section is organized as follows: First, the phenomenon of contagion is
defined. Second, the two broad theoretical approaches to modeling contagion
are presented. Third, contagion channels and mechanisms are considered.
Finally, the contribution of this study is considered in light of the relevant
literature.
1.3.1 The Contagion Phenomenon
The term contagion has been defined in a number of different ways in the
literature. While a few researchers define contagion as an increase in the co-
movement of the financial indicators of different countries during crisis periods
that is unexplained by common shocks, other researchers define contagion
simply as co-movement during crisis periods that is unexplained by common
shocks.32 In this analysis, following Didier et al. (2006), contagion is defined
as the propagation of crises across countries beyond what would be implied by
common shocks. The crises analyzed in the chapter on contagion are significant
drops in stock market returns.
The spread of different crisis phenomena has been treated separately in the
literature. While in the beginning the focus was on the spread of currency
crises, research shifted toward questions about the spread of banking crises
and stock market crises. Prominent analyses of the contagion of currency
crises are Eichengreen et al. (1996), Glick and Rose (1999), Drazen (2000),
and Fratzscher (2003). The spread of banking crises has been analyzed by
Dasgupta (2004). The literature on the contagion of stock market crises is
extensive. Prominent examples are Goldstein and Pauzner (2004) or Broner
et al. (2006).
In line with, for example, Broner et al. (2006), chapter 3 of this study
focuses on the spread of stock market crises. Two main considerations explain
this scoping decision. First, the empirical disaggregate analysis of capital
flows, reported in the balance of payments statistics, shows that in particular
32See Rigobon (2003), Forbes and Rigobon (2001), and Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000)
for details.
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portfolio investments (i.e., cross border stock market investments) and other
investments (which comprise bank flows) are volatile during crisis periods.33
Therefore, questions about how stock market crises and banking crises spread
appear particularly relevant.
Second, especially with regard to an empirical analysis of contagion, the
spread of stock market crises appears more promising than an analysis of the
spread of banking crises. This is due to better data availability of stock market
data and therefore a more reliable identification of crises events.34
1.3.2 Modeling Approaches to Contagion
The theoretical literature on contagion can be distinguished into two main
threads from a methodological standpoint: A first thread of literature is based
on portfolio optimization while the second thread uses models of sequential
investment games.35 In the first thread of literature, the optimal allocation of
investments across countries is done according to considerations of the expected
portfolio return versus the accompanying risks, i.e., the variance of the portfolio
return.36
In the second thread of literature, the game-theoretical investment games
begin with describing a self-fulfilling crisis in the first country. The crisis oc-
curs due to the condition that expected returns of holding an investment until
maturity depend positively on the fraction of other agents doing the same,
whereas an early withdrawal generates a lower but certain payoff. If every-
one expects everyone else to withdraw early, the crisis fulfills itself. Private
information is introduced into this setting to be able to determine a unique
threshold equilibrium dividing the fundamentals into ranges where the attack
versus the non-attack equilibrium exist. In turn, the crisis in the first country
influences the behavior of agents in such way that a self-fulfilling crisis in the
second country becomes more probable. Goldstein and Pauzner (2004) show
that investors become more risk averse in country two, because they lose part
33See Levchenko and Mauro (2006).
34See Caprio and Klingebiel (2002) for a comprehensive overview of banking crises. Even
in this comprehensive and elaborate data set on banking crises, the authors refrain from
stating exact crises months.
35The portfolio optimization literature originates from Markowitz (1959). The investment
games literature is based on Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
36Prominent literature on portfolio optimization are, for example, Kodres and Pritsker
(2002), Calvo and Mendoza (2000), and Broner et al. (2006).
24 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE OVERVIEW
of their wealth in the first country.
Both approaches of modeling generate valuable insights into how contagion
functions and, hence, also into preventative policies . These policy implications
will be explained in the next subsection.
The present analysis builds upon sequential coordination games. This
choice stems from my interest in uncertainty about the fundamentals. The
sequence of investment games is an optimal setting to introduce private in-
formation about the fundamentals and to analyze the effect of dispersion of
private information on the vulnerability of a country to contagion.
1.3.3 Contagion Channels
The literature on contagion arrays a variety of explanations on how a crisis in
one country can spread to other countries. Following Hernandez and Valdes
(2001) and Dornbusch, Claessens, and Park (1999), this overview distinguishes
three different explanations: macroeconomic similarities, trade effects, and
financial linkages.
The first part of literature has identified macroeconomic similarities as
main source of contagion. In these models, contagion either occurs because
countries with bad fundamentals are subject to common negative shocks (e.g.,
a rise in US interest rates) or because investors treat all countries that ”look
alike” equally. This behavior of investors can be explained by incomplete infor-
mation. Hence, if a country is hit by a crisis, information spill-overs materialize
against countries in similar situations. The crisis in the first country serves as
a wake-up call according to this view.37
Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996) have analyzed the effect of macroeco-
nomic similarities empirically. They identify the characteristics of countries
performing worse after the Mexican crisis in 1994-95. They find that both
the initial real exchange rate overvaluation and excess bank credit creation
contribute largely to the after-crisis cross country performance. These results
suggest that contagion is driven by initial macroeconomic fundamentals. In
terms of policy implications, this means that the best way of avoiding conta-
gion is for a country to improve on its macroeconomic fundamentals.
The second part of the literature has identified trade linkages as main
37This idea has been put forward by Goldstein (1998).
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source of contagion. Direct trade linkages and trade competition have been
analyzed in this context. Trade competition leads to a transmission of crises
through a competitive devaluation: If a trading partner or competitor experi-
ences a strong devaluation, the government may also devalue in order to stay
competitive. Investors foreseeing this step cut demand for the second country’s
assets, thereby triggering a crisis, followed by a devaluation, and therein val-
idating their own expectations. This indirect channel is particularly relevant
in the spread of currency crises.38
Eichengreen et al. (1996) analyze contagion of currency crises in a group
of 20 OECD countries. They define contagion as an increase in the likelihood
of a crisis in a particular country, given a crisis in another country. They
conclude that trade linkages play a more relevant role in explaining contagion
than do macroeconomic similarities. In line with Sachs et al. (1996), Glick and
Rose (1999) try to explain cross-country performance after particular crises.
The authors find that trade linkages are more relevant than macroeconomic
characteristics. If the trade channel is the most relevant in transmitting crises,
the best policy for a country to avoid contagion is to diversify its trade across
trading partners and sectors.
The third part of literature has identified financial linkages as main
drivers of contagion. Apart from direct links through cross-country invest-
ments, the financial linkages occur due to common creditors. Because the
most recent empirical literature supports the view that common creditors are
the most relevant driver of contagion, a number of theories have been devel-
oped to explain the exact mechanism of the spread of crises through common
creditors. These mechanisms are explained in the next section.
The empirical literature supporting the importance of common creditors as
contagion channel started with Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000). The authors
follow a similar strategy as Eichengreen et al. (1996) but use a larger sample
of countries and a different crisis criterion. They analyze the effect of crises in
alternative clusters of countries on the likelihood of a crisis occurring in coun-
tries of that same cluster. They conclude that financial links are potentially
the more important transmission mechanism. However, the confinement is the
high correlation between trade and financial links which makes an ultimate
distinction difficult. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) incorporate a measure
of competition for bank funding between potentially-affected countries and the
38See Gerlach and Smets (1996) for a model of contagion through trade linkages.
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initial-crisis country as explanatory variable for the probability of a crisis in
a potentially-affected country. They find that competition for bank lending
is a more robust indicator for incidences of contagion than trade linkages and
countries’ macroeconomic characteristics. Caramazza, Ricci, and R. (2004)
analyze the contagion of currency crises in a panel probit analysis with 41
emerging economies. Controlling for the role of domestic and external funda-
mentals, trade spill-overs, and financial weaknesses, they find a strong effect
of financial linkages to the initial-crisis country. Financial linkages are defined
according to the same measure of competition for bank funding as in Van Ri-
jckeghem and Weder (2001). Hernandez and Valdes (2001) show empirically
the importance of financial linkages for contagion of stock market crises.
The policy implications from the common creditor channel largely depend
on the exact mechanism through which the crisis is spread. Therefore, I men-
tion them in the next section.
1.3.4 Contagion through Common Creditors
Based on the insight into the role of common investors, the theoretical liter-
ature suggests different transmission mechanisms. The most relevant are the
following five: transmission of crises through financial market practices, infor-
mation asymmetries, changes in risk aversion, wealth effects, and information
revelation.
The transmission mechanisms based on financial market practices ad-
dress optimization behavior of financial investors. A prominent example of this
thread of literature is Calvo and Mendoza (2000). The authors show contagion
as a result of the interaction between short-selling constraints, fixed costs of
information acquisition, and fund managers’ performance schemes. Contagion
is defined as a situation in which utility-maximizing investors choose not to pay
for information relevant for their portfolio decision or in which investors op-
timally choose to mimic arbitrary ”market” portfolios. The investors become
susceptible to country-specific rumors because of their lack of information. In
their model of mean-variance portfolio optimization, the portfolio manager’s
performance is measured relative to a market portfolio. Assuming further that
the marginal cost of yielding a below market return exceeds the marginal gain,
in the opposite case, it can become a rational decision to mimic the market
portfolio. If a rumor sets the return of a specific country to be lower than the
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market portfolio, then investors might simply follow the herd.
Disyatat and Gelos (2001) empirically validate the theoretical findings by
Calvo and Mendoza (2000). They show that the asset allocation of emerging
market funds can be well approximated by short-sell constraints and mean
variance optimization around benchmark indices.
The policy implication from these studies is the necessity to reassess the
utility from short-selling constraints in the presence of fixed costs of informa-
tion acquisition and the regulations regarding average returns for institutional
investors.
Another article addressing contagion through financial market practices is
Schinasi and Smith (2000). The authors focus on the rebalancing of portfolios
within a mean variance or a value at risk (VaR) framework. In the case that the
investment position of the portfolio is partly financed by debt, i.e., is leveraged,
the loss in one high-risk asset can lead to a withdrawal from other high-risk
assets. To reestablish the optimal portfolio weight after the loss in one high-
risk asset, market participants shift from the low-risk to the high-risk asset.
However, in the case of a leveraged position, the low-risk asset is a negative
position. Hence, less leverage also implies less investment into the high-risk
asset.
The transmission of stock market crises through information asymme-
tries has been prominently analyzed by Kodres and Pritsker (2002). In their
model, differently informed market participants transmit idiosyncratic shocks
across countries by optimally rebalancing their portfolios’ exposure to macroe-
conomic risks. Contagion is defined as a price movement in a market not
initially hit by the shock. The transmission of shocks is induced by rational
investors who are differently informed. Price movements in the second market
are exaggerated because order flows by the informed investors are misinter-
preted as information-based by the uninformed investors. In terms of pol-
icy implications, Kodres and Pritsker (2002) suggest removal of informational
asymmetries to diminish vulnerability to contagion.
The transmission of stock market crises through an increase in investors
risk aversion has been analyzed by Broner et al. (2006). In a mean-variance
optimization setup, the authors illustrate the effect of increased risk aversion
of investors who performed relatively badly due to overexposure to a crisis
country. In this setup, investors hold different portfolios due to heterogenous
beliefs about expected dividends. Investor utility is a function of their own
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wealth and their relative wealth to other investors, which depends on their
relative performance. If an investor is overly optimistic with respect to a
specific country and then under-performs there, his risk aversion increases and
he will rebalance his portfolio towards the average portfolio. To do this, he
withdraws from all other countries in which he was formerly overexposed. This
leads to the crisis being transmitted between countries that share overexposed
investors. The model is convincing and in line with empirical observations.
However, the increase in the risk aversion is not explicitly modeled.
In the empirical part of the paper, the authors examine the effect of gains
and losses on investor behavior in terms of portfolio choices. The authors fo-
cus on the Thai (1997), the Russian (1998), and the Brazilian (1999) crises.
They show that under-performing funds do adjust portfolios in direction of
the average portfolio. The presence of overexposed investors, measured by
a time-varying index of financial interdependence, helps explain stock mar-
ket co-movements across emerging markets above and beyond trade linkages.
Also important is a negative correlation between countries’ stock market per-
formance during crises and the degree to which these countries shared overex-
posed funds with the original crisis country.
The analysis by Broner et al. (2006) generates an interesting policy im-
plication. Apart from the sound analysis of the fundamentals of an economy,
the authors suggest close monitoring of the micro-composition of investment
positions across investment funds to detect dangers early.
A number of papers have analyzed the transmission of crises through a
wealth effect. Prominent examples are Goldstein and Pauzner (2004), Kyle
and Xiong (2001), and Yuan (2004). Goldstein and Pauzner (2004) model a
sequence of self-fulfilling roll-over crises (in the sense of Diamond and Dybvig
(1983)) in two countries that have independent fundamentals but are linked
through common investors. The transmission functions as follows: First, a self-
fulfilling roll-over crisis happens in the initial-crisis country. In this crisis, some
investors loose wealth. Investors’ utility function displays decreasing absolute
risk aversion, which implies that investors became more risk-averse after the
loss of wealth. Withdrawing early in any country is the safe action, whereas
holding the investment until maturity is risky. In the latter case, the return
depends on the fundamentals and the action of agents. As a result, agents
in the second country will coordinate on maintaining their investments over a
smaller range of fundamentals. Hence, a crisis there becomes more likely, i.e.,
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there is contagion. This generates a positive correlation between the returns
on investments in the two countries, reducing the benefits of diversification.
Goldstein and Pauzner (2004) deliver ambiguous policy implications. De-
pending on the welfare implications of portfolio diversification, on the one
extreme, introducing capital controls can help the situation (when partial di-
versification generates a higher welfare than full diversification). On the other
extreme, subsidizing diversification is the better move (when partial diversi-
fication generates a lower welfare than full diversification). A shortcoming of
this approach is that determining which of the scenarios is closer to the real
world is not possible.
One example of the transmission of currency crises through the revelation
of information in the initial crisis is the model by Taketa (2004). The author
models crises of speculative attacks a la Morris and Shin (1998) in two countries
having independent fundamentals but being linked through common investors.
In the model, two types of investors are characterized by different costs of
attacking the currency. The investor type is private information. If a crisis
reveals other investors’ types, this case will lead each investor to update his
beliefs and thereby change his optimal behavior, which can lead to a crisis in
another unrelated country. Namely, if the fundamentals in the country of the
original crisis country were good, the occurrence reveals the presence of many
investors with low costs of attacking. Hence, the crisis makes investors revise
their beliefs, leading them to attack the second country already in better state
of fundamentals than without the crisis in the first country. This implies that
crises can be the more contagious the better the fundamentals of the crisis
country are.
Although this literature has generated a good understanding of the mech-
anisms through which financial crises spread and many plausible and helpful
policy implications, analysis of uncertainty about the fundamentals is missing.
Additionally, in terms of the empirical analysis, the main channels have been
tested, i.e., whether it is macroeconomic similarities, trade linkages, or finan-
cial linkages that are at the core of contagion. However, only few studies take
on a specific mechanism.
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1.3.5 Contribution of this Study
The contribution of this study to contagion literature is the illustration of an
additional mechanism through which financial crises spread in a simple model.
The idea that the dispersion of private signals in potentially-affected countries
increases after a surprise crisis in an initial-crisis country and decreases after
an anticipated crisis has not been modeled so far.
The focus of chapter 3 is on the empirical analysis. The present analysis
contributes to the empirical contagion literature by examining one additional
mechanism through which a stock market crisis can spread.
Additionally, the construction of a rich, monthly data set, spanning from
beginning of 1993 until the end of 2005, allows for improvement on the existing
literature. Firstly, the long time span and cross-sectional dimension allows for
covering the crises in Thailand (1997), Russia (1998), Brazil (1999), Turkey
(2001), and Argentina (2001). Most of the above mentioned papers work with
a collection of only three of these crises. Secondly, this study controls for a
large range of alternative contagion channels adapting the existing measures
of linkages to the specific needs in the context of the spread of stock market
crises.39
1.4 The Effect of uncertainty about the fun-
damentals
The effect of uncertainty about the fundamentals in the context of financial
crises is interesting from two perspectives. From one vantage, observers can
study how far uncertainty is a factor in explaining the occurrence of a crisis
within a country. From another vantage, observers can examine which role un-
certainty about the fundamentals plays in the transmission of financial crises
across countries. A first brief section explains the concept of uncertainty used
in this study while the two subsequent sections mirror these two perspectives.
The first subsection clarifies the concept of uncertainty, while the second sub-
section reviews the literature on the effect of uncertainty on the occurrence
of financial crises. Finally, the third subsection reviews the literature on the
39For example, Broner et al. (2006) among others use the exact same measures of com-
mon creditors to control for this channel as other authors use for currency crises, thereby
underestimating the real effect of those alternative channels.
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effect of uncertainty on the spread of crises. This entire section is brief, be-
cause many of the relevant papers have already been reviewed in the sections
on financial crises and on the spread of crises and, therefore, are not repeated
here.
1.4.1 The Concept of Uncertainty
The term uncertainty in the present study refers to the uncertainty about
the fundamentals, which is relevant in the literature of global games. Global
games are coordination games, in which the fundamentals and the information
that agents in the model receive about the fundamentals are random variables
with specific distributions. Following, for example, Morris and Shin (1998),
Heinemann and Illing (2002), or Prati and Sbracia (2002), this study defines
uncertainty about the fundamentals as the dispersion of private signals around
the true value of the fundamentals. In models using global game theory, a cru-
cial assumption is that the true value of the fundamentals is not observable by
agents and that, therefore, its realization is not part of the common knowledge
of the game. Instead, each agent in the game receives a private signal about
this true value of the fundamentals. The dispersion or the noise of the private
signals around the true value of the fundamentals is called uncertainty about
the fundamentals. An increase in the dispersion of private signals is equal to
a decrease in the precision of private signals. In this study, uncertainty about
the fundamentals is interpreted as the dispersion of the agents’ private opin-
ions or agents’ disagreement about the state of the economic fundamentals. In
chapter 2, these economic fundamentals refer to the level of government debt,
while in chapter 3 to the investment environment.
Achieving clarity in this study requires distinguishing the concept of uncer-
tainty about the fundamentals from related concepts. As stated in Heinemann
and Illing (2002), in general, economists identify two kinds of uncertainty: un-
certainty about the fundamentals of the economy and strategic uncertainty.
Strategic uncertainty refers to uncertainty about the behavior of other agents.
While these concepts are closely related, the present study focuses on the un-
certainty about the fundamentals.
A concept closely linked to uncertainty about the fundamentals is trans-
parency. Transparency refers to the precision and timeliness of information
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disclosure by public authorities.40 In most analyses transparency is modeled
such that, in all states, increased transparency reduces the dispersion of private
signals around the true value of the fundamentals.41
A number of papers assume that, in addition to private signals about the
fundamentals, public signals exist.42 Public signals are not equal to informa-
tion disseminated by public authorities but are signals observed by all agents
in the model in exactly the same way (they are therefore common knowledge).
Public signals represent the true value of the fundamentals plus a noise term.
In this study, public signals are abstracted from, following the argument that
private interpretation of available information ultimately determines the ac-
tions of investors.
Moreover, readers should distinguish uncertainty about the fundamentals
referred to in this study from volatility over time, which is partly subsumed
under the notion of uncertainty.43
1.4.2 Uncertainty, Crises and their Spread
Carlsson and van Damme (1993) developed the theory of global games by first
introducing private, noisy information into the setup of a coordination game
on investment. This type of model is a natural framework for studying the
role of uncertainty in the occurrence of financial crises because global game
models allow consideration of the effect of changes in the precision of private
and public information on the likelihood of a crisis. Morris and Shin (2003)
provide a concise summary of the global games approach.
This approach has been applied to various setups of crisis models. The
particular appeal here is the following: Applying the global games approach to
models characterized by a multiplicity of equilibria under complete information
serves as an equilibrium selection mechanism; under certain assumptions, the
approach allows removal of the indeterminacy of equilibria completely.
40See Morris and Shin (2004) for this definition.
41See, for example, Cukiermann and Meltzer (1986) or Heinemann and Illing (2002).
42See, for example, Metz (2002).
43See, for example, Mondria (2006b) for a paper closely linked to this study but, among
other differences, uses this different notion of uncertainty. Additionally, much of the finance
literature, for example, uses macroeconomic uncertainty as a synonym for macroeconomic
volatility, a time series based concept. In this context, only recently has the value of survey
data been discovered. See, for example, Giordani and Soederlind (2003) or Arnold and Vrugt
(2006).
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Additionally, models using the global games approach combine features of
first and second generation models. The equilibrium outcomes result from of
the interaction of levels of the fundamentals and the behavior of agents. Agent-
behavior, in turn, is a function of the expectations of the agents regarding the
fundamentals and the actions of all other agents. In this sense, these models of
crises are both belief- and fundamental-driven at the same time. They belong
to the third generation of crises models. This study benefits especially from
the global games approach, allowing the study of the likelihood of a crisis as
a function of the precision of private signals. Recall that the purpose of this
study is the evaluation of the effect of uncertainty on the occurrence and the
spread of financial crises from a theoretical and an empirical angle.
Theoretical Analyses of Uncertainty
The literature of crisis models applying the global games approach to a setup
where initially multiple equilibria exist is large. This literature starts with
Morris and Shin (1998) who model the occurrence of a currency crisis induced
by a speculative attack. They assume uniformly distributed fundamentals and
uniformly distributed private signals. Finding a unique threshold equilibrium
in terms of the fundamentals, the authors can conduct a comparative static
analysis with respect to the parameters in the model. They show that for
small enough noise of private signals, an increase in transaction costs renders
a currency crisis less probable. Additionally, they show that a higher aggre-
gate wealth of investors, or simply a higher number of investors, increases the
probability of a crisis. However, the authors stop short of analyzing the effect
of uncertainty, despite providing interesting policy implications with regard to
the imposition of transaction costs and capital controls.
Heinemann and Illing (2002) provide a good analysis of the uncertainty
effect in the Morris and Shin (1998) setup. The authors find that a higher pre-
cision of the private signals around the true value of the fundamentals reduces
the likelihood of a speculative attack. In their model, higher transparency
leads to a higher precision of private signals. Hence, the policy implication
of their paper is that governments should provide the best possible private
information but avoid common knowledge in the effort to reduce the risk of
currency crises.
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Morris and Shin (2004) apply the global games approach to a model similar
to the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) bank-run model. Assuming normally dis-
tributed fundamentals and private signals, they find that greater precision of
information does not always mitigate the coordination problem.44 Extending
the model used by Morris and Shin (2004), Metz (2002) analyzes the effect of
changes in the noisiness of private and public information on the occurrence
of a currency crisis. She finds that an increase in dispersion of private sig-
nals increases the probability of a currency crisis if the fundamentals of the
economy are sufficiently bad. In this range of fundamentals, an increase of the
dispersion of public information would generate the opposite effect because
then public information serves investors less as a coordination device. The
additional policy implication from this paper is that policy makers must con-
sider that information disseminated to all agents not only affects the outcome
through content but also by functioning as a coordination device.
Papers on the spread of crises, using either the global games approach or
being important for this study because they are linked to uncertainty, have al-
ready been reviewed in section 1.3.1. These are Goldstein and Pauzner (2004),
Taketa (2004), and Mondria (2006a). Global games papers exist on the spread
of banking crises, as for example Dasgupta (2004). However, discussion of
these papers is left to studies dealing with the spread of banking crises.
Empirical Analyses of Uncertainty
Only a few empirical papers explore the effect of uncertainty on the occur-
rence of crises. The existing studies examine the effect of uncertainty on the
occurrence of currency crises. Prati and Sbracia (2002) analyze the effect of
uncertainty on the occurrence of speculative currency crises in the presence of
public and private information about the fundamentals. Bannier (2006) inter-
prets the Mexican crisis as a currency crisis, analyzing the effect of uncertainty
in this context. Both these analyses are based on the theoretical model in Metz
(2002) and assume the presence of public and private information.
Prati and Sbracia (2002) use dispersion of GDP growth forecasts as a mea-
sure combining the effects of public and private signal precision. In their
analysis of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) for six Asian countries with
44In this informational setup, the variance of private signals has to be small enough relative
to the variance of the fundamentals in order to be able to find a unique equilibrium.
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a monthly data set from 1995 to 2001, they find that dispersion of GDP
growth forecasts has a significant and independent effect from the level of
mean GDP expectations on the exchange rate pressure index. They find a
higher dispersion of GDP growth forecasts increasing exchange rate pressures
when expected GDP growth is above an estimated country-specific threshold,
and forecasts reducing exchange rate pressure when expected GDP growth is
below the threshold.
Some doubts about generality, however, remain about these studies. Ques-
tions on Prati and Sbracia (2002) cluster around the small sample of countries,
application of time series estimations to testing a static global game model,
and finally, estimation of the threshold level to distinguish good from bad fun-
damentals within the main estimation equation. Using the same estimation
method Bannier (2006) is subject to the same criticism.
Tillmann (2004) analyzes the effect of uncertainty on the occurrence of
currency crises in a Markov-switching framework for the French franc and the
Italian lira in 1992. In a framework assuming private information only, he
finds that an increase in the dispersion of private signals renders a speculative
attack more likely. The measure of uncertainty in his analysis consists of
country fund discounts. This is the difference between the price of closed-
end country funds and their underlying net asset value. The results support
the theoretical predictions of Heinemann and Illing (2002), thus enforcing the
policy implications of that paper. One drawback of this analysis is, however,
again, that time series techniques are applied to test a static model.
Based on a model of portfolio optimization, Gelos and Wei (2005) analyze
the effect of different measures of transparency on portfolio holdings. The au-
thors conduct a convincing analysis of the country weights of 137 investment
funds over a time period from January 1996 until December 2000. They show
that both government and corporate transparency have separate and distinct
positive effects on investment flows from international funds into a particular
country. Additionally, they show that during the Thai and the Russian crises
capital flight is greater in the less transparent countries. Hence, as a policy
implication the authors suggest that becoming more transparent is an effec-
tive strategy for countries to benefit from international integration, thereby
avoiding increased volatility.
While including public information in the setup of a global game appears
interesting from a theoretical perspective, keeping track of the empirical rele-
36 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE OVERVIEW
vance renders this concept much less attractive.
Firstly, conveying the meaning of public information is difficult, in partic-
ular if admitting the existence of private information. How does information
emerge that is understood in exactly the same way by all agents of the model
(i.e., information that is common knowledge)? In particular, in the context
of information provided by public authorities, how achievable is a situation in
which all agents understand an announcement in exactly the same way?
Secondly, from a practical view point, available data does not allow for a
reliable distinction between private and public information.
And thirdly, apart from Prati and Sbracia (2002) and Bannier (2006), first
empirical analyses on the effect of uncertainty in the context of financial crises
appear to tend towards a clear-cut effect. This finding seems to contradict
the predictions of a global games setting with public and private information,
where direction of the effect also depend on the level of the fundamentals.
Summing up, these criticisms appear to favor an analysis abstracting from
public information as is done in this study.
To my best knowledge, chapter 3 of this study is the first analysis to test
the effect of uncertainty about the fundamentals on the spread of financial
crises.
1.4.3 Contribution of this Study
The theoretical model in chapter 2 of this study is the first analysis that ap-
plies the global games approach to the question of sudden stops of capital flows.
Much of the literature on global games focuses on currency crisis models a la
Morris and Shin (1998) or on bank-run models of the Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) type. From a theoretical viewpoint, the fact that the strategic comple-
mentarity enters into the model through the shared tax burden is interesting.
Additionally, the multiplicative payoff function is interesting.
The empirical part of chapter 2 contributes to the empirical literature on
the effect of uncertainty on the occurrence of crises by analyzing the effect
of a different type of crisis. The analysis in this study is more rigorous than
the existing literature due to a larger data set. This large data set makes
the exploitation of the cross-sectional dimension of the data possible, which is
more consistent with a static model than the time series analyses mostly done
1.4. THE EFFECT OF UNCERTAINTY 37
in the literature.
While the idea of an uncertainty channel of contagion is new, the model
in chapter 3 rather serves illustrative purposes. The focus is on the empirical
part. Again, here, chapter 3 of this study explores a new effect of uncer-
tainty. Especially, this study accomplishes a rigorous empirical analysis of the
existence and the relevance of the effect of uncertainty on the spread of crises.
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Chapter 2
Uncertainty About the
Fundamentals and the
Occurrence of Sudden Stops of
Capital Flows: Theory and
Empirics
2.1 Introduction
Most major financial crises involve a sudden stop of capital inflows.1 Examples
are the Latin American debt crises during the 1980s, the crisis experienced in
South East Asia in 1997, and the Russian crisis in 1998.
Recall the example of the Tequila crisis hitting Mexico at the end of 1994
and the beginning of 1995. During this crisis net private capital flows fell by
almost 4 percent relative to GDP in 1994 and a drop of more than 5 percent in
1995.2 The sudden stop was followed by further financial turmoil and severe
consequences in the real economy.
This chapter contributes to the discussion about causes and prevention of
sudden stops in two ways. The first contribution is a model that explains how
1For a list of headline financial crises, see Table 2.12 in Appendix 2.10. These financial
crisis incidents were so severe that they were in the newspaper headlines around the world
and are remembered by most for the associated financial turmoil.
2These percentages correspond to a drop in capital flows of 15.5 billion current US dollars
in 1994 and further 15.2 billion in 1995 in absolute values.
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private investors’ uncertainty about the fundamentals increases the probability
of a sudden stop. Uncertainty is interpreted as the disagreement between
the private investors about the quality of the fundamentals.3 The second
contribution of this chapter is to test the predictions of the theoretical model
empirically.
The current theoretical and empirical literature on sudden stops ignores the
effect of uncertainty about the fundamentals, leaving room for a contribution.
It is surprising that the uncertainty about the fundamentals has not been
analyzed in the context of sudden stops of capital flows. In most models,
investors are assumed to take their investment decisions in a forward-looking
manner. They are assumed to base their decisions on expectations about
future returns, which in turn depend on other investor behavior and the future
fundamentals in an economy.4
Whether uncertainty about the fundamentals has an effect on the occur-
rence of sudden stops of capital flows has important policy implications: If,
for example, an increase in uncertainty about the fundamentals increases the
probability of a sudden stop of capital flows, then an economy will be more vul-
nerable in times when uncertainty is higher. Hence, policy makers should take
this fact into consideration. Additionally, to the extent that public authorities
can influence the degree of investors’ uncertainty about the fundamentals, pol-
icymakers should adjust their policies on information dissemination to reduce
uncertainty.
The basic model is an extension of a model by Calvo (2003). As a first
extension, I introduce infinitely many investors of mass one. Then, I set up
a coordination game. In this basic model, investors maximize the value of
their firm, which is the net present value of their after-tax returns net of
investments. The government mechanically sets the tax rate that is necessary
to cover the exogenously given amount of debt. However, the tax lowers the
after-tax productivity of capital, which is the crucial variable in the investment
decision of the investors.
For sufficiently low levels of debt, the government sets output taxes so low
3This interpretation is in line with the global games literature, reviewed in section 1.4.
4In the present model, sudden stops of capital flows are assumed to be unexpected to
private investors. In this sense, investors are still not forward looking. Nevertheless, it can
be shown that the results of the analysis also hold for an expected sudden stop, see Calvo
(2003).
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that investing is attractive. In this model, the level of investment directly
determines the economic growth of the economy. Hence, a high level of invest-
ment induces high growth. On the other extreme, if the debt is high, only low
growth can be observed due to the negative impact of the high taxes.
However, for intermediate levels of the government debt, the optimal action
of a firm depends on the actions of the other firms. If a firm expects all other
firms to invest, it is optimal for this firm to invest as well. This is due to
the debt burden being shared by a large number of other firms. Hence the
government can choose a low tax rate and the after-tax returns of the investing
firms are high. Otherwise, if a firm expects that few other firms will invest,
it is optimal for this firm to abstain from investing. Otherwise the firm will
have to pay high taxes because the debt burden is shared by few investors.
The strategic complementarity between investments that results from the tax
burden being shared among investors explains a multiplicity of equilibria in
the intermediate debt region. High (low) growth induces low (high) output
taxes, which in turn generates high (low) economic growth.
A sudden stop occurs if growth discontinuously switches from high to low
growth. With the help of the methodology of global games, it is possible
to show that there is a threshold level of the government debt, below which
everyone invests and above which no one does. Specifically, the assumption of
private information on the level of debt allows for finding the unique threshold
level. This assumption means that the true value of the government debt is
no longer common knowledge but that every investor receives a private signal
on the level of debt.5
This results in a new equilibrium condition, which permits the determi-
nation of a unique threshold in terms of the debt level: At the threshold
signal, each investor is indifferent between investing and not investing. This is
because at this level of debt the expected payoff of investing, given that each
other investor invests weighted with the conditional probability that each other
investor receives a better signal and hence invests, equals the expected loss of
an investment in the case that each other investor does not invest weighted
with the conditional probability of this event. The probabilities are conditional
on the private signal that the investor receives about the value of the debt.
5It is a plausible assumption that investors interpret published information about the
state of the fundamentals differently. In the current model, it is assumed that government
debt and private signals are uniformly distributed.
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Due to the monotonicity of the payoff function in the private signal, clearly,
each investor invests if he receives a smaller signal than the threshold signal
and does not invest above. Hence, above the threshold, the economy drops to
the low growth equilibrium due to a lack of investment, although the state of
the fundamentals would still support the high growth equilibrium. The reason
for the switch is a coordination failure between private investors.
Analyzing the threshold equilibrium yields a set of interesting comparative
static results. In the present setup, the change in the value of the threshold
translates into a change in the probability of a sudden stop crisis. The first
result is that the probability of a sudden stop increases with the dispersion of
the private signals on fiscal burden. The second result is that the crisis proba-
bility decreases with the parameter of technological progress. This parameter
can also be understood as an indication of how safe an investment is. The
third result is that the probability of sudden stops increases with the inter-
national interest rate. Finally, the fourth result is that technological progress
and international interest rate influence the scope of government policies.
The policy implications of these findings on sudden stop conditions are
that governments should take uncertainty about the fundamentals into account
because the uncertainty condition has real effects. Two kinds of advice can
be given to governments based on this study. First, governments should help
private investors obtain precise private information on the fundamentals. A
government could achieve this by allowing unrestricted access to government
data for independent institutions. These institutions could then sell the data to
other market participants. One could argue that it would not make a difference
if the government itself sold this information. However, a government could
have incentives to understate the true value of the debt and then ask for higher
taxes ex post. This credibility problem could be alleviated with the help of an
independent institution. As a second policy advice, the results of the study
suggest that governments should care for investment safety in their country
and foster technological progress.
How relevant are the described effects in reality? Do the model and policy
prescriptions apply to real sudden stop cases? Answering these questions re-
quires empirical verification of technological progress, the international interest
rate, and most importantly, uncertainty about the fundamentals influencing
the probability of a sudden stop.
Three hypotheses can be derived from the theoretical model. They build
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the basis for the empirical analysis. The first hypothesis is that sudden stops
are less likely if internal factors of an emerging market country become more fa-
vorable, e.g., if the government adopts technology-enhancing policies or takes
measures to ensure investment safety. The second hypothesis is that more
sudden stops occur if the international interest rate increases. The third hy-
pothesis is that a sudden stop is more likely to occur with more uncertainty
on a government’s fiscal policy (less precise private information).
Take the third hypothesis. In the empirical analysis, I focus on the effect
of uncertainty on the probability of a sudden stop. The dependent variable
in the regressions is a dummy variable that takes a value of one in a sudden
stop period and of zero otherwise. In line with Calvo et al. (2004), Cavallo
and Frankel (2004), and Eichengreen, Gupta, and Mody (2006), I identify
sudden stops of capital flows by considering both the first and the second
moments of a measure of capital flows. Provided that in a particular period
the capital flows drop as low as two standard deviations below the sample
mean, a sudden stop crisis period starts when the flows drop lower than one
standard deviation below the sample mean. For symmetry, the crisis period
stops when the flows exceed this limit again. The most important explanatory
variable in the analysis is a measure of uncertainty about the fundamentals: the
variance of investor’ expectations about the fundamentals. The base data are
expectations about GDP growth of the current and following year. These data
are collected by Consensus Economics and the IFO Institute for Economic
Research. I select these growth forecasts because they are available for a
sufficiently large sample of countries.
As a benchmark regression, I use a pooled probit estimation controlling
for country and time fixed effects. The data set contains 31 developing and
developed countries. The sample size is dictated by data availability. The
analyzed period extends from 1990 to 2001, including yearly and monthly
data.
The search for determinants of a sudden stop quickly leads to a problem
of potentially omitted variables and endogeneity. To tackle these difficulties,
I run various robustness checks. Specifically, to address the first problem of
omitted variables, I include a large variety of control variables. To address
the endogeneity problem, I estimate the model with an increasing order of
lags of the explanatory variables. Additionally, I employ two-step estimation
where I instrument the uncertainty in the current period with its own lag.
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Furthermore, I check the robustness of my results by conducting the analysis
for the full sample and an emerging market sample by making use of a yearly
and a monthly data set and by using various different estimation methods.
The positive effect of the uncertainty on the occurrence of a sudden stop is
robust across these tests.
Calculating the marginal effects of a one unit increase in uncertainty sug-
gests that an increase of the uncertainty by one standard deviation increases
the crisis probability by up to nine percent.6 These results, indeed, suggest
that the uncertainty about the fundamentals has a non-negligible effect on the
probability of a sudden stop in reality and should thus be incorporated in the
considerations on economic policies.
This study is connected to the following threads of economic literature.
Calvo et al. (2004) analyze drivers of sudden stops, finding that the vulner-
ability to real exchange rate fluctuations and domestic liability dollarization
increase the probability of a crisis. Edwards (2005) focuses on capital mobility
and disputes its link to increased crisis probability. Furthermore, the question
whether internal or external (global) factors drive capital flows into and out
of emerging markets has been extensively studied. Calvo et al. (1993), Calvo,
Leiderman, and Reinhart (1996), Fernandez-Arias (1996), and Montiel and
Reinhart (1999) examine internal factors such as, for example, the price of
debt on the secondary market, country credit ratings, and the domestic rate
of inflation versus external ones such as the interest rates and the economic
activity in highly developed countries. These analyses attribute a higher im-
portance to external factors. In the more recent literature with a focus on
FDI (foreign direct investment), Albuquerque et al. (2005) find that the most
important driver of capital flows is a synthetic global factor, which they inter-
pret as a globalization measure. Broner and Rigobon (2005) detect regional
patterns in capital flows and emphasize the role of contagion in determining
capital movements to a country.
However, the literature ignores the effect of uncertainty about the funda-
mentals on the occurrence of sudden stops. The issue has been addressed so
far only in the context of currency crises. Prati and Sbracia (2002) analyze
the effect of uncertainty on the occurrence of a currency crisis. With their
seemingly unrelated time series regressions (SUR) for six Asian economies,
they show that higher dispersion of GDP growth forecasts (their proxy for the
6See Table 2.8 in section 2.7.2.
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fundamentals) tends to have an additional independent effect apart from the
effect exercised by the lagged level of the fundamentals.
The analysis by Prati and Sbracia (2002) suffers from two shortcomings.
The first shortcoming is its application to a small sample of countries all af-
fected by the East Asian financial crisis in 1997-98. Second, given that Prati
and Sbracia (2002) model a static global game, an analysis emphasizing the
cross sectional variation between countries seems more appropriate than the
time series analysis conducted. To overcome these shortcomings in the present
analysis, I work with a much larger set of countries, emphasizing the cross-
sectional variation between countries by estimating pooled probit regressions
controlling for time effects.
2.2 Theoretical Background
This section presents a coordination game model on the occurrence of sudden
stops. The model is based on the framework presented in Calvo (1998b) and
Calvo (2003). I extend the original Calvo setup by introducing a continuum
of infinitely many identical firms of mass one. In a first step, I set up a
coordination game with common knowledge. In a second step, in section 2.4 I
extend the setup further by introducing private signals on the fundamentals.
2.2.1 The Firms
Following Calvo (1998b) and Calvo (2003), each of the infinitely many firms
produces tradable output with a linear homogeneous production function, in
which tradable capital is the only production factor. Capital is fully interna-
tionally mobile ex ante but immobile after investment.
The firms maximize their value by choosing between constant growth paths.
The value of a firm is defined as the sum of discounted future cash flows until
infinity. Due to the linear production function, the rate of investment or capital
accumulation equals the rate of output growth. In their optimization, firms
consider the technology parameter, the tax rate, and the international interest
rate as given. Thereby, the following representation of the value of a firm i
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can be found.7
V i =
α(1− τ)− zi
(r − zi) (2.1)
V i represents the firm value, α is the productivity factor, τ is the constant
output tax rate, zi is the investment rate that the firm can choose. r represents
the constant international interest rate. Optimizing the value of the firm with
respect to the rate of investment or capital accumulation leads to:
∂V i
∂zi
=
α(1− τ)− r
(r − zi)2
The model delivers corner solutions. If the after-tax return on capital,
α(1 − τ) exceeds the international interest rate r, it is optimal for a firm to
invest as much as possible and thus grow as fast as possible. If the return on
capital is lower than the interest rate, the firm does not accumulate capital at
all. Such a firm would even borrow as much capital as possible and invest it
abroad. For the model to deliver a sensible outcome, the parameter zi must
be restrained to finite ’corners’. Following Calvo (2003), the value of zi is
restricted to an interval [0, z] with z < r, in which the lower bound ensures that
capital cannot be unbolted. The upper bound stands for reasonable outcomes
with respect to the valuation of the firms. In particular, as zi signifies the
constant growth path of the firm, by bounding it, I rule out the possibility
that the firm can outgrow the world market in the infinite horizon.
A firm would never invest if this investment had a negative effect on the
value of the firm. Hence, it suffices to consider the sign of the derivative of V i
with respect to zi. If the sign is positive, the agent invests as much as possible
(restricted to z < r in this model); if negative, investment equals zero.
sgn
∂V i
∂zi
= sgn[α(1− τ)− r] (2.2)
7For a detailed derivation, please see Appendix 2.10. The firms expect the tax rate
to be constant, because a sudden stop is unexpected to them. In the light of possible
growth collapses and ensuing sudden stops, a different tax policy τt might be optimal for
the government. Therefore, firms would expect the tax rate to change once a crisis occurs.
Calvo (2003) shows that growth collapse and sudden stops also occur in the case when they
are foreseen by the firm. Therefore, I do not consider the case of an anticipated crisis here.
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2.2.2 The Government
The government inherits a stock of debt D, which must be financed by an
output tax. The tax rate is set so that the future discounted tax revenues
cover the amount of debt. This is possible, assuming full capital market access
by the government.
D = ατ
∫ ∞
0
Kecont e
−rtdt =
ατ
r − zecon (2.3)
with
zecon =
∫ 1
0
K˙ idi∫ 1
0
K idi
=
K˙econ
Kecon
The superscript econ indicates that a variable refers to the economy and not
to an individual i.
2.2.3 The Reduced Form Game Between Firms
The mechanical way in which the government sets the tax rate introduces
strategic complementarity between the firms into the model. The profit of
investment for an individual company positively depends on the rate of invest-
ment of all other firms. This can be shown by solving Equation (2.3) for τ and
plugging it into Equation (2.2):
sgn
∂V i
∂zi
= sgn[α−D(r − zecon)− r] (2.4)
The return on investment is a positive function of zecon. This results from
the burden of debt repayment being carried by more firms. Through the tax-
setting mechanism, the investment decision of each firm depends negatively on
the state of the fundamentals.
The main mechanism underlying the interaction of firms is therefore: If
growth is high, the government sets a low tax rate, which in turn sustains
high growth. Similarly, if growth is low, the government sets a high tax rate,
holding firms off investing, which in turn further induces low growth.
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2.3 The Common Knowledge Game
First, it is assumed that all the firms and the government know the true values
of the relevant variables. Recalling that firms either do not invest or invest z,
a strategy pii is defined as pii : [D˘, Dˆ]→ [0, 1], in which D˘ is the lower and Dˆ
is the upper bound of the support of the debt level. This means that firm i
invests in state D with probability pii(D). Because of the mass of agents being
1, the fraction of agents that invest at a particular state of fundamentals can
be expressed as pi−i(D) =
∫ 1
0
pij(D)dj for j 6= i. This makes it possible to
express the investment rate of the economy as the product of upper limit of
investment and the fraction of agents that invest in the economy.
zecon(D) = zpi−i(D) (2.5)
2.3.1 High Growth and Low Growth Equilibrium
Equation (2.4) can be used to illustrate the parameter range for which the
low growth and the high growth equilibrium exist. On the one hand, the low
growth equilibrium can exist if a firm does not have an incentive to deviate
from its strategy not to invest, given that all the other firms do not invest.
This is the case if Equation (2.4) displays a negative value in the case that
zecon = z ∗ 0 = 0. Solving for the debt level yields that the low growth
equilibrium exists in the case that the debt is higher than a threshold:
D > D =
α− r
r
(2.6)
On the other hand, the high growth equilibrium exists if a firm does not
have an incentive to deviate from the strategy to invest, given that the other
firms do also invest. In terms of Equation (2.4), this means that the high
growth equilibrium exists if the signum of the equation is positive for zecon =
z ∗ 1 = z. Thereby one finds that the high growth equilibrium exists below a
threshold:
D < D =
α− r
r − z (2.7)
2.3.2 The Tripartite Classification of Fundamentals
The level of debt can be classified into three ranges. By definition 0 < z < r
and α > r. Therefore, clearly, from the two equations in section 2.3.1 follows
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that D is greater than D. Between the two threshold values, D and D, the
two equilibria coexist. Above D, only the low growth equilibrium exists, and
below D, only the high growth equilibrium exists.
If D is smaller than D, there exists a dominance region of investment. Con-
sequently, the economy will be in high growth equilibrium. If D lies between D
and D, it is not clear if firms can coordinate on the high growth equilibrium or
if a coordination failure occurs and the economy is captured in the low growth
equilibrium. If D exceeds D, there is a dominance region of no investment and
the economy displays low growth with certainty.8 The tripartite classification
of fundamentals is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
D
Dominance Region
of bad fundamentals
Dominance Region of 
good fundamentals
DD
Area of possible 
coordination failure
D*
z
Only high-growth
equilibrium exists
Only low-growth 
equilibrium exists
Multiple equilibria
Figure 2.1: Model Setup
Figure 2.1 shows the existence of the high growth and the low growth
equilibrium as a function of the government debt level. In case of common
knowledge of the true value of government debt, the model displays indetermi-
nacy between the high growth and the low growth equilibrium for those debt
levels, where both equilibria coexist.
8The threshold cases, in which D = D and D = D, are not of interest and will therefore
not be discussed.
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2.4 The Private Information Game
Introducing private, slightly noisy information on the state of the fundamentals
makes eliminating the range of multiplicity betweenD andD possible. Instead,
there is a threshold value of the debt level, below which all agents coordinate
on the high growth equilibrium and above which no agent invests. The dotted
line in Figure 2.1 represents the equilibrium that is realized in the private
information game.
This section explains, first, the informational structure of the model with
private information, second, the optimization of the firms, and third, the proof
of uniqueness of the threshold equilibrium. The next section, then, shows how
the threshold equilibrium is influenced by changes in the technology parameter,
by changes in the international interest rate, and by changes in the precision
of the private signal.
2.4.1 Informational Structure
The agents cannot observe the true debt value but receive noisy signals Di on
the state of the debt. The true debt level is uniformly distributed over the
interval [D˘, Dˆ]. The signals are privately observable and uniformly distributed
in an ² surrounding of the true debt value Di ∼ U [D − ²,D + ²]. The agents
know the distribution and the support of D and of the private signals. All
agents know that all other agents also receive private signals.
The fact that the signal on the state of the debt is private reflects that
agents interpret officially announced values of the government debt differently.
In addition, debt levels are often revised ex post by public authorities. This
enforces the importance of the interpretation of information and justifies the
signals on debt being private.
Deriving a unique equilibrium requires care that the signal is informative
about the true level of debt. Otherwise, the agents would not have any idea
about the true value of debt and about the possible signals that the other
agents receive, given their own signal. As shown in Heinemann and Illing
(2002), the distributional assumptions in the current setup ensure that this
requirement is fulfilled.
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2.4.2 Object of Optimization
The firms cannot observe the true value of D in the private information setup
but only have an expectation about it, given the private signal that they
receive.
Because a firm’s expectations ofD and of zecon depend on the private signal,
the firm has an expectation about the tax rate that the government will set,
given its private signal:
E(τ |Di) = E
(
D(r − zecon)
α
|Di
)
(2.8)
Therefore, the expectation of the value of the firm depending on the level
of investment can be expressed as:
E(V |Di) = E
(
α−D(r − zecon)− zi
r − zi |D
i
)
(2.9)
The optimizing behavior in the private information game is analogous to the
behavior under common knowledge. Agents maximize the expected difference
in payoffs resulting from alternative strategies: investing versus non-investing.9
However, the expectations of an agent are now conditional on the signal that
he receives. Each agent weighs the expected payoff of investing: for the case
that each other agent invests and for the case that no one else invests, with the
conditional probability given his private signal that the other agents choose
the respective strategies, i.e., investing versus not investing.
Assuming private information, a firm’s strategy is a function of the pri-
vate signal instead of being a function of the true value of the fundamentals:
pii(Di) : [D˘, Dˆ] → [0, 1]. As shown before, the extreme strategies of maxi-
mum investment versus not investing at all dominate all intermediate strate-
gies. Therefore, when calculating the payoff difference, comparing the expected
payoffs of these two strategies suffices.
The investment rate of the economy can be expressed as the product of
the maximum investment z times the fraction of other firms investing, which
depends on their respective signals Dj:
zecon = zpi−i(Dj) = z
∫ 1
0
pij(Dj)dj (2.10)
9In the following, this will simply be referred to as payoff difference. As in Doenges and
Heinemann (2001), in the present model also, the payoff of the alternative action depends
on the state of the fundamentals and is not fixed to a constant value.
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The expected payoff difference P˜ , given the private signal Di, is then
P˜ (Di) = E
(α−D(r − zpi−i(Dj))− z
r − z −
α−D(r − zpi−i(Dj))− 0
r − 0 |D
i
)
In the case of unbiased signals around the true value, the expectation of the
true value of a variable, given the private signal that individual firm i receives,
is the signal itself: E(D|Di) = Di. Therefore, the above expression can be
simplified to:
P˜ (Di) = z
α− r − rDi + zE(Dpi−i(Dj)|Di)
(r − z)r (2.11)
2.4.3 Unique Equilibrium
This section shows the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium. The
analysis proceeds in several steps. First, it is assumed that all agents follow
a simple switching strategy. Second, the starting points for the iterative elim-
ination of dominated strategies are determined. In this process, dominated
strategies are excluded from the set of possible strategies until the unique
threshold equilibrium is found. Third, the monotonicity of the expected pay-
off difference in the private signal is proved. Steps one through three enable
the fourth step, the iterative elimination of dominated strategies beginning at
borders of the dominance regions. Finally, in the fifth step, it is shown that
there is only one unique value of the level of debt for which the payoff differ-
ence given the private signal equals zero. This level of debt is the threshold
value below which all agents invest and above which, no one does.
In the first step it is assumed that each firm follows a simple switching IT .
This means that a firm invests with probability one, if and only if, the signal
it receives is below a threshold T and abstains from investing with probability
one, if the signal is above the threshold: 10
IT =
{
1 if Di < T
0 if Di ≥ T
11 (2.12)
10By continuity arguments, it is possible to show that such a simple switching strategy is
optimal. So generality is not lost when imposing it in the first place.
11In terms of the payoff, the behavior of the firms in a single event is irrelevant. Therefore,
it is also irrelevant whether firms invest at Di = T or not.
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At this point, assuming a simple switching strategy, the fraction of other
agents investing can be expressed as the probability that one agent receives a
smaller signal than the threshold signal.
Lemma 2.1 Under the assumption that, in the game with infinitely many
agents of mass one, all follow the same switching strategy IT , the fraction of
agents investing, pi−i(Dj), can be replaced by the probability that one agent
receives a signal smaller than the threshold signal T , prob(Dj < T |D), in
Equation (2.11).
Proof. See Appendix 2.10.
Given Lemma 2.1, the payoff difference can be expressed in the following
way:12
P˜ (Di, IT ) = z
α− r − rDi + zE(Dprob(Dj < T |D)|Di)
(r − z)r (2.13)
The second step is determining the starting points of the elimination of
dominated strategies.
Lemma 2.2 The starting points for the iterative elimination of dominated
strategies are D and D.
Proof. See Appendix 2.10.
The third step shows proof of the monotonicity of the payoff difference
needed as one further ingredient to apply the iterative elimination of dominated
strategies.
Lemma 2.3 P˜ (Di, IT ) is strictly monotonically decreasing in the private sig-
nal Di.
Proof. See Appendix 2.10.
Given Lemma 2.2 and Lemma 2.3, the lowest possible threshold for a
switching strategy of all the firms is D. Similarly, the highest possible thresh-
old is D. For all Di < D, the payoff difference is positive, irrespective of the
12This probability (and the fraction of firms investing) depends on the realization of D.
Hence, given private information, firm i’s expectation of the probability is a function of the
realization of the private signal Di.
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actions of all other firms. As the rationality of the agents is common knowl-
edge, not to invest is a dominated strategy for signals below D. And, at the
other extreme, for all signals Di > D the payoff difference is negative.
Due to the strategic complementarity between investments, the worst sce-
nario that a firm has to consider is the case where IT = ID. This means that
for all values of debt in the range of multiplicity, firms choose not to invest,
although the levels of debt would in case of coordination on the high growth
equilibrium also allow for this. The best scenario would be a switching strategy
of IT = ID.
Steps one through three provide all ingredients to begin the fourth step,
which iteratively eliminates all dominated strategies. This process works as
follows: If a firm i receives a signal that is very close to the border of the
dominance region, the probability that other firms receive signals within the
dominance region and thus have a dominant strategy is very high. Due to the
strict monotonicity, this suffices to induce firm i to have a dominant strategy
as well. This is true for all firms. Therefore, the range between the signal
of firm i and the former border of the dominance region can be added to
the dominance region. The iterative elimination starts at both borders of the
multiplicity range. Starting at the low [high] end of the multiplicity range,
the iterative process continues until finding the maximum [minimum] signal,
at which firm i is indifferent between investing and not investing and which is
at the same time the threshold of the switching strategy of all other firms.13
Milgrom and Roberts (1990) have shown that in all games with strategic
complementarity, the set of strategies that resist the iterative elimination of
dominated strategies is limited by Nash equilibria. Nash equilibria are not
eliminated through this process. Thus ID? and ID? are the most extreme Nash
equilibria of the game. There is no Nash equilibrium below D? in which the
firms do not invest. On the other hand, there is also no Nash equilibrium
above D
?
in which the firms invest.
Given this argument and due to the strict monotonicity of the payoff from
Lemma 2.3, it suffices to show that equation
P˜ (Di = D?) = z
α− r − rD? + zE(Dprob(Dj < D?)|Di = D?)
(r − z)r = 0 (2.14)
13For a more formal consideration of the iterative elimination, please refer to Appendix
2.10.
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has a unique solution. This can be expressed in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2.4 There exists only one value, for which the expected payoff dif-
ference equals 0 given that firm i receives exactly the threshold signal D? as
private signal and given that all other firms have a switching strategy where
the switching signal equals exactly D?.
Proof. See Appendix 2.10.
The unique solution is
D? =
α− r − ²
6
z
(r − 1
2
z)
(2.15)
D? determined by Equation (2.15) is the unique threshold equilibrium of
the game with private information. This can be summarized in the following
proposition:
Proposition 2.1 There exists a unique threshold equilibrium D? of the game
with private information, such that each firm invests if and only if Di ≤ D?
and does not invest if Di > D?.
Applying the methodology of global games allows for elimination of the
multiplicity range. This, in turn, allows the prediction of the levels of fun-
damentals, at which a growth collapse occurs. In the Calvo setup, a growth
collapse automatically entails a sudden stop of capital flows. So the above
analysis not only lays bare how the economy will plunge into a growth collapse
but, at the same time, explains the onset of a sudden stop of capital flows. It is
of interest to know how the change of economic variables alters the threshold
and, thereby, the probability of a sudden stop.
2.5 Comparative Statics
This section analyzes how a change in the productivity of the country, a change
in the international interest rate, and a change in the noise in the information
on the debt influence the value of the threshold equilibrium at which the growth
collapse and, therefore, the sudden stop take place.
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2.5.1 Changes in the Technology Parameter α
First, consider the technology parameter, which in the model is equivalent to
the productivity of capital.
Proposition 2.2 If the technology parameter α increases, the threshold equi-
librium is shifted to a higher debt level, i.e., a growth collapse and, therefore,
a sudden stop occurs at higher debt levels only.
Proof. Differentiating Equation (2.15) with respect to α delivers:
∂D?
∂α
=
1
(r − 1
2
z)
> 0 (2.16)
The above expression must always be positive because z < r. This implies
that an increase in α shifts the threshold level to a higher debt level.
Considering the finite support of the distribution of the debt, Proposition
2.2 implies that the probability of a growth collapse decreases and with it the
probability of a sudden stop. In Figure 2.2 this is mirrored by D′? lying right
of D? with α′ being bigger than α.
Another interesting result emerges when looking at the change of the bor-
ders of the multiplicity range with a change in the technology parameter.
Proposition 2.3 If the technology parameter α increases, the range of debt
levels, for which the multiplicity of equilibria prevails, widens in the common
knowledge game.
Proof. The derivative of the lower bound of the multiplicity range, D, with
respect to α is smaller than the derivative of D.
0 <
∂D
∂α
=
1
r
<
∂D?
∂α
=
1
(r − 1
2
z)
<
∂D
∂α
=
1
r − z (2.17)
As illustrated in Figure 2.2, the range of multiplicity enlarges with bigger
α. BetweenD? and D lies the range, where the low growth equilibrium prevails
due to coordination failure, although in terms of the fundamentals, still, the
high growth equilibrium is possible. One interpretation of this range is to see
it as a measure of inefficiency of the economy. According to this interpretation,
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an increasing α implies an increase in the inefficiency of the economy. How-
ever, this view is incorrect. Simultaneous to the increase of the range between
D? and D, also, the range between D and D? increases by the same amount.
For these debt levels, investors coordinate to the high growth equilibrium al-
though, also, the low growth equilibrium exists. Therefore, a more convincing
interpretation of the range between D? and D is the following: It is a range
where the government can improve the situation by helping investors to co-
ordinate. This suggests that technological progress has two positive effects.
Firstly, it directly decreases the probability of a sudden stop and secondly it
accords a larger scope to government policy to enhance coordination.
Note further, that the effect of α decreases in r.14 This can be explained by
the fact that the scope of action for the government is reduced, when external
factors change in an unfavorable way. One example of such a change is an
increase in the international interest rate.
D DD*
~U
D, Di
~U (α)
D‘ D‘D*‘
~U
D, Di
~U (α‘)
with α‘>α
Figure 2.2: Changes in D? and the borders of the multiplicity area due to
changes in α
2.5.2 Changes in the International Interest Rate r
First, I show the direct effect of the international interest rate on the threshold
equilibrium. Next, I show the effect of the international interest rate on the
borders of the multiplicity range in the common knowledge game.
14To see this, differentiate the right hand side of Equation (2.16) with respect to r.
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Proposition 2.4 If the international interest rate r increases, the threshold
equilibrium is shifted to a lower level of debt, i.e., a growth collapse and thereby
a sudden stop occurs already at lower levels of debt.
Proof. A change in the international interest rate produces the following
effect:
∂D?
∂r
=
(3 + ²)z − 6α
6(r − 1
2
z)2
< 0 (2.18)
The denominator of the fraction in Equation (2.18) is always positive. The
numerator could, in principle, be positive or negative. However, given the
assumptions on α and ², it is always negative. Recall that α exceeds r, which
in turn exceeds z. ² is restricted to be a small positive number. In the limiting
case that α = z, ² has to be smaller than 3 for ∂D
?
∂r
to be negative. Given the
assumption on the possible size of ², this restriction is not binding. Hence,
the effect of a change of r on D? is negative. This means, if the international
interest rate increases, D? moves to lower levels of debt, i.e., a growth collapse
already happens at better states of the fundamentals.
In Figure 2.2, this translates into a shift of the threshold to the left if the
international interest rate increases. In terms of the real economy this implies
that, with higher international interest rates, a sudden stop becomes more
probable.
Proposition 2.5 If the international interest rate r increases, the range of
multiplicity of equilibria shrinks in the common knowledge game.
Proof. The derivative of the lower bound of the multiplicity range, D, with
respect to r is bigger than the derivative of D.
0 >
∂D
∂r
= − α
r2
>
∂D
∂r
= − α− z
(r − z)2 (2.19)
This inequality can be reformulated to:
2αr − αz − r2 > 0
which must hold because α > r > z > 0 by assumption, and hence, αr > r2
and αr > αz.
The comparative static analysis lays bare that the derivative of D with
respect to r is more negative than the one of D. This result implies that the
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range of multiplicity shrinks with increasing r. This implies that the scope of
government policies is diminished by an increase in the international interest
rate.
Again, this comparative static result reveals the opposing effects of α, a
parameter determined in the respective country, and r, a parameter, which is
independent of the situation in the particular country.
These opposing effects of α and r are fully in line with the empirical lit-
erature on pull and push factors with respect to capital flows.15 As a large
part of the relevant literature tries to explain the surge of capital inflows into
developing countries, pull refers to the factors that lie inside the economy
and attract capital inflows. Montiel and Reinhart (1999) define these capital
attracting factors as the ones operating through an improvement in the risk-
return characteristics of assets issued by the developing country debtors. Such
an improvement could result from productivity-enhancing economic reforms.16
So in the present setup, these would translate into policies that increase the
technology parameter α.
The most prominent of the push factors (which lie in the industrialized
countries) is the world interest rate.17 In their paper on inflows of capital to
developing countries in the 1990s, Calvo et al. (1996) mention that low interest
rates in developed countries attracted investors to the high investment yields
and improving economic prospects of economies in Asia and Latin America in
the beginning of the 1990s. For example, the short term interest rate in the
United States reached its lowest point since the early 1960s in 1992. Fernandez-
Arias (1996) contributes an interesting twist to the question of the influence of
external factors on capital flows to emerging markets. He shows the positive
effect of lower world interest rates on the creditworthiness of debtor countries
borrowing at these rates. This is a further channel through which low world
interest rates may induce capital to flow into emerging markets.
15See, for example, Calvo et al. (1993), Calvo et al. (1996), Diaz-Alejandro (1983),
Fernandez-Arias (1996), and Montiel and Reinhart (1999).
16In addition, Calvo et al. (1993) mention introduction of institutional reforms such as
liberalization of the domestic capital market, opening of the trade account, and policies that
result in credible increases in the rate of return on investment.
17As stated in Calvo et al. (1996), additional external factors include terms-of-trade de-
velopments, the international business cycle, and regulatory changes that affect the interna-
tional diversification of investment portfolios at the main financial centers.
60 CHAPTER 2. UNCERTAINTY AND OCCURRENCE OF CRISES
The relevant literature disputes whether external or internal factors are
more important in determining the direction and composition of these flows.
In the present model it is indeterminate whether the derivative of the threshold
with respect to α is smaller or bigger than the derivative with respect to r in
absolute values.18 So the model does not reveal, which factors, external or
internal, are more important. However, the present model can illustrate that
the scope of government policies dealing with possible coordination failures
changes as a function of external factors. If the international interest rate
increases, governments of developing countries lose scope, whereas they gain
scope if the interest rate falls. This study finds that the government can buy
scope for its policies by, for example, productivity enhancing reforms. But, at
the same time, governments lose scope if the productivity is decreased. This
means that the relative importance of internal versus external factors varies
over time. As governments lose scope when the international interest rate
increases, i.e., when the economic surrounding turns unfavorable, governments
are even in a worse position because their effort in preventing a crisis would
even have less effect.
2.5.3 Changes in the Degree of Uncertainty ²
Finally, the comparative static analysis with respect to the precision of private
information ² reveals interesting insights.
Proposition 2.6 If the degree of uncertainty about the fundamentals ² in-
creases, the threshold equilibrium is shifted to a lower level of debt, i.e., a
growth collapse and, thereby, a sudden stop occurs already at lower levels of
debt.
Proof. Proving 2.6 requires calculating the derivative of the thresholdD? with
respect to the variance of the private signal around the true value of debt.
∂D?
∂²
= − z
6(r − 1
2
z)
< 0 (2.20)
Recall that r > z. Hence, the derivative is always negative. This means that
D? decreases with increasing uncertainty.
18This depends on the relative magnitudes of α, z, and r.
2.6. TESTABLE HYPOTHESES 61
As argued before, this finding implies that the probability of a sudden stop
increases with an increase in uncertainty. Formulated differently, this means
that the more precise the information, the lower the probability of a bad equi-
librium. This result contrasts the findings of the ”game of refinancing.”19 In
terms of government policies, these results mean that governments should aim
for an information dissemination policy that entails small variation in the value
of private signals, i.e. that entails little uncertainty about the fundamentals.20
2.6 Testable Hypotheses
In this section, predictions of the theoretical model are translated into a set of
testable hypotheses. In particular, I formulate testable hypotheses regarding
the influence of technological progress, the international interest rate, and the
uncertainty about the fundamentals on the probability of a sudden stop.
Hypothesis 1 Sudden stops become less likely if internal factors of emerging
market countries become more favorable, e.g., if the investment safety increases
or if governments adopt technology enhancing policies (derived from Proposi-
tion 2.2).
Hypothesis 2 Sudden stops become more likely if the international interest
rate increases (see Proposition 2.18).
Hypothesis 3 Sudden stops become more probable with more uncertainty on
the fundamentals of the economy (see Proposition 2.6).
2.7 Empirical Analysis
The purpose of this section is to validate the predictions of the theoretical
model, and evaluate these three hypotheses. Particular attention will be paid
to showing the effect of uncertainty about the fundamentals on the occurrence
of sudden stops of capital flows.
19See Morris and Shin (2004).
20For an extensive analysis of transparency, see Heinemann and Illing (2002).
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2.7.1 The Data
I work with two data sets: a yearly data set of 14 emerging and 17 industri-
alized countries and a monthly data set of 11 emerging and 14 industrialized
countries. Both sets run from January 1990 to December 2001. I work with
these two data sets because the yearly data does not allow me to tackle the
potential problem of endogeneity in a convincing manner because there are
too few observations. However, the results of the analysis with yearly data
are displayed, because a part of the time series of control variables are only
available in yearly frequency. In the analysis with monthly data, those series
are interpolated.
The selection of countries reflects those emerging countries tracked by JP
Morgan’s Emerging Market Outlook, i.e., countries that significantly show in
the world capital markets. The developed countries in the sample are OECD
members. However, some of the countries that fulfill those criteria are dropped
due to lack of the relevant data.21
The dependent variable is an index of sudden stops of capital flows. Fol-
lowing Calvo et al. (2004), I employ a dummy variable based on monthly data
of capital flows. This high frequency of data is chosen because it best unveils
the origin of sudden stop crisis episodes. Due to the high frequency of data,
however, it is necessary to work with a proxy for the flows, netting out the
trade balance from changes in foreign reserves. Then, the change in the capital
flows with respect to the capital flows 12 months before is calculated to avoid
seasonal effects.
The first criterion that determines whether a month is counted as a crisis
month or not concerns capital flows: This criterion is fulfilled for an observa-
tion where the year-to-year decrease in capital flows lies at least two standard
deviations below its sample mean. To introduce persistence in this measure,
the criterion is also regarded as fulfilled if the flows decrease more than one
standard deviation below the sample mean in the months that encircle the
two standard deviation decrease. In addition to this first criterion, the second
criterion is that the output of the economy has to contract at the same time.
Thereby, only crisis episodes with costly disruptions in economic activity are
identified. For robustness checks, I make also use of a crisis dummy variable,
21For more details, see Table 2.1 in Appendix 2.10.
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for which only the capital flow criterion has to be fulfilled.22 In the analysis
with yearly data, a year is counted as a sudden stop year if it contains at least
one month that fulfils the above-mentioned criteria.
The explanatory variable most interesting for the present analysis is un-
certainty about the fundamentals. I use the standard deviation of growth
forecasts by a group of country experts as a measure of uncertainty. In the
models a la Morris and Shin (1998), uncertainty takes the form of the disper-
sion of the private signals around the true value of the fundamentals. In this
chapter of the study, this translates into the dispersion of the private signals
about the true value of government debt, i.e., the evaluation of the debt level
by each of the private investors. Direct observation of the private signals of all
investors is not possible. However, there is data that can be used as reliable
proxy.
Firstly, given the distributional assumptions that I made in the theoretical
model the expectation of the true value of the debt, given the private signal,
is exactly the private signal itself: E(D|Di) = Di. If the private signals are
dispersed with a standard deviation of ² around the true value of the debt, the
expectations will as well. Therefore, the standard deviation of the expectations
will give a good indication of the standard deviation of the signals of concern
in this chapter. Data are available that closely proxies the expectations by
private agents about the fundamentals.
Data on the standard deviation of expectations about the level of gov-
ernment debt are not available in a sufficient coverage. Therefore, the best
available option is to use the standard deviation of expectations about GDP
growth as a proxy. In doing this, I follow Prati and Sbracia (2002) who use
these data to test the effect of uncertainty on the occurrence of currency crises
22No consensus in the literature exists about the concept of capital flows or the criteria to
detect a sudden stop. While, for example, Calvo and Reinhart (2000) examine variations in
net private capital flows, Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998), and Hutchison and Noy (2006)
analyze changes in the current account. In addition, measures of the variation in capital
flows differ. In one part of the literature, negative differences are measured relative to
the country’s GDP and considered a sudden stop if they exceed a specific threshold (see,
for example, Calvo and Reinhart (2000) and Hutchison and Noy (2006)). However, newer
literature also takes into consideration the unexpected character of such an extreme event
and considers a drop in capital flows a crisis when it falls below a threshold in terms of the
standard deviations below the sample mean (see Calvo et al. (2004), Cavallo and Frankel
(2004), and Eichengreen et al. (2006)). I use the latter approach because it is consistent
with my theoretical model.
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in a similar model. In addition, because the model in this chapter of the study
also works if the uncertainty lies on the productivity parameter, this procedure
seems even more justified.
A second restriction is that no data exists on the private signals of all
investors. Data collecting firms only survey the opinions of a group of about 20
banks and other market analysts per country. However, assuming that private
agents can buy expert opinion, it is reasonable that they will buy different
numbers of those opinions and will weigh these signals differently. If the experts
strongly diverge in their expectations, private agents will most likely have
even more divergent evaluations of the fundamentals. Therefore, dispersion of
expert opinions, i.e., their standard deviation, seems a good indicator of the
dispersion of private agents’ expectations about the fundamentals.
I use data from two sources: the IFO Institute for Economic Research and
Consensus Economics. Both institutes collect GDP forecasts of a group of
experts within all the countries that they track at a particular point in time.
The IFO Institute and Consensus Economics then report mean and standard
deviation of these forecasts for the respective country. I use the standard de-
viations as the measure of uncertainty. When working with yearly data, I use
both data sets. While the IFO Institute asks experts within tracked countries
about their forecasts of GDP growth for the current year, once yearly in April
Consensus Economics collects forecasts of GDP growth, CPI inflation, gov-
ernment budget balance, current account balance trade balance, and exports
for the current and following year in monthly frequency. In the analysis with
yearly data I display two sets of estimations: In the first set of estimations, the
measure of uncertainty is a yearly average of the standard deviations of fore-
casts that Consensus Economics gathers. In the second set of estimations, I
combine the observations by Consensus and WES (World Economic Survey by
the IFO Institute). I do this by only taking the April forecast for the current
year by Consensus. If both observations are available, I use the WES data.23
To achieve a constant one-year forecast horizon for the data by Consensus
Economics, I follow Prati and Sbracia (2002) in computing a weighted average
of the current and the following year forecast. In January a weight of 11/12
is attributed to the current and of 1/12 to the following year forecast. In
23For robustness checks, I ran the same regressions two more times: first, using WES data
only and second, using a combination where in case of redundancy I took the Consensus
data. The results are qualitatively the same and quantitatively similar.
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February the weights equal 10/12 and 2/12 respectively. For every month in
the same logic, another set of weights is applicable until December, where the
respective weights are 0/12 and 12/12.24
I use a large set of control variables. Firstly, I control for the mean of the
growths forecasts. This appears to be the most important control because I
want to disentangle the effect of private investors having diverging opinions as
opposed to all investors being sure that growth will be low. Additionally, I
draw upon Calvo et al. (2004). They convincingly put forward the vulnerability
to large real exchange-rate fluctuations and the degree of domestic liability
dollarization as drivers of the occurrence of sudden stops. In addition, I use a
large set of macroeconomic controls. When I work with monthly data, I have
to interpolate several time series of the control variables that are only available
in yearly frequency. This technique does have a cost: an understating of the
variance of those series. Since I have monthly observations on the variables
that I am most interested in and most of the controls that I have to interpolate
represent economic variables that do not vary substantially in a year’s time,
it is very unlikely that this procedure influences the results. In addition, I
can show the presence of the effect of uncertainty on the occurrence of sudden
stops of capital flows with yearly data.
2.7.2 Benchmark Regression
As a benchmark regression I estimate a pooled probit controlling for country
and time effects. The theoretical model is static and predicts the probability
of a crisis at a particular point in time. Therefore, a probit approach to
estimating the effect of uncertainty on the occurrence of a crisis appears most
appropriate.
Prob(Suddenstop = 1|xitβ) = G(β0 + β1unci,t−1
+ β2mgexpi,t−1 + β3macrocntrlsi,t−1
+ δi + γt + εi,t) (2.21)
with i = 1, 2, ..., n; t = 1, 2, ..., T .
24As a robustness check I rerun all the estimations with the current year and with following
year forecasts separately. The results are qualitatively the same and quantitatively similar.
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Suddenstop equals one if country i experiences a sudden stop in period
t. xit represents the set of explanatory variables, including the measure of
uncertainty, explicitly named unc in the right hand side of Equation (2.21), the
mean of the growth expectations, named mgexp, and a set of macroeconomic
control variables, named macrocntrols. For a full list of the variables used
as control variables, please refer to Table 2.2 in Appendix 2.10. δi stands
for country fixed effects, γt stands for time fixed effects, and εi,t represents
the error term. β is the vector of the corresponding coefficients. G(.) is the
standard normal cumulative distribution function.
Country dummies are included into the analysis. The level of uncertainty
varies strongly across countries.25 While in some countries, for example, the
Netherlands or Italy, the average of the uncertainty measure, i.e., the standard
deviation between the growth forecasts of different experts (January 1990 - De-
cember 2001), is as low as 0.24 percentage points, in countries like Indonesia or
Turkey, the average of the uncertainty measure reaches levels of 1.022 and 1.15
respectively. These statistics suggest that, systematically, some countries are
characterized by higher uncertainty than other countries, therefore requiring
control for country fixed effects. In a probit estimation obtaining consistent
estimates requires controlling for time fixed effects by incorporating country
dummies in a pooled regression.
Additionally, I control for time fixed effects. Calvo et al. (2004), in line with
a large part of the literature, state that sudden stops in emerging economies
”bunch” around the Tequila (1994), East Asian (1997), and Russian (1998)
crises. In developed countries, sudden stops materialize mostly around the
ERM (Exchange Rate Mechanism) crisis in 1993. The graphs in Figure 2.3
in the Appendix, which depict the sudden stop periods against the measure
of uncertainty, also show this feature of the crises. Thus, controlling for time
fixed effects is necessary. Mostly I do this by including time dummies in
the regressions. However, where the data quality does not allow for this, I
use polynomial time trends to reduce the number of dummy variables and
approximate the variation over time.
25This is illustrated in Table 2.3 in the Appendix.
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2.7.3 Analysis with Yearly Data
I run a pooled probit regression with a sample of all countries with yearly data.
As seen in Table 2.4 in Appendix 2.10, the coefficient on the contemporaneous
uncertainty has a positive sign, irrespective of the measure of uncertainty cho-
sen here. Controlling for country and time effects, the result is significant.26
However, sudden stops are mainly an emerging market phenomenon.27 For
some of the countries that do not experience sudden stops of capital flows, the
country dummies are dropped from the regression, while the observations are
included. This makes the result look weaker. To circumvent this difficulty, the
analysis is repeated for emerging economies only. The results are reported in
Table 2.5 in Appendix 2.10. Again, the effect of the uncertainty on the sudden
stop crisis probability is positive and significant. However, if working with the
uncertainty measure based on the Consensus data in the case of the inclusion
of the quadratic time trend (column 3 in the left half of the table), none of
the explanatory variables is significant. This seems to be related to the small
number of 64 observations. This does not happen with the combined measure
of uncertainty, for which it is possible to obtain 97 observations.
In all regressions, I control for the mean of the expectations over all the
experts. Therewith, I ensure to disentangle the self-fulfilling effect of the ex-
pectations from the uncertainty about the fundamentals, i.e., the disagreement
on the state of the economy. In most of the regressions, the mean of the expec-
tations turns out to significantly impact the crisis probability: The lower the
mean of the expectations, the higher the crisis probability. The other control
variables, namely the domestic liability dollarization, the vulnerability to real
exchange rate fluctuations, the index of exchange rate flexibility, the reserves
over the current account deficit, M2 over reserves, credit growth, foreign di-
rect investment over GDP, public balance over GDP, total debt over GDP,
and TOT growths turn out to be insignificant in many of the regressions when
controlling for country fixed effects.28
This analysis with yearly data suggests that the empirical findings are in
26The results stay the same when including higher order time trend. However, if country
and year dummies are included, none of the explanatory variables are significant, which
indicates that including all these dummy variables is demanding too much from the data.
27See Figure 2.3 in the Appendix.
28I present the results with the most convincing specification in terms of the control
variables. However, I have run all the regressions with a larger set of controls and the
results are qualitatively the same and quantitatively similar.
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line with the theoretical model. However, due to data limitations, this analysis
does not permit tackling one obvious problem of the analysis: the direction of
causality. Here, the monthly data contributes to finding a remedy.
2.7.4 Analysis with Monthly Data
When repeating the analysis with monthly data, the one-month lag of the ex-
planatory variables is used as a first step to reduce the problem of endogeneity.
Additionally, one month is an appropriate time, on average, that investors can
act according to their expectations. The capital flow proxy comprises portfolio
investments, which are very liquid, and foreign direct investments, which are
less liquid. The regression, which includes the entire country sample, suffers
from the same difficulty of dropped country dummies as the counterpart with
yearly data. The results of these regressions are displayed in Table 2.6. Still,
the analysis shows that the sign of the effect of the uncertainty on the oc-
currence of crises is positive as expected. The pooled probit estimation with
monthly data and the emerging market sample reveals the most interesting
insights into the effect of uncertainty.
(Table 2.7 here)
The results of the analysis with monthly data and the emerging market
sample turn out as expected by theory.29 The lagged uncertainty influences
the crisis probability positively. The lagged expectations themselves have the
opposite impact. The fact that the vulnerability against real exchange rate
fluctuations and the domestic liability dollarization are insignificant may lie
in the interpolation of these series from yearly data. These are the variables
that Calvo et al. (2004) put forward as main drivers of sudden stops. However,
recall that in the analysis with yearly data30, the two variables do not appear
29The result with respect to the uncertainty holds also when applying monthly time dum-
mies into the analysis. However, most of the other variables prove insignificant, which may
reflect that some of them are interpolated from yearly data. Therefore, the specification
with time dummies is not displayed here and is not the most convincing specification.
30See Appendix 2.10, Tables 2.4 and 2.5.
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significant in a number of specifications. This finding casts a doubt on the
robustness of the results by Calvo et al. (2004), once country fixed effects are
controlled for. As argued before, a pooled probit analysis using country and
time dummies is a more convincing approach for the current question than the
assumption of random effects as used in Calvo et al. (2004).31
The effect of uncertainty on the occurrence of sudden stops is not negligible.
Assessing the relevance of the effect of uncertainty requires calculation of the
marginal effects for the regressions from Table 2.7. The effect ranges between
a 2.5 and 10.8 percent increase of the crisis probability, if uncertainty (i.e.,
the standard deviation of the growth forecasts) is increased by one percentage
point. The most convincing specifications are those with a quadratic or cubic
time trend. Therefore, it is safe to say that an effect of 2.5 to 5.6 percent is
most realistic. The variation stems from different specifications.
(Table 2.8 here)
2.7.5 Facing Endogeneity
To dispel the possibility that the results presented above stem from an endo-
geneity problem rather than displaying the effect of the uncertainty about the
fundamentals, I first apply higher order lags as explanatory variables. Second,
I implement instrumental variable estimation.
The analysis with lags of the potentially endogenous variables (namely the
uncertainty measure, the mean of the expectations, and the vulnerability to
real exchange rate fluctuations) reveals that the uncertainty up to four month
previous to the crisis period has a significant positive effect on the probability of
a crisis. Earlier uncertainty, however, does not matter for a crisis to occur. This
pattern does not materialize with respect to the mean of the expectations and
the vulnerability to real exchange rate fluctuations, which both stay significant
31The result of the uncertainty influencing the crisis probability positively also holds under
the assumption of random effects controlling for time effects.
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when applying these higher order lags. These results are illustrated in Table
2.9 in Appendix 2.10.
It is hard to confirm that a lag of four month is enough to deny possible
endogeneity. Nevertheless, four month prior to a crisis, it is mostly impossi-
ble to predict when and in which form the crisis will materialize. Therefore,
investors cannot be certain that a crisis is going to happen. Furthermore, it
is also not surprising that uncertainty does not have an effect for more than
four month into the future. If the disagreement between investors about future
outcomes at the point of the investment decision itself really matters, then one
month should be a good proxy for the reaction time. To summarize: these
results cannot exclude the possibility that the result is driven by endogeneity,
but these results render it much less likely.
The next step in the attempt to cope with the potential endogeneity is
to instrument the contemporaneous variable with its own lag. In the first
stage, the uncertainty measure is regressed on its own lag controlling for the
same set of controls as in the second stage regression. Based on the estimated
coefficients, the contemporaneous uncertainty is then predicted. In the second
stage, the predicted values are used along with the control variables.
The results in Table 2.10 in Appendix 2.10 suggest that uncertainty does
have an aggravating effect on the probability of a crisis. Here, I display the
results where I used the six-month lags of the potentially endogenous variables
as instruments. I did the same analysis with lower- and higher-order lags.
The results are similar for lower-order lags. For higher-order lags, however,
they break down: Under some specifications, the lags are not significant in the
first-stage regressions any more; and, under other specifications, the predicted
values do not significantly explain the occurrence of a crisis. Keeping in mind
the fast burst speed of many sudden stop events, it seems that a lag of six
months is a sufficient distance to exclude the causality from the crisis to the
uncertainty. In addition (and this also applies already to the argument when
explaining the results with the lagged explanatory variables), I control for
mean expectations and for time effects, which ensures against picking up the
reverse causality by the uncertainty variable. Hence, both the analysis with
lagged explanatory variables and the instrumental variable estimation further
support the validity of the theoretical findings.
One additional possibility to avoid the endogeneity problem would be to
look for past data revisions as an instrument for the uncertainty. However,
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there might be also a problem that revisions of data often happen in sight of
a crisis, e.g., to smooth outcomes.
2.7.6 Robustness Analysis
One additional set of estimations is reported in this analysis to check that
the results are not sensitive to the econometric method chosen. Table 2.11
in Appendix 2.10 reports the results of these estimations. Additionally, to
the pooled probit that was chosen as a benchmark case, I estimate a pooled
logit controlling for country and time effects, a conditional logit in a panel
setting with fixed effects, and a Chamberlain’s panel probit estimations. All
these approaches have in common that they control for country specific effects.
Applying the logit estimation implies employing the logistic function instead
of the normal cumulative distribution function as in the probit approach. The
conditional logit allows for a fixed effects estimation, which is not possible
in a probit setting. A fixed effects estimation in a probit setting leads to
inconsistent coefficient estimates because the country effects cannot cancel out
when they are within the cumulative distribution function. The problem is
reduced in the case of the logistic function. Using Chamberlain’s panel probit
approach allows for the unobserved heterogeneity to be correlated with the
mean of each of the explanatory variables, which is calculated by country and
included into the estimation as further control. Therefore, this mean functions
similarly to a country dummy.32
As Table 2.11 in Appendix 2.10 illustrates, the positive effect of uncer-
tainty on the occurrence of sudden stops is robust against different estimation
approaches; the negative effect of the expectations is robust as well.
All regressions are also run with the complete list of control variables.33
The results do not qualitatively and quantitatively change when including the
additional variables. The specification that I show here contains the most
important explanatory variables. The different results illustrate different spec-
ifications in terms of the control for time effects (including time trends of
differing order). This approach is the best available option because some of
the series of control variables are interpolated and, therefore, data quality does
not always allow inclusion of the 144 monthly time dummies in the regressions.
32See Wooldridge (2002), pp. 487f., for a detailed description.
33See Table 2.2 in Appendix 2.10.
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Furthermore, I run all the above regressions with an alternative measure of
sudden stops. Specifically, the analysis is repeated counting a month as sudden
stop month if the criterion regarding the drop in capital flows is fulfilled while
ignoring whether growth is positive or negative in the respective period. The
results from this analysis are quantitatively the same as the ones that I report
here.
The empirical findings conclude by noting the contemporaneous positive
and significant effect of uncertainty on the crisis probability shown in the
analysis with yearly data. However, recall the difficulty of resolving potential
endogeneity with this data set. One way out of the problem of potential
endogeneity is to switch to monthly data: I first apply higher-order lags as
explanatory variables. In a further step, I perform a two-stage estimation with
the lags of the potentially endogenous variables serving as instruments. This
works for lags up to six months. Additionally, I check for different estimation
approaches. In the analysis with monthly data, the positive and significant
effect of uncertainty persists. By calculating the marginal effects, one can also
show that the effect that I am showing is not negligible quantitatively.
Summarizing, the empirical results support the theoretical predictions of
the model. Recall, the model predicts that the probability of a sudden stop
increases with a deterioration of internal factors. Moreover, it predicts that
the probability of a sudden stop increases with external conditions turning
unfavorable. Most importantly, the model predicts that the probability of a
sudden stop increases with an increase in uncertainty about the fundamentals.
2.8 Policy Implications
This section discusses the implications of the theoretical and empirical results
for economic policies.
The increase in the technology parameter decreases the probability of a
crisis. This implies that governments should try to enhance technological
progress, rendering their country more attractive for investment. Also, in the
context of the technology parameter, the safety of investment seems crucial so
that investors can realize a high after-tax return on investment. In the same
line of argument, high tax policies seem counterproductive. To summarize, all
steps toward a credible increase in the long term rate of return on investment
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help prevent a crisis. An interesting implication of this analysis is that, apart
from the direct effect of an increase in the technology parameter, a government
can buy scope for other policies that help private investors coordinate on the
good equilibrium if they increase this parameter.
The international interest rate is not under the control of one economy.
The model, rather, refers to small open economies. The findings in this con-
text imply that governments should take into consideration that they have
even less scope for action once the outside world turns unfavorable, i.e., if
the international interest rate increases. Therefore, governments should take
precautions for such cases of deteriorating external conditions.
Another finding of the present analysis is that private information with
little noise is the most favorable setting for an economy. Therefore, a govern-
ment should achieve such an informational structure to advance their interest
in preventing a sudden stop event.
In the present model, the government mechanically services its debt in a
static model. This means that problems of credibility or commitment are ab-
stracted from. Therefore, one can only infer policy implications for a credible
government. This model does not cover the mechanisms by which govern-
ments could achieve credibility. One venue by which a credible government
could achieve a preferred setting, in which investors decide upon private infor-
mation, would be to allow full access to government data to a small group of
independent economic rating agencies. These institutions would be allowed to
gather all relevant information on the fundamentals and could then sell their
signals to private investors. The private investors could buy signals of different
agencies, weighing those according to their preferences. This would make sure
that signals, which the investors in the market have about the fundamentals,
would be private and characterized by a small amount of noise.
2.9 Conclusion
This study considers the possibility of coordination failure between investors
as a factor triggering a sudden stop. This finding is verified empirically. More
specifically, the analysis shows that an increased uncertainty about the fun-
damentals of an economy increases the probability of a sudden stop of capital
flows.
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The main theoretical findings of this chapter about the causes of sudden
stop events are the following: 1) The probability of a sudden stop decreases
with technological progress. 2) The probability of a sudden stop increases
with a higher international interest rate. 3) The probability of a sudden stop
also increases with noisier private signals, which can be interpreted as higher
uncertainty or disagreement about the fundamentals among private investors.
With regard to the discussion on internal versus external factors that at-
tract capital to emerging markets, this study finds that, with increasing inter-
national interest rate, the scope of policy action, preventing a sudden stop, is
reduced. In contrast to this result, the government gains scope for its actions
through the use of policies that advance investment safety or technological
progress. Thus, in terms of the discussion regarding pull and push factors of
capital flows, the outcome is that the relative importance of those factors vary
over time in an unfavorable way for the concerned economies. If the external
conditions are unfavorable, governments have less possibility to influence the
economic outcome by, for example, helping private investors to coordinate on
the good equilibrium.
This study contributes to the empirical literature on sudden stops of capital
flows by the verification of the theoretical findings on the effect of uncertainty
on the probability of a sudden stop. To verify the theoretical result, a pooled
probit analysis controlling for country and time effects is used. Calculating
marginal effects also shows that the influence of the uncertainty on the oc-
currence of sudden stops is quantitatively not negligible. Additionally, a large
number of robustness checks is implemented. These include two-stage estima-
tions to address the potential endogeneity problem. In all these regressions,
the positive effect of the uncertainty about the fundamentals on the probability
of the occurrence of a crisis persists.
The results strongly suggest that governments should take uncertainty
about the fundamentals in the economy into account. Lower precision of infor-
mation about the government’s fiscal policy and, therefore, uncertainty about
these values increases the probability of a sudden stop of capital flows. Hence,
an economy will be more vulnerable in times when uncertainty is higher. Pol-
icymakers should adjust their policies accordingly. Specifically, the provision
of less noisy private information is crucial in this context. One venue would
be to allow full access to all government data to a small set of independent
agencies which could then sell their ratings to private investors.
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Limitations of the present study are that considerations about default and
thereby credit frictions have not been included. Furthermore, the analysis has
not extended the non-monetary model to a monetary one. Calvo (2003) illus-
trates these extensions in his model. In the mentioned paper, Calvo also shows
that foreseen a crisis is possible in the model. The introduction of infinitely
many firms and the coordination problem do not alter these considerations.
Banking crises, however, cannot be rationalized within the current framework.
However, looking at these factors would be an interesting agenda for future
work.
For future research, two potential extensions of this theoretical model would
be interesting. First, adding the assumption of public information about the
debt level to the assumption of private information of each agent could be
worthwhile. So far, this study assumes that agents base their decisions on
personal interpretation of publicly available information, i.e., each agent does
not know how the other agents interpret the available information. Morris and
Shin (2004), Metz (2002), and Hellwig (2002) include public information that is
known by all agents into their analysis. However, it is questionable whether this
would generate different implications in the present setup. A vivid discussion
on the interaction between public and private information exists in the context
of central bank policy, triggered by Morris and Shin (2004).
Second, analyzing the distinction between domestic and foreign investors
tackling the following questions could generate valuable insights. How would
the probability of a sudden stop be influenced if the signals of domestic and
foreign investors are differently dispersed around the true value of the debt?
Are economies with investors that differ with regard to the precision of their
information more prone to a crisis than economies with homogenous and only
domestic investors? Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin (2004) analyze the
effect of the presence of one big investor who is better informed than the rest
on the occurrence of a currency crisis. In their setup, the large, well-informed
speculator makes all other investors more aggressive. In the present setup
if, for example, domestic investors are better informed and can coordinate
more easily among themselves than foreign investors, one would expect all
investors stampeding to the exits more often. Given the progressing financial
integration of emerging market economies, this question appears relevant for
future research.
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2.10 Appendix
2.10.1 Value of the Firm
The firm is characterized by a linear production function yit = αK
i
t , where y
i
t
is firm i’s output in period t, α is the productivity factor and Kit is the capital
invested.
The cash flow of firm i in period t is
Sit = α(1− τ)K it − K˙it (2.22)
where τ represents a constant output tax rate and K˙t the rate of capital ac-
cumulation, neglecting capital depreciation.
The value of the firm at t = 0 is
V i =
∫ ∞
0
Site
−rtdt (2.23)
where r represents the constant international interest rate.
zit, the growth rate of capital, is defined as z
i
t =
K˙it
Kit
. Normalizing the initial
capital stock to one, solving the differential equation, and assuming that the
firms only choose between constant growth paths, the value of the firm can be
expressed in the following simplified form:
V i = [α(1− τ)− zi] 1
(r − zi)
In order to obtain this simple expression, one has to proceed in several
steps. In a first step, one expresses Kit and K˙
i
t in Equation (2.22) in terms of
the initial capital stock K0:
First, one solves the differential equation zit =
K˙it
Kit
. This can be expressed as∫ t
0
zisds =
∫ t
0
K˙is
Kis
ds
=
∫ t
0
dKis
ds
1
Kis
ds =
∫ t
0
1
Kis
dK is
= lnKit − lnKi0
⇔ e
∫ t
0 z
i
sds =
Kit
Ki0
⇔ K it = e
∫ t
0 z
i
sdsK i0
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Second, noting that K˙ it = z
i
tK
i
t , plugging K
i
t and K˙
i
t into Equation (2.22), and
normalizing K i0 to unity delivers
Sit = α(1− τ)e
∫ t
0 z
i
sds − zite
∫ t
0 z
i
sds
Plugging the new expression of Sit into Equation (2.23) leads to
V i =
∫ ∞
0
[(α(1− τ)e
∫ t
0 z
i
sds − zite
∫ t
0 z
i
sds)e−rt]dt
Third, because r is constant, e−rt can be expressed as e−
∫ t
0 rdt. Thus, the above
expression can be rearranged to
⇔ V i =
∫ ∞
0
[α(1− τ)− zit]e−
∫ t
0 (r−zis)dsdt
Given that firms choose between constant growth paths in the setup, this
expression can be simplified to
⇔ V i = ∫∞
0
[α(1− τ)− zi]e−(r−zi)tdt
= [α(1− τ)− zi] ∫∞
0
e−(r−z
i)tdt
and, assuming r>z
= [α(1− τ)− zi][ e−(r−zi)t−(r−zi) ]∞0 = [α(1− τ)− zi]
1
(r − zi)
2.10.2 Lemma Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.1
Proof. With the switching strategy IT , the fraction of firms investing is
pi−i(IT ) =
∫ 1
0
IT (D
j)dj. Thereby, the expected value in Equation (2.11) is
E(Dpi−i(Dj)|Di) = E(Dpi−i(IT )|Di).
By the use of the law of iterated expectations and the fact that D is more
precise information than the private signals Di and Dj, it is known that34
E(Dpi−i(IT )|Di) = E(E(Dpi−i(IT )|D)|Di)
34In general, it is known that if one has an information set Ω3 = (Ω1,Ω2), then the
expectation of a random variable X conditional on a small information set Ω2, E(X|Ω2)
is equivalent to the conditional expectation given this smaller set Ω2 of the conditional
expectation given the bigger information set Ω3 of X: E(E(X|Ω3)|Ω2).
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This is equivalent to
E(DE(pi−i(IT )|D)|Di)
As the signals, givenD, are independent of each other, the expected fraction
of firms that receive a signal smaller than some threshold T is equal to the
probability that one firm receives such a signal given the realization of D:
E(pi−i(IT )|D) = prob(Dj ≤ T |D)
Proof of Lemma 2.2
Proof. The support of the distribution of the true value of the debt [D˘, Dˆ]
exceeds D and D (the borders of the multiplicity area in terms of the true
value of the fundamentals, which were found in section 2.3.1, by at least more
than ² each. Therefore, there exist signals D0 and D
0
, such that
E(D|D0) = D and E(D|D0) = D
and as
E(D|Di = D) = D and E(D| Di = D) = D
this implies that D0 = D and D
0
= D.
If firm i receives a signal of exactly D, and even in the worst case that the
probability of another firm investing was 0, the payoff difference equals 0 given
this signal.35
Proof of Lemma 2.3
Proof. The monotonicity of P˜ in Di is a necessary condition for the iterated
elimination of dominated strategies to work and to make sure that there are
not several values for which Equation (2.14) holds.
The factor z 1
(r−z)r is positive, thus I focus on the rest of the expression. It
is clear that the term −rDi is strictly decreasing in Di:
35Plug the right hand side of Equation (2.6) into Equation (2.13) and set prob(Dj <
K|D)|Di = 0).
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∂(−zrDi)
∂Di
= −r < 0
.
It is more difficult to show the characteristics of the term E(D∗prob(Dj <
T |D)|Di): Making use of the distributional assumptions that I made with re-
gard to the true value of debt and the private signal, I can write the conditional
density of the private signal, given the true value of the fundamentals, in the
following way:
g(Di|D) =
{
1
2²
if D − ² ≤ Di ≤ D + ²
0 otherwhise
(2.24)
Therefore, I can write prob(Dj < T |D) as
prob(Dj < T |D) =

0, if T < D − ²
1
2²
(T −D + ²), if D − ² ≤ T ≤ D + ²
1, if T > D + ²
(2.25)
Now, in addition referring to the conditional density of the true value of
debt given the private signal that firm i receives,
h(D|Di) =
{
1
2²
if Di − ² ≤ D ≤ Di + ²
0 otherwhise
(2.26)
One can rewrite the expected value as:
E(Dprob(Dj < T |D)|Di) =
∫ Di+²
Di−²
Dprob(Dj < T |D) 1
2²
dD
=

∫ Di+²
Di−²
D
2²
0dD, if T < Di − 2²∫ T+²
Di−²
D
2²
1
2²
(T −D + ²)dD
+
∫ Di+²
T+²
D
2²
0dD, if Di − 2² ≤ T ≤ Di∫ T−²
Di−²
D
2²
1dD
+
∫ Di+²
T−²
D
2²
1
2²
(T −D + ²)dD, if Di ≤ T ≤ Di + 2²∫ Di+²
Di−²
D
2²
∗ 1dD, if Di + 2² < T
(2.27)
The value of the conditional probability depends on the relative position
of T to D and, therefore, the expectation of it given Di also depends on the
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relative position of T to Di. Due to the fact that Di is known to the firm, the
integral is evaluated from Di − ² to Di + ².
Equation (2.27) delivers:
=

0, if T < Di − 2²
1
4²2
(
1
3
((Di)3)− 1
2
(3²+ T )(Di)2
+(2²2 + T²)Di + 1
6
T 3 + 1
2
T 2²− 2
3
²3
)
, if Di − 2² ≤ T ≤ Di
1
4²2
(− 1
3
((Di)3)− 1
2
(3²− T )(Di)2
+(2²2 + T²)Di − 1
6
T 3 + 1
2
T 2²− 2
3
²3
)
, if Di ≤ T ≤ Di + 2²
Di, if D + 2² < T
(2.28)
I have shown that the term −rDi is strictly monotonically decreasing in
Di. In addition, one knows that z < r. Hence, for the monotonicity of the
expected payoff difference between investing and not investing, P˜ (Di, IT ), it
is sufficient that the derivative of the expected value that I am analyzing is
smaller or equal to 1. The derivatives for the different intervals of the expected
value are the following:
∂E(D ∗ prob(Dj < T |D)|Di)
∂Di
=

0, if T < Di − 2²
1
4²2
(
(Di)2 − (3²+ T )Di
+(2²2 + T²)
)
, if Di − 2² ≤ T ≤ Di
1
4²2
(− (Di)2 − (3²− T )Di
+(2²2 + T²)
)
, if Di ≤ T ≤ Di + 2²
1, if D + 2² < T
(2.29)
For the cases of T < Di−2∗² and D+2² ≤ T , it is clear that the derivatives
are 0 or 1 respectively and hence that P˜ (Di, IT ) is monotonically decreasing
in Di in these intervals.
For the case that Di − 2² ≤ T ≤ Di, the derivative is a positive quadratic
function (U-shape) in Di. So the derivative will take its maximum value at
either of the borders of the analyzed interval.
Evaluated at T + 2², the function
1
4²2
(
(Di)2 − (3²+ T )Di + (2²2 + T²))
takes the value of 0. Evaluated at T , the function takes the value of 1
2
(
1− T
²
)
if
T ≥ −². This is the maximum value that the derivative takes in the mentioned
interval. ² is a very small positive number and T is bound to be positive by
the support of D, hence the restriction is not binding.
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So one can conclude that also in the interval of Di − 2² ≤ T ≤ Di the
expected payoff difference is monotonically decreasing.
If Di ≤ T ≤ Di + 2², I find the following results. First of all, the function
1
4²2
(− (Di)2 − (3²− T )Di + (2²2 + T²))
is a negative quadratic function in Di (inverse U-shape). So it is necessary
to find out how the function looks in the relevant interval, especially, whether
the maximum of the function lies within it. This can be analyzed by taking
the second derivative of the expected value. If it is positive over the entire
interval, one knows that the analyzed interval is entirely located on the in-
creasing branch of the function. Hence the function takes the maximum value
at the upper limit of the interval. Accordingly, for an entirely negative second
derivative, the interval lies in the decreasing branch and the function will take
its maximum value at the lower limit of the interval. If the second derivative
changes sign the situation is more complicated. Then, one has to find the
maximum of the function.
In the present case, the second derivative of the expected value is
∂2E(Dprob(Dj < T |D)|Di)
∂(Di)2
=
1
4²
(−2Di − 3²+ T )
This is a linear function in Di. Plugging in the borders of the interval, one
can determine the sign over the interval: At T − 2², the function takes the
value 1
4²2
(−T + ²) < 0 if T ≥ ². As the upper bound of the dominance region
where all firms invest, D, is at least ² bigger than D˘ and a signal within the
dominance region cannot be a switching signal, the restriction of T ≥ ² is not
binding.
At T the second derivative takes the value of 1
4²2
(−T − 3²) < 0 if T >
−3², where clearly the restriction is not binding. So the interval that one is
interested in is entirely located in the declining branch of the negative quadratic
function of the first derivative of the expected value. Therefore, the maximum
of the first derivative will be at Di = T − 2². It is:
1
4²2
(− (T − 2²)2 − (3²− T )(T − 2²) + (2²2 + T²)) = 1
This is sufficient to proof monotonicity. One can conclude that the expected
payoff difference is strictly monotonically decreasing in the private signal Di.
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To complete the evaluation of the function at the borders of the interval
and thereby completing the proof of continuity of the first derivatives, I also
show the value of the function at the upper bound T of the interval. Then
1
4²2
(− (Di)2 − (3²− T )Di + (2²2 + T²))
takes on the value of 1
2
(
1− T
²
)
and 1
2
(
1− T
²
) ≤ 1 if T ≥ −². This is the same
value as when I evaluated the lower bound K for the interval Di−2² ≤ T ≤ Di.
At all borders of intervals, the derivatives coincide; this indicates the continuity
of the first derivatives and shows the smoothness of the expected value. One
can show continuity for the expected value itself as well.
The above expression for the derivative of the expected value can hence be
expressed as follows:
∂E(Dprob(Dj < T |D)|Di)
∂Di
=

0, if T < Di − 2²
∈ [0, 1
2
(1− T
²
)
]
, if Di − 2² ≤ T ≤ Di
∈ [1
2
(1− T
²
), 1
]
, if Di ≤ T ≤ Di + 2²
1, if D + 2² ≤ T
(2.30)
Adding the two terms that are dependent on Di, one finds that P˜ (Di, IT )
is strictly monotonically decreasing in Di.
Proof of Lemma 2.4
Proof. Finding the solution to Equation (2.14) implies setting T = Di = D?
in Equation (2.27). It is straight forward that I do not have to take into
consideration the cases where T < Di − 2² and T > Di + 2². From Equation
(2.27), I see that for K = Di = D? the second term in the case of Di − 2² ≤
K ≤ Di disappears and the first term becomes∫ D?+²
D?−²
D
2²
D? −D + ²
2²
dD (2.31)
In the case of Di ≤ T ≤ Di + 2², the first term disappears and the second
term is identical with expression (2.31).
Solving the integral delivers:
=
1
4²2
[1
2
D2D? − 1
3
D3 +
1
2
²D2
]D?+²
D?−²
2.10. APPENDIX 83
The above expression simplifies to:
D?
2
− ²
6
With this result, I can simplify Equation (2.14) to become
P˜ (D?) = zi
α− r − rD? + z(D?
2
− ²
6
)
(r − zi)r = 0
Solving for D? delivers the unique value
D? =
α− r − ²
6
z
(r − 1
2
z)
2.10.3 Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies
One starts the elimination at the borders of the multiplicity area.
Due to the strict monotonicity in Di, there exist unambiguous signals D
1
<
D
0
= D and D1 > D0 = D, such that:
U˜(Di, I
D
0) < 0 for all Di > D
1
and U˜(Di, ID0) > 0 for all D
i < D1
As D
0
> D0, it also holds that D
1
> D1. For the case of the upper border
of the multiplicity area, this means: Given that the other firms do not invest
when receiving signals above D
0
, the investment does not pay for signals above
D
1
either. One finds D
1
by calculating U˜(Di = D
1
, I
D
0). This process can
be iterated. Given that the other firms do not invest when receiving signals
above D
n
, it does not pay to invest at a signal D
n+1
with D
n+1
< D
n
. The
signals D
n+1
are found by setting the expected payoff difference to 0, reflecting
indifference between investment and no investment at firm i:
U˜(D
n+1
, IDn) = z
iα− r − rD
n+1
+ zE(Dprob(Dj < D
n|D)|Di = Dn+1)
(r − zi)r = 0
(2.32)
The sequence D
n
is decreasing, monotone and bounded. By the common
knowledge of rationality, this process is driven to its limit of D
?
= limn→∞D
n
.
Concretely, one finds a value D
?
such that
U˜(D
?
, ID?) = 0 (2.33)
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D
?
has the interpretation that above this signal all firms do not invest with
certainty.
At the lower bound of the multiplicity area, the analogue situation occurs,
just with the sequence Dn being increasing. There one iterates until one finds:
U˜(D?, ID?) = 0 (2.34)
.
This means, one iterates until one finds a maximum [minimum] signal at
which firm i is indifferent between investing and not, and which is at the same
time the threshold of the switching strategy of all other firms, when starting
off at D
0
= D [D0 = D].
The switching strategies ID? and ID? are Nash equilibria of the private
information game. Milgrom and Roberts (1990) have shown that that in all
games with strategic complementarity the set of strategies that resist the iter-
ative elimination of dominated strategies are limited by Nash equilibria. Nash
equilibria are not eliminated through this process. Therefore, ID? and ID? are
the limiting Nash equilibria of the game. If D
?
= D?, there exists an unam-
biguous signal D?, below which in equilibrium all firms will invest and above
which no one does.
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Table 2.1: Country samples
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Table 2.2: List of variables
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A
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0.
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0.
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A
u
st
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51
0.
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0.
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8
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-
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0.
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0.
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0
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n
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a
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3.
86
-
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0.
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0.
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0.
15
0
Ch
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2.
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0.
49
0.
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0.
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m
bi
a
3.
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0.
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0.
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0.
25
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0.
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0.
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0.
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0.
28
3
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2.
37
3.
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0.
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0.
27
0.
58
0.
14
0
G
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m
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y
2.
02
4.
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-
0.
55
0.
33
0.
64
0.
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5
In
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n
es
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4.
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7.
56
-
7.
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1.
02
3.
32
0.
18
11
Ita
ly
2.
07
3.
37
0.
62
0.
24
0.
51
0.
06
0
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pa
n
1.
71
4.
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-
0.
96
0.
67
1.
30
0.
21
12
M
ex
ic
o
3.
43
5.
48
-
1.
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0.
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1.
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0.
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7
N
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he
rla
n
ds
2.
48
3.
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0.
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0.
24
0.
51
0.
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0
N
ew
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al
an
d
2.
68
4.
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1.
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0.
53
0.
95
0.
30
0
N
o
rw
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3.
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0.
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0.
47
0.
94
0.
23
0
Pe
ru
4.
07
6.
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-
1.
35
0.
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20
0.
30
6
So
u
th
 
K
o
re
a
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7.
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-
1.
40
0.
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2.
11
0.
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11
Sp
ai
n
2.
85
4.
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0.
50
0.
24
0.
38
0.
10
9
Sw
ed
en
1.
76
2.
84
0.
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0.
26
0.
60
0.
14
14
Sw
itz
er
la
n
d
1.
76
2.
84
0.
70
0.
26
0.
60
0.
14
0
Th
ai
la
n
d
4.
15
8.
53
-
3.
31
0.
95
2.
84
0.
25
19
Tu
rk
ey
3.
23
5.
38
-
0.
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1.
15
1.
90
0.
59
26
U
n
ite
d 
K
in
gd
o
m
2.
11
3.
42
-
0.
17
0.
42
0.
85
0.
19
0
U
n
ite
d 
St
at
es
2.
53
4.
13
-
0.
14
0.
37
0.
76
0.
13
12
Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics
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Japan - Sudden Stop Dummies and the uncertainty about  the 
fundamentals 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
19
90
:01
19
90
:08
19
91
:03
19
91
:10
19
92
:05
19
92
:12
19
93
:07
19
94
:02
19
94
:09
19
95
:04
19
95
:11
19
96
:06
19
97
:01
19
97
:08
19
98
:03
19
98
:10
19
99
:05
19
99
:12
20
00
:07
20
01
:02
20
01
:09
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
dum_SS_od s_cfw
Netherlands - Sudden Stop Dummies and the uncertainty 
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New Zealand - Sudden Stop Dummies and the uncertainty 
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Norway - Sudden Stop Dummies and the uncertainty about  
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USA - Sudden Stop Dummies and the uncertainty about  the 
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Figure 2.3: Sudden stops versus uncertainty
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Argentina - Sudden Stop Dummies and the uncertainty about  
the fundamentals 
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Brazil - Sudden Stop Dummies and the uncertainty about  the 
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Chile - Sudden Stop Dummies and the uncertainty about  the 
fundamentals 
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Colombia - Sudden Stop Dummies and the uncertainty about  
the fundamentals 
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Czech Republik - Sudden Stop Dummies and the uncertainty 
about  the fundamentals 
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Indonesia - Sudden Stop Dummies and the uncertainty about  
the fundamentals 
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Korea - Sudden Stop Dummies and the uncertainty about  the 
fundamentals 
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Mexico - Sudden Stop Dummies and the uncertainty about  
the fundamentals 
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Peru - Sudden Stop Dummies and the uncertainty about  the 
fundamentals 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
19
97
:08
19
97
:11
19
98
:02
19
98
:05
19
98
:08
19
98
:11
19
99
:02
19
99
:05
19
99
:08
19
99
:11
20
00
:02
20
00
:05
20
00
:08
20
00
:11
20
01
:02
20
01
:05
20
01
:08
20
01
:11
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
dum_SS_od s_cfw
Thailand - Sudden Stop Dummies and the uncertainty about  
the fundamentals 
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Turkey - Sudden Stop Dummies and the uncertainty about  
the fundamentals 
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Figure 2.4: Sudden stops versus uncertainty (continued)
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Table 2.4: Estimation with yearly data (all countries sample)
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Table 2.5: Estimation with yearly data (emerging countries sample)
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Table 2.6: Estimation with all countries sample
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Table 2.7: Estimation with monthly data (emerging countries sample)
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Table 2.8: Marginal effects for the estimation with monthly data and emerging
markets
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Table 2.9: Different lags
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Table 2.10: IV estimation
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 Focal crises - Headline crises - (large IMF packages, defaults, currency crises) measures
Private Net 
Flows on Debt 5/
Country year What defined crises
IMF-supported Programs/Aid 
packages
((GDPt - GDPt-1) 
/GDPt-1)*100
((GDPt+1 - GDPt-1) 
/GDPt-1)*100, 
Global 
Development 
Finance 2/ WEO 3/ BOP YB 4/ WEO 3/ BOP YB 4/
the 70s
Peru 1978
sovereign default, Currency crisis (FR), no banking 
crises
1978: IMF stabilization program+ 
multilateral rescheduling with 
official and private creditors 0.08 5.68 -6.89 -4.75 -5.93 -4.32 -4.77
Turkey 1978
sovereign default, no currency crises, fall in Central 
bank reserves, 1982-85 Systemic banking crisis 2.83 1.93 -5.89 -2.65 -1.61 -2.88 -2.01
United Kingdom 1974-76
Currency Crisis in 1976 (ERW), Borderline and 
smaller banking crisis -1.70 -2.38 5.08 2.24 5.08 2.25
Zaire 1978
Sovereign default since 1976, Enormous amounts of 
external debt lead to Paris Club reschedulings in 1979 
as well as 1981 and with a syndicate of commercial 
banks in 1980, Currency Crisis in 1979 (MR and BP), 
1980s Systemic banking crisis -5.30 -5.02 -0.21 -6.86 -6.69
crises countries 80s 
Argentina 1982-88 1982
sovereign default, Currency Crises in 1981 (MR1, FR, 
GKR) and 82 ( FR, BP, GKR), 1980-82 Systemic 
banking crisis, 1989-90  Systemic banking crisis, 
hyperinflation -3.15 0.47 0.24 0.18 -0.11 0.16 -0.23
Bolivia 1980
sovereign default in 1980,  hyperinflation, Spring 
1984 suspension of interest payments to commercial 
banks, Currency Crises in 1980 (MR2), 1982 (MR, 
FR, BP, GKR), 83 (FR, BP, GKR), 84 (FR) and 85 
(FR, BP, GKR),1986-88 Systemic banking crisis 0.61 1.54 -10.13 -12.29 -2.40 -19.60 -14.72
Brazil 1982
sovereign default 1983, Currency Crisis in 1982 (BP) 
and 83 (FR, BP, GKR), no banking crisis
Brady Plan: Brazil Parallel 
Financing agreement, terms 
announced Sep 1988 -4.36 -8.63 0.24 -0.69 -0.41 -1.12 -0.38
Bulgaria 1990 1989
No sovereign default but during second half of 80s 
build up of large external debt in order to finance 
enlarging current account deficit. no data on currency 
crises available, but exhaustion of foreign reserves. 
1995-97 Systemic banking crisis
Brady Plan: Bulgaria Brady, terms 
announced Mar 1994 -0.50 -9.55 0.68 -0.30 -3.88 0.49 -2.01
Chile (Cline p. 287, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/lo/countries/)1982
Sovereign default in 1983, Currency Crises in 1982 
(MR, FR, GKR) and 83 (FR), 1981-86 Systemic 
bankin  crisis -13.42 -16.44 -5.50 -9.57 -10.03 -9.95 -10.49
China 1990
Currency Crises 1990 (MR), 1991 Systemic banking 
crisis 3.80 13.35 1.14 -1.74 -0.21 -2.46 -0.95
Colombia  (Cline p.280) 1983
No Sovereign default, Currency Crises in 1983 (GKR) 
1985 (BP and GKR), 1982-87 Systemic banking crisis 1.57 4.98 -1.88 -3.21 -2.56 -3.72 -3.33
Costa Rica 1981
Sovereign default, Severe balance of payment crisis, 
Currency Crises in 1981 (MR and FR), no banking 
crisis
Brady plan: Costa Rica Brady 
terms announced May 1990 0.80 -6.25 -8.41 -7.07 -10.07 -9.32 -7.19
Cote d'Ivoire 1984
Sovereign default, no Currency Crisis, Systemic 
banking crisis from  1988-91 Brady plan concluded in 1997 -2.00 1.55 0.38 -25.75 -13.32 -20.19 -12.80
Ecuador 1982
Sovereign default, Currency Crises in 1983 (MR2), 84 
(MR1) and 86 ( MR, FR),1980- 83 Systemic banking 
crisis
Brady plan:Ecuador Brady, terms 
announced May 1994 1.20 -1.63 -7.93 0.93 7.40 3.46 2.30
Korea (Sachs, p. 121) 1979-821980
No Sovereign default, but in 1981world's fourth 
largest debtor country. Currency Crisis in 1980 (MR, 
BP and GKR), Doubling of inflation from 14.4 % in 
1978 to 28.7 % in 1980. -2.09 4.24 -0.11 0.77 1.99 6.74 1.83
Jordan 1989
Sovereign default on loans to commercial banks, 
Currency Crisis (MR1, FR, BP), Non systemic 
banking crisis
Brady Plan: Jordan Brady, terms 
announced in July 1993 -13.45 -7.29 24.74 -41.37 -3.59 -34.87 -5.61
Output
Net Private Capital 
Flows
Net Private Capital 
Flows plus Net Errors 
and Omissions
Table 2.12: Headline crises from 1970 - 2000
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 Focal crises - Headline crises - (large IMF packages, defaults, currency crises) measures
Private Net 
Flows on Debt 5/
Country year What defined crises
IMF-supported Programs/Aid 
packages
((GDPt - GDPt-1) 
/GDPt-1)*100
((GDPt+1 - GDPt-1) 
/GDPt-1)*100, 
Global 
Development 
Finance 2/ WEO 3/ BOP YB 4/ WEO 3/ BOP YB 4/
the 90s till present
Argentina 1995
Contagion from Mexican crisis, background currency 
board without deposit incsurance scheme and without 
lender of last resort: withdrawal of bank deposits, 
significant loss of central bank's gross reserves, 
liqidity crunch, surge in interest rates,  output 
contraction, Systemic banking crisis X / EFF 3.85 7.79 5.36 -1.16 -1.88 -1.91 -2.38
Argentina 2001-2
sovereign default, no data on currency crisis, 2001-
present Systemic banking crisis 2.10 5.27 -7.19 -4.28 -5.02 -5.06
Brazil 1998
No sovereign default, Currency crises in 1999 (MR1), 
substantial curret account deficit, surge of interest 
rates, outflow of capital, Output contraction, 1994-9 
Systemic banking crisis
X/ SBA/ SRF, new arrangement, 
12/2/98, X / SBA/SRF, new 
arrangement, 9/14/01,  0.13 0.92 0.07 0.41 0.82 0.31 0.85
Ecuador 1999
El Nino crisis, default on external and internal debt, 
Currency Crises in 1999 (MR1), 1998-present 
Systemic banking crisis -6.30 -3.67 -4.26 -16.63 -13.47 -14.09 -15.36
ERM 1992/1993
Currency Crises: Denmark 93 (GKR), Finland 92 
(GKR, ERW), Ireland 92 (ERW), Italy 92 (ERW), 
Portugal 93 (MR1), Spain 92 (GKR) and 93 (GKR), 
Sweden 92 (ERW), UK 92 (ERW) 0.00 0.00
Finland 1991-94
No sovereign default, Currency Crisis in 1991 (GKR) 
and 92 (GKR, ERW), Systemic banking crisis -6.26 -9.37 -3.20 -5.88 -1.55 -4.19
Indonesia 1997-98
no sovereign default, consequence of unresolved 
capital account crisis, important short-term private 
sector external debt, depreciation, hyperinflation, runs 
on deposits, collaps of corporate balance sheets, sharp 
economic contraction, Currency Crisis in 1997 (MR2, 
BP, GKR), 1997-present Systemic banking crisis
X/ SBA, new arrangement, 
11/5/97 4.54 -9.18 -2.92 -0.90 -3.71 0.95 -5.46
Korea 1997-8
No sovereign default, but high level of short term 
private foreign debt, Curreny Crisis in 1997 (MR2, 
FR, BP, GKR) and 98 (MR1)
X/ SBA/SRF, new arrangement, 
12/4/97 5.01 -2.01 -6.32 -8.52 -4.54 -9.70 -5.72
Mexico 1994-5
Tequila crisis. No sovereign default, Currency Crisis 
in 1994 (BP, GKR) and 95 (MR), 1994-97 Systemic 
banking crisis
X / SBA, new arrangement, 
2/1/95 -6.17 -1.33 0.10 -4.09 -4.32 -2.67 -2.90
Malaysia 1997-8
No sovereign default, interest rate surge, real GDP 
contraction, Currency Crisis in 1997 (FR, BP), 1998 
(MR1), 1997-present Systemic banking crisis 7.32 -0.57 1.39 -7.82 -7.17 -7.55 -4.83
Norway 1987-93 1989
No sovereign default, currency crisis in 1986 (ERW), 
Systemic banking crisis 0.90 2.92 -2.69 -2.94 -2.85 -3.10
Pakistan 1999-2000
Sovereign default, Eurobond exchange, no Currency 
Crisis in 1999, 2000 n.a., no data on banking crisis 3.96 7.57 -0.72 -1.06 0.97 -0.49 0.57
Phillipines 1997
No sovereign default, Currency Crisis in 1997 (FR, 
GKR), 1998-present Systemic banking crisis X/ EFF 5.19 4.58 2.55 -4.83 -4.82 -7.60 -7.54
Russia 1998
Sovereign default 1998-99, interest rate surge, 
Currency Crises in 1998 (GS), 1998-9 Systemic 
banking crisis
EFF/SFR/CCFF, Augmentation 
and Extension, 7/20/98 -4.90 0.24 2.90 0.26 1.46 -0.51 0.47
Sweden 1991
No sovereign default, Currency Crisis 1992 (GKR), 
Systemic banking crisis -1.11 -2.83 -4.02 -9.30 -4.02 -4.67
Thailand 1997-8
No sovereign default, but roll over of short term debt 
stopped,  Currency Crisis in 1997( MR2, FR, BP, 
GKR), 1997-present Systemic banking crisis
X/ SBA, new arrangement, 
8/20/97 -1.37 -11.74 -7.11 -18.42 -12.75 -18.54 -13.05
Turkey 1994
No sovereign default, interest rate surge,  Currency 
Crisis in 1994 (BP, GKR), Non systemic banking 
crisis X/ SBA -4.97 1.57 -9.47 -4.45 -6.19 -4.45 -4.23
Turkey 2000
No sovereign default, no data on currency crisis 
available, 2000-present Systemic banking crisis
X / SBA/SRF, augmentation, 
5/15/01,  SBA, new arrangement, 
2/4/02 7.36 -0.69 1.18 -1.33 3.75 -1.33 1.53
Output
Net Private Capital 
Flows
Net Private Capital 
Flows plus Net Errors 
and Omissions
Table 2.13: Headline crises from 1970 - 2000 (continued)
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Chapter 3
The Uncertainty About the
Fundamentals and the Spread of
Stock Market Crises
3.1 Introduction
Financial crises in emerging markets in recent years have been especially cen-
tered around the Mexican (December 1994), the Thai (July 1997), and the
Russian (August 1998) crises. Financial markets witnessed a similar accu-
mulation of crises in developed countries in the context of the crisis of the
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (September 1992).1 These periods of
crises concentration suggest contagion effects across countries.
Because of the high costs of these financial crises in emerging markets,
researchers and practitioners have been exploring these cases. Specifically un-
der investigation are the mechanisms through which crises spread, the factors
that render countries vulnerable to contagion, and, most importantly, which
policies might help prevent contagion.
This chapter addresses these questions by analyzing one particular mecha-
nism of the spread of crises: the contagion of crisis through uncertainty about
the fundamentals. This chapter focuses on financial crises characterized by a
severe plunge in stock market returns.
1See, for example, Broner et al. (2006), Caramazza et al. (2004), or Kaminsky et al.
(2000) for the dates of the crises.
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It can be observed that, after a number of crises, the disagreement about
the fundamentals in other markets – especially those markets that are later on
themselves hit by a crisis – increases. Figure 3.1 illustrates this observation in
the case of the Thai crisis in 1997.2 As illustrated in the graph, the uncertainty
not only increases in Thailand after the crisis, but also in neighboring countries.
Korea, for example, is characterized in the data by a build-up of uncertainty
after the Thai crisis. Korea is then hit by a currency crisis in November 1997.
In addition, Figure 3.1 shows that the crisis in Thailand does not have an
effect on the degree of uncertainty in Taiwan and the UK, neither were these
countries economically strongly affected by the crisis.
However, in the case of other financial crises, careful scrutiny reveals that
uncertainty about the fundamentals decreases in other markets after the crisis
in the initial market. For example, this is the case in the period around the
Argentinean crisis in 2002, which is illustrated in Figure 3.2.
The recent literature distinguishes between surprise crises as, for example,
the Thai crisis in 1997 and anticipated crises as, for example, the Argentinean
crisis in 2001/2002. This literature argues that the international repercussions
of the anticipated crises in Brazil (January 1999), Turkey (February 2001),
and Argentina (December 2001) were much less important than those after
the crises in Mexico (December 1994), Thailand (August 1997), and Russia
(August 1998).3
This chapter picks up this distinction and shows that surprise crises in-
crease uncertainty about fundamentals in other countries, thereby resulting in
a higher probability of crises there. In contrast, the occurrence of anticipated
crises decreases disagreement about the state of the fundamentals in other
countries, thereby lowering the probability of a crisis there.
This chapter contributes to the literature in two ways: First, uncertainty
about the fundamentals is theoretically illustrated as a factor transmitting
2The left Y-axis displays the crisis variable. The two bars in the figure show the two most
pronounced crisis events in the Thai crisis: First, the severe devaluation of the Bath in the
beginning of July 1997 and second, the substantial drop in stock market returns one month
later. The dates are chosen in accordance with Kaminsky et al. (2000) and Goldstein (1998).
The right Y-axis displays the uncertainty about the fundamentals in the tracked economies.
Uncertainty is measured by the standard deviation of growth forecasts for the current and
following year, by financial analysts within the tracked countries. For more details on this
measure, please refer to Appendix 3.6.
3See Kaminsky et al. (2000) or Didier et al. (2006)
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Figure 3.1: Uncertainty in the surroundings of the Thai crisis
crises across markets. Second, predictions of the theoretical model are vali-
dated empirically. The role of uncertainty about the fundamentals has been
neglected in the existing literature on contagion. So far, common investors
have been detected as the main reason of the spread of financial crises between
economies. While early research focused on trade linkages4 and on macroeco-
nomic similarities between economies5, more recent analyses converge to the
view that common creditors are at the core of contagion. This view is sup-
ported by a large number of empirical analyses.6
Based on the insight into the role of common investors, the theoretical liter-
ature suggests different propagation mechanisms. Research thus far examines
4See, for example, Gerlach and Smets (1996).
5See, for example, Goldstein (1998).
6See, for example, Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) and Caramazza et al. (2004).
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Figure 3.2: Uncertainty in the surroundings of the Argentinean crisis
herding due to fixed information cost7, differently informed investors8, changes
in investors’ risk aversion9, and wealth effects10 as possible propagation chan-
nels for crises.
Following Goldstein and Pauzner (2004), I model the financial crisis in
country B as a coordination game between private investors. The reason for
using a coordination game is that the setup of a coordination game is well
suited to analyze the effect of uncertainty about the fundamentals. The present
model differs from the Goldstein and Pauzner (2004) setup in two crucial
ways. The first difference concerns modeling the initial-crisis country and
the potentially-affected subsequent country. While Goldstein and Pauzner
7See Calvo and Mendoza (2000).
8See Kodres and Pritsker (2002).
9See Broner et al. (2006).
10See Goldstein and Pauzner (2004).
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(2004) explicitly model the sequence of two bank-run crises of the Diamond
and Dybvig (1983) type, I focus on the second economy exclusively. I model
the occurrence of a crisis in the second country, assuming that either a surprise
crisis takes place in the first country or an anticipated crisis.
The second difference concerns the mechanism through which the crisis
spreads. In Goldstein and Pauzner (2004), the crisis spreads due to a wealth
effect. In my setup, the change in uncertainty about the fundamentals trans-
mits the crisis. I assume that uncertainty about the fundamentals increases in
the second country if a surprise crisis hits the first country. Further, I assume
that uncertainty decreases if an anticipated crisis occurs in the first country.
The illustrative model in this chapter is then used to show that an increase in
uncertainty increases the probability of a crisis in the second country while a
decrease in uncertainty makes a crisis less likely there.
This study offers two justifications of the assumption that a surprise crisis
in an initial-crisis country increases the uncertainty in another country: The
first justification is the empirical evidence presented in Figures 3.1 and 3.2.
The second justification is the following line of arguments: If a crisis hits a
country by surprise, i.e., without investors expecting the event, investors learn
that they did not put sufficient effort into information processing given existing
data-processing technology. If they want to predict crises in other countries,
they have to increase their investment in information processing. However,
a number of the investors realizes losses in the first country and, hence, are
less inclined to invest in the second economy.11 Given the assumption that the
payoff of one agent positively depends on the fraction of other agents investing,
i.e., that strategic complementarity prevails between investments, this leads to
all agents optimally choosing to spend less on their information processing after
the crisis in the first country.12 As a result, all agents receive more dispersed
signals about the true value of the fundamentals.
This mechanism about how the degree of uncertainty depends on a cri-
sis in a first country works in the opposite direction if an anticipated crisis
materializes. In this case, investors’ trust in their information processing is
strengthened and they are willing to spend a higher amount on gathering infor-
mation, despite the crisis in the first market. This higher effort in information
processing, in turn, leads to more precise signals.
11This is an outcome of the model by Goldstein and Pauzner (2004).
12The assumption of strategic complementarity is common in the global game literature.
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The model in this chapter illustrates the presence of contagion in a coordi-
nation game: In country B, infinitely many investors (agents) have one unit of
endowment available for investment there. If they choose not to invest, they
receive a certain return of zero. In case that they invest, the return depends
positively on the fraction of other agents who invest. In addition, the return
decreases with an increasing level of the fundamentals. A high level of funda-
mentals indicates high costs of investing (this could be due to high political
instability or high transaction costs). The fundamentals of the economy are
uniformly distributed over a finite support. However, investors cannot observe
the true realization of the fundamentals but receive a private signal that is
symmetrically and uniformly distributed around the realization of the true
fundamentals. This means that investors base their investment decisions on
the expected return, given their private evaluation of the fundamentals.
This information structure yields a threshold equilibrium in terms of the
fundamentals in B and the outcomes in A. Below the threshold, the investors
coordinate on investing; above, no one invests. Comparative static analysis
shows that the threshold is a decreasing function of the dispersion of the private
signals. The dependence of the uncertainty in B on the crisis in A together
with the result of the comparative static analysis of the threshold in B are
sufficient to illustrate the existence of contagion: A surprise crisis in country
A increases the dispersion of the private signals, i.e., the support of the private
signals around the true value of the fundamentals, in B and hence, decreases
the threshold there. The decrease in the threshold means that coordination on
the bad equilibrium becomes more likely, i.e., a crisis becomes more probable.
In the case of an anticipated crisis in country A, the opposite is true.
To validate empirically the uncertainty channel of contagion, I construct
a rich data set for 38 countries with monthly time series (December 1993 to
September 2005). This country sample and the associated time frame enables
the inclusion of the following six pronounced crisis periods into the analysis:
Mexico (1994), Thailand (1997), Russia (1998), Brazil (1999), Turkey (2001)
and Argentina (2001). The two main variables in the data set are a stock
market crisis dummy and an uncertainty measure. A stock market crisis is de-
tected by significant negative variation in stock market returns. The monthly
stock market returns that serve as a basis for the crisis dummy are computed
from the IFC (International Finance Corporation) investable US dollar total
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return index.13 When necessary, I complete the returns with data from MSCI
(Morgan Stanley Capital International) or national sources. As in the pre-
vious chapter, the measure of uncertainty is the standard deviation of GDP
growth forecasts between country experts. Additionally, I employ a large set
of domestic control variables and alternative channels of contagion.
I proceed in two distinct steps. Firstly, I use fixed-effects panel estimations
to establish the link from the initial crisis in country A to the uncertainty
in other countries B. I control for country and time effects, running vari-
ous robustness checks. Secondly, I quantify the effect of uncertainty in those
economies on the probability of a crisis there. For this second step, I employ
pooled probit estimation, controlling for country and time effects. Again, I
control for potential domestic drivers of crises. Finally, as a check for alterna-
tive channels of contagion, I control for contagion through common creditors,
trade links, the size effect of the initial stock market, and for overexposed
common fund investors.
The empirical analysis in this chapter expands the existing empirical liter-
ature on the spread of crises in several respects. First, the effect of uncertainty
in the context of the spread of crises has been neglected so far. Second, as the
panel data spans a larger time horizon, I can consider a larger number of crises
periods.14 Third, I control for a large number of alternative contagion channels,
adapting them to the particular kind of crises analyzed – namely, substantial
stock market drops. Fourth, including control for time effects results in very
strict tests for the transmission channels of crises. The time-effects control
takes care of all effects present at a particular point in time. In case of all
emerging markets, the time-effects control for increases in the interest rates in
the financial centers. Not all of the alternative contagion channels controlled
for remain significant when controlling for time effects.
The analysis yields two main empirical findings. The first finding is that
uncertainty about the fundamentals is a propagation mechanism of contagion,
if the first country is hit by a surprise crisis. The first step of the analysis
finds that the Mexican, Thai, and Russian crises increase the uncertainty in
potentially-affected countries. The effect is stronger within the region where
13The investable indices take into consideration restrictions on foreign investment. There-
fore, this measure represents the part of the national stock markets accessible to foreign
investors, which is relevant in the context of contagion.
14For example, Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) only consider the Mexican, Thai, and
Russian crises, while Broner et al. (2006) analyze the Thai, Russian, and Brazilian crises.
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the crises occur; the effect appears more pronounced in countries nearer to the
initial crises country. The second step of the analysis finds that the effect of
uncertainty on crisis probability in countries B is positive, significant, and, as
shown by marginal effects, not negligible in size.
The second finding is that in the case of an anticipated crisis, uncertainty
about the fundamentals in the second economy is decreased, which, in turn,
decreases the probability of a crisis there. The first step of the analysis yields
the following result: The Brazilian, Turkish, and Argentinean crises decrease
the uncertainty in the potentially-affected countries. The effect is stronger
within the region where the crises occur and in countries closer to the initial-
crisis country. The second step of the analysis confirms that the effect of
uncertainty in the potentially-affected countries on the probability of a crisis
there is positive, significant, and not negligible.
These findings have several implications. The first, obvious implication is
that a close monitoring of the fundamentals in the resident country and also
of other countries is crucial. Particularly other countries in the first-country
region and geographically close ones should be focused on. Surprise crises seem
to be especially bad because they set off mechanisms that further worsen the
situation. This chapter illustrates such a mechanism through the uncertainty
about the fundamentals. The second implication is that, once a surprise crisis
has hit a first country, policy makers in potentially-affected countries should
move toward policies that diminish the potential increase in uncertainty. One
venue could be to develop mechanisms for such situations through which gov-
ernments could credibly disseminate very precise information about the state
of their economy so that the private signals get as precise as possible. One
could even start to think about subsidies for information-gathering technology.
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2, I describe the model.
In section 3.3, I present the empirical analysis. Section 3.4 explains policy
implications while section 3.5 contains the conclusion.
3.2 The Model
This section presents a simple coordination game to illustrate the occurrence
of contagion between two markets that are uncorrelated in terms of their fun-
damentals. The focus of the model is on the potentially-affected country. In
3.2. THE MODEL 109
an investment game, I illustrate that a crisis in country B becomes more prob-
able after a surprise crisis in country A and becomes less probable after an
anticipated crisis materializes in a first country. The transmission functions
through the uncertainty about the fundamentals. For the theoretical illustra-
tion of this channel, three ingredients are necessary. A first ingredient is that
the dispersion of private signals in country B increases due to a surprise crisis
in country A and, conversely, that dispersion of private signals decreases due
to an anticipated crisis in country A. In this study this effect of a crisis on
uncertainty about the fundamentals is introduced as an assumption.15
The second ingredient is a unique threshold equilibrium in terms of the
fundamentals of the economy, so that it is possible to attribute to each level
of the fundamentals the realization of the investment or the non-investment
equilibrium. Once this unique threshold equilibrium is determined, the third
ingredient is the comparative static analysis of the threshold equilibrium with
respect to the uncertainty about the fundamentals. If the threshold shifts with
changes of the uncertainty, contagion is present.
The assumption that a surprise crisis in an initial-crisis country increases
uncertainty about the fundamentals in another country can be justified by the
empirical evidence presented in the introduction to this chapter. Addition-
ally, it could be argued that investors learn after a surprise crisis that they
did not put sufficient effort into information processing, given existing data-
processing technology. If investors want to predict crises in other countries,
they must increase investment in information processing. However, a number
of the investors realize losses in the first country and, hence, are less inclined
to invest in the second economy.16 Given the assumption that the payoff of
one investor depends positively on the fraction of other agents investing, i.e.,
that strategic complementarity prevails between investments, this leads to all
investors choosing optimally to spend less on information processing after the
crisis in the first country.17 As a result, all investors receive more dispersed
signals about the true value of the fundamentals. The mechanism works in
the opposite direction if an anticipated crisis materializes in the initial-crisis
country. In this case, investor trust in information processing is strengthened.
Therefore, investors are willing to spend a higher amount on gathering infor-
15It is an interesting topic for future research to explicitly model this effect.
16This is an outcome of the model by Goldstein and Pauzner (2004).
17The assumption of strategic complementarity is common in the global game literature.
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mation despite the crisis in the first market. This in turn leads to more precise
signals.
The notion of a surprise crisis and an anticipated crisis in the first crisis
country are absent in the setting of Goldstein and Pauzner (2004). However,
the idea of the distinction between surprise crises and anticipated crises is
consistent with the setup of a global game. Think of a surprise crisis in the
following way: If the prior expectation about the value of the true fundamentals
is lower than the threshold equilibrium, investors, on average, expect that no
crisis will happen. If the fundamentals are then realized in the range above
the threshold, this realization can be interpreted as a surprise crisis. On the
other hand, if the prior expectation about the value of the true fundamentals
is higher than the threshold equilibrium, investors expect the bad equilibrium
to be realized. If is the bad equilibrium is then realized, this can be interpreted
as an anticipated crisis.
3.2.1 Model Setup
Here, I describe the game in country B taking as a given the outcomes in the
initial crises country A.18
As with the fundamentals in the previous chapter, in this chapter the in-
vestment environments are assumed to be uniformly distributed over the finite
interval θ ∼ [θ˘, θˆ]. A high value of the fundamentals θ signifies an adverse
environment for investment with high investment obstacles.
There is a continuum of [0, 1] identical investors . Each investor decides
whether to invest 1 unit or not. If an investor does not invest, he receives a
certain return of 0. If he decides to invest, he receives an uncertain return
of P (θ, pi−i), which depends negatively on the level of fundamentals θ and
positively on the fraction of other investors that invest in B, pi−i. A strategy
is defined as pii : [θ˘, θˆ] → [0, 1], which means that investor i invests in state
θ with probability pii(θ). Due to the mass of agents being 1, the fraction of
agents who invest at a particular state of fundamentals can be expressed as∫ 1
0
pij(θ)dj = pi−i(θ) for j 6= i. The positive dependence on the fraction of other
agents investing, i.e., strategic complementarity between the agents, can be
18The investment game in country B is a straight application of the theory of global
games by Carlsson and van Damme (1993). Similar investment games have been used in
the literature, for example, by Heinemann (2005).
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explained by increasing returns on aggregate investment. These assumptions
are reflected by the following payoff function of investor i:
P = Rpi−i(θ)− 1
2
θ2 (3.1)
in which Rpi−i(θ) stands for the simplest form of a return that is positively
dependent on the fraction of other agents investing. Further, the last term
can be interpreted as a cost of investing that increases exponentially with the
worsening of the investment environment.
An investor decides whether to invest or not to invest in a country after
receiving information about the fundamentals of the country. Assuming that
the fundamentals are not common knowledge, each investor privately inter-
prets publicly available information. The investors thus act upon their private
signals. The private signals are uniformly distributed in an η surrounding of
the true fundamentals θ: θi ∼ U [θ− η, θ+ η]. Now, the variance of the signals
depends on the outcomes in country A. In the case of a surprise crisis in coun-
try A, the private signals are uniformly distributed in an η + c surrounding of
θ, with c being a small positive number. In case of an anticipated crisis in A,
the private signals are uniformly distributed in an η−d surrounding of θ, with
d being a small positive number.
An investor is more likely to invest if 1) the obstacles to invest are lower and
2) if a large number of other investors invest in the same country. However, in
line with global games literature, I assume that there are small ranges at the
extremes of the support of the fundamentals where investors have dominant
strategies. If the fundamentals are very good, i.e., if the investment obstacles
are very low, it is optimal for an investor to invest irrespective of the actions of
all the other investors. On the other extreme, if the state of the fundamentals
is very adverse to investment, then it is the optimal strategy of an investor not
to invest, irrespective of the actions of the other investors.
Formally, this assumption means that the support of the fundamentals has
to exceed the border of the dominance region by at least 2η: θ˘ + 2η < θ <
θ < θˆ − 2η, in which θ stands for the border of the lower dominance range
and θ stands for the border of the upper dominance range. This condition
ensures that an investor is indifferent between investing and not investing at
the borders of the dominance ranges. At the border of the dominance region
at the high end of the support, the investor is indifferent, even if the fraction of
other agents investing equals 1, P (θ, 1) = 0. At the border at the dominance
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region at the low end of the support, the investor is indifferent even if no
one else invests, P (θ, 0) = 0. When an investor receives a signal θi < θ − η,
he knows that his payoff P i > 0, no matter what all the other investors are
doing. Therefore, he will invest. Analogously, if he receives a private signal
θi > θ + η, he knows that P i < 0, no matter what all the other investors are
doing. Therefore, he will not invest. In contrast, between the borders of the
dominance regions, the payoff of an investor depends on the actions of other
investors. This results in the same tripartite partition of the fundamentals as
in the model of chapter 2. Under common knowledge, multiple equilibria exist
in this intermediate range of fundamentals. Because the common knowledge
game is extensively described in chapter 2, I proceed here immediately to the
investment game with private information.
3.2.2 Solving the Model
Firstly, I will show that the game with private information is characterized by
a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium in country B.
Proving the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium requires several
steps. In the first step, a simple switching strategy is assumed to be followed
by all investors. In the second step, the monotonicity of the expected payoff
difference in the private signal has to be proved. Based on this, dominated
strategies can then be iteratively eliminated in the third step, beginning at
borders of the dominance regions. Finally, it has to be shown that there is
only one unique value of the level of debt, for which the payoff difference,
given the private signal, equals zero. This level of debt is the threshold value,
below which all agents invest and above which no one invests.
In the private information game, a strategy is a function of the private signal
received instead of the true value of the fundamentals: pii(θi) : [θ˘, ˆtheta] →
[0, 1].19 The payoff function of an investor now depends on his private signal
on the state of the fundamentals and is therefore given by
P (θi) = E[Rpi−i(θj)− 1
2
θ2|θi] (3.2)
19Note that the private signal is drawn from the same support as the true value of the
fundamentals. No private signal will be realized at a level of debt that is, in reality, nonex-
istent. As noted earlier, the support of the true value of the fundamentals must exceed the
borders of the dominance regions sufficiently, i.e., by 2η, so that there exist private signals
that are consistent with those dominant strategies.
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Analogously, the fraction of other agents investing pii(θi) is a function of
the private signals θj they receive.
In the first step towards the unique equilibrium, it is assumed that all
investors follow a simple switching strategy. A switching strategy IT means
that an investor invests with probability one if, and only if, the signal it receives
is below a threshold T and abstains from investing with probability one if the
signal is above the threshold20
IT =
{
1 if θi < T
0 if θi ≥ T (3.3)
The simple switching strategy permits rewriting the payoff function, re-
placing the fraction of other investors investing with the probability that one
other investor receives a signal that is smaller than the threshold signal
pi−i(IT ) =
∫ 1
0
IT (θ
j)dj = prob(θj ≤ T ) (3.4)
P (θi, IT ) = R · 1 · prob(θj ≤ T ) +R · 0 · prob(θj > T )− E(1
2
θ2|θi) (3.5)
Recall that at the borders of the dominance regions, the investors are in-
different between investing and not investing.21 If the payoff function is mono-
tonically decreasing in the private signal, clearly, these borders are the lowest
and the highest possible threshold signals for the switching strategies. In the
dominance region at the low end of the support of the fundamentals, the invest-
ment obstacles are so low that the payoff of an investor is positive if investing,
irrespective of the actions of all other investors. At the border itself an investor
is, then, indifferent. In the dominance region at the high end of the support,
the investment obstacles are so high that the payoff of an investor is positive
if investing, irrespective of the actions of all other agents. In the case of a
monotone payoff function, the borders of the dominance regions are, therefore,
the starting points of the iterative elimination of dominated strategies.
Accordingly, in a second step towards the unique equilibrium, the mono-
tonicity of the payoff function in the private signal has to be shown.
20Continuity arguments show that such a simple switching strategy is optimal. Therefore,
generality is not lost when imposing it in the first place.
21More precisely, each investor is indifferent at the border of the high dominance region,
given that all other investors invest P (θ, 1) = 0 or at the border of the dominance region at
the high end of the support, if no one else invests P (θ, 0) = 0.
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Lemma 3.1 P (θi, IT ) is strictly monotonically decreasing in the private signal
θi.
Proof. See Appendix 3.6.
Due to the strict monotonicity of the payoff, the lowest possible threshold
for a switching strategy of all the investors is θ. Similarly, the highest possible
threshold is θ. For all θi < θ, the payoff is positive, irrespective of the actions
of all other investors. As the rationality of the investors is common knowledge,
not to invest is a dominated strategy for signals below θ. At the other extreme,
for all signals θi > θ, the payoff difference is negative.
Due to the strategic complementarity between investors, the worst scenario
that an investor must consider is the case where IT = Iθ. This case means that
for all values of the fundamentals in the multiplicity range, investors choose
not to invest although the fundamentals would, in case of coordination on the
high growth equilibrium, also allow for this. The best scenario would be a
switching strategy of IT = Iθ.
At this point, it is possible to start the iterated elimination of dominated
strategies. This iteration permits cutting the multiplicity range down to a
unique threshold signal. The elimination functions as follows: If an investor i
receives a signal that is very close to the border of the dominance region, the
probability that other investors receive signals within the dominance region
and, thus, have a dominant strategy is very high. Due to the strict mono-
tonicity, this suffices to induce the investor i to have a dominant strategy as
well. This is true for all the investors. Therefore, the range between the signal
of investor i and the former border of the dominance region can be added to
the dominance region. Performing this addition at both ends of the support
and iterating this process leads to the maximum [minimum] signal at which
investor i is indifferent between investing and not investing; this signal has
to be, at the same time, the threshold of the switching strategy of all other
investors.22
According to Milgrom and Roberts (1990), in all games with strategic
complementarity the set of strategies that resist the iterative elimination of
dominated strategies are limited by Nash equilibria. Nash equilibria are not
eliminated through this process. Thus Iθ? and Iθ? are the most extreme Nash
equilibria of the game. No Nash equilibrium exists below θ? in which the in-
22For a more formal consideration of the iterative elimination, please see Appendix 3.6.
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vestors do not invest. Likewise, no Nash equilibrium exists above θ
?
in which
the investors invest.
Steps one and two enable the third step in the proof of the uniqueness of
the equilibrium. Given Lemma 3.1, it now suffices to show that equation
P (θi = θ?, Iθ?) = Rprob(θ
j ≤ θ?)− E(1
2
θ2|θi) = 0 (3.6)
has a unique solution. This can be expressed in the following Lemma.
Lemma 3.2 There exists only one value, for which the expected payoff equals
0 given that investor i receives exactly the threshold signal θ? as a private
signal, and given that all other investors have a switching strategy, in which
the switching signal equals exactly θ?.
Proof. See Appendix 3.6.
This unique solution is
θ? = (R− 1
3
η2)
1
2 (3.7)
The three steps can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3.1 There exists a unique threshold equilibrium θ? of the game
with imperfect information, such that any investor i invests if and only if θi ≤
θ? and does not invest if θi > θ?.
Proposition 3.1 permits the conclusion that θ? identified by Equation (3.7)
is the unique threshold equilibrium of the game with private information.
3.2.3 Results and Implications
The unique threshold equilibrium allows to show that an increase in the degree
of disagreement about the fundamentals in country B increases the probability
of a crisis there.
Proposition 3.2 A crisis becomes more likely to occur in country B if a sur-
prise crisis happens in country A. A crisis becomes less likely to occur in
country B if an anticipated crisis materializes in country A.
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Proof. To prove Proposition 3.2, it suffices to calculate the comparative statics
of the unique threshold equilibrium in terms of the fundamentals with respect
to η.
These deliver the following result:
∂θ?
∂η
=
1
2
(R− 1
3
η2)−
1
2 (−2
3
η) < 0 (3.8)
This result implies that the threshold below which all investors invest shifts
to the left (right), i.e., to better (worse) levels of the fundamentals, if the
dispersion of private signals around the true value of the fundamentals increases
(decreases) due to a surprise (anticipated) crises in country A. Thereby, the
probability space of the good equilibrium is reduced (increased) and, hence, a
crisis becomes more (less) likely in the case where private signals are dispersed
in an η + c (η − d) surrounding of the true fundamentals, as opposed to the
case where they are only dispersed in an η surrounding.
Due to the assumption that higher uncertainty results from a crisis in
another country, e.g., Thailand in the case of Korea, the shift of the threshold
can be viewed as an incident of contagion.23
θB*‘
PB
PB (η+c)
θB*
with c>0
θB, θBi
PB (η)
Figure 3.3: θ?B as a function of the dispersion of private signals in country B
Figure 3.3 illustrates the comparative static analysis. The payoff is plotted
against the level of the fundamentals. θ?
′
B lies at lower levels of the fundamentals
than θ?B as described above due to η + c being a higher value than η. Clearly,
the threshold based on a dispersion of private signals η− d would lie at higher
levels of the fundamentals than θ?B.
23This assumption is justified by empirical evidence, see Figure 3.1.
3.3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 117
3.2.4 Testable Hypotheses
In this section, the predictions of the theoretical model are translated into
testable hypotheses. From Proposition 3.2, two testable hypotheses can be
derived:
Hypothesis 1 The occurrence of a surprise crisis in a first country makes a
crisis in a second country more likely through an increase in uncertainty about
the fundamentals in the second country.
Hypothesis 2 The occurrence of an anticipated crisis in a first country makes
a crisis in a second country more likely through a decrease in uncertainty about
the fundamentals in the second country.
3.3 Empirical Analysis
The purpose of this section is to validate the predictions of the theoretical
model. I focus on showing the effect of uncertainty about the fundamentals as
a channel through which crises spread from one financial market to another.
3.3.1 The Data
A rich data set is used comprising monthly observations of different alternative
crisis measures as the dependent variable, a measure of uncertainty as the main
explanatory variable, and a large set of control variables.24 The data run from
December 1993 to September 2005. The sample comprises 38 countries – 15
developed and 23 emerging – where the selection of the period and countries
reflects the existence of uncertainty and return data.25 I exclude the initial
crises countries (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Russia, Thailand, and Turkey)
from the set of potentially-affected countries. Although this means a non-
negligible loss in observations, this procedure is in favor of finding convincing
results.
The explanatory variable that is most interesting for the current analysis
is uncertainty about the fundamentals. As in the chapter on sudden stops
24Please refer to Table 3.2 in Appendix 3.6 for detailed descriptions of the time series and
their calculation.
25For details, please refer to Table 3.1 in Appendix 3.6.
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of capital flows, I use the standard deviation of growth forecasts by a group
of country experts as a measure of uncertainty. In models similar to Morris
and Shin (1998), uncertainty takes the form of the dispersion of private sig-
nals around the true value of the fundamentals. In the current model, this
is the dispersion of the private signals about the true value of the investment
environment. Such data is not directly observable. However, investment en-
vironments correlate strongly with the country levels of GDP and associated
growth. Hence, the available data by Consensus Economics on the standard
deviation of GDP growth forecasts between experts in an economy seems a
reasonable proxy.26
To measure the significant drops in stock returns, a crisis dummy variable
is constructed. Monthly stock market returns, computed from IFC (Interna-
tional Finance Corporation) investable US dollar total return index, serve as a
basis for this crisis dummy.27 When needed, I complete the returns with data
from MSCI (Morgan Stanley Capital International) or national sources.28 I
construct a binary crisis variable of severe drops in stock market returns, in
which a month is counted as a crisis month if the total return undershoots its
sample mean by more than two standard deviations. After this initial drop, the
subsequent months are also counted as crisis months until the return reverts
into the one standard deviation band around the sample mean.29
I use a rich set of domestic control variables. Most important are the
mean of the growth expectations by Consensus Economics to control for the
status of the economy and its evaluation by investors. Additionally, I disen-
tangle the effect of uncertainty about the fundamentals from effects linked to
the volatility of stock market returns, which I include as a control variable
into the regressions. Following Broner et al. (2006), I use the ICRG (In-
26Please refer to chapter 2 for detailed arguments why this measure is a good proxy of
the dispersion of private signals around the true fundamentals of an economy. See Table
3.2 in Appendix 3.6 for a description of the exact construction of the variable. In the main
analysis, I use a weighted average of current and following year forecasts as described in
Table 3.2. However, as a robustness check I repeat all estimations with the current year,
and all estimations with following-year forecasts, separately. The results are qualitatively
the same and quantitatively similar.
27The investable indices take into consideration restrictions on foreign investment. There-
fore, this measure represents the part of the national stock markets accessible to foreign
investors, which is relevant in the context of contagion.
28For more details, please refer to Table 3.2 in Appendix 3.6.
29I run the regressions with variants of this measure, i.e., 1.5 standard deviations and also
3.
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ternational Country Risk Guide) indices of financial, economic, and political
risk as a summary statistics to control for the state of the fundamentals in
the potentially-affected country. Then, domestic liability dollarization, TOT
growth, and credit growth are included as further control variables.
Numerous alternative mechanisms of contagion appear to be relevant in the
context of stock market drops. Specifically, I control for contagion through
common creditors. In line with Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001), I use
consolidated data of BIS banking statistics to construct an index of contagion
through the presence of a common creditor. However, I construct a different
index than their index. The index used in this chapter of the study reflects the
dependence on common creditors as opposed to their measure that reflects the
competition for funds. In the context of stock market drops, the dependence
appears more relevant than competition for their funding.30 Another relevant
channel of contagion is trade with the crisis country. Following Glick and Rose
(1999), I use bilateral export data from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics
to construct the measure of trade contagion. However, in contrast to their
contagion measure, I use the export share to country A in total exports. For
the control of contagion through common overexposed fund investments, I
use the index developed by Broner et al. (2006). I interact the alternative
contagion measures with the crisis dummies for country A. It seems natural
that the contagion variables only play a role for the uncertainty in country B
if there is a crisis in country A to begin with.
3.3.2 Methodology
The goal of this study is to show that uncertainty about the fundamentals
has a separate and non-negligible effect on the spread of crises apart from the
channels already studied. If the goal of the present study were to prove the
relevance of uncertainty and its predominant role relative to other potential
explanatory variables in spreading financial crises, the best procedure to prove
this point would be a two-step instrumental variable estimation.31
In the context of analyzing contagion, it would be difficult to find a valid
instrument for the uncertainty in country B. Arguing, for example, for the use
30For detail on the construction of this index, please refer to Table 3.2 in Appendix 3.6.
31A good example of a convincing instrumental variable estimation is Acemoglu, Johnson,
and Robinson (2001) who analyze institutions as opposed to geography as explanation of
differences in current dispersion of countries’ incomes.
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of the crisis in country A as an instrument for the uncertainty in B requires the
crisis in A to significantly affect the uncertainty in B but not to directly affect
the probability of a crisis in country B and not to affect it through a channel
different from uncertainty. The existing literature on alternative channels of
contagion already proves the last assumption wrong. Other variables linked
to the crises in A, which might serve as instruments for the uncertainty in
B, would have the same problem: they are likely to also feed into alternative
channels of contagion.
Given the presence of alternative contagion channels other than the uncer-
tainty channel and therefore the impossibility of finding a valid instrument for
uncertainty in B, this empirical analysis is designed in the following way:32
In a first step, the effect of the crisis in country A on the uncertainty in a
second country B is estimated. To ensure that the effect of the crisis in A on
the uncertainty in B is correctly quantified, I control for potential domestic
drivers of uncertainty. I also control for country and time effects. Thereby, I
employ a very strict test on the effect of uncertainty on the occurrence of a
crisis. The control for time effects is often avoided in the literature. In the
second step, I analyze the effect of uncertainty in country B on the probability
of a crisis there. In this step, I run probit regressions estimating the effect of
the uncertainty in B on the probability of crises there. I control for domestic
factors that could trigger crises and also for alternative contagion channels.
Additionally, I control for country and time effects.
One drawback of this approach is that in contrast to an instrumental vari-
able estimation, reverse causality from the crisis in B on the uncertainty there
cannot be entirely ruled out. However, as described in more detail in subsec-
tion 3.3.3, I run a number of regressions to be confident that this possibility is
minimized in the chosen setup.
Methodology Used to Estimate the Effect of the Initial Crisis on the
Uncertainty in Potentially-affected Countries
To analyze the relevance of the uncertainty channel of contagion, I proceed
in two distinct steps. In the first step, I pin down the effect of the crisis in
country A on the uncertainty in a second country B. In the second step, I
analyze the effect of uncertainty in country B on the probability of a crisis
32In section 3.3.3, the reasons for this design are described in further detail.
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there.
In step one, I estimate two sets of regressions. Firstly, I specify the following
test:
uncB,t = α0
+ α1d crArg,t−1 + ... + α6d crTur,t−1
+ α7d crB,t−1 + α8macrocntrlsB,t + δB + εB,t (3.9)
with B = 1, 2, ..., 32; t = 1, 2, ..., 141,
where uncB,t signifies the uncertainty in the potentially-affected country
B at time t. I exclude the initial crises countries Argentina, Brazil, Mexico,
Russia, Thailand, and Turkey in the panel as potentially-affected countries.
Therefore, the index B represents the 32 remaining countries in the sample.
d crA,t−1 signifies the lag of the crisis dummies in the initial-crisis countries A,
representing Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Russia, Thailand, and Turkey. The
dummy variable takes a value of 1 if there is a significant drop in the stock
market return. macrocntrlsB,t−1 stands for the set of domestic control variables
described in section 3.3.1. δB stands for country specific effects. The level of
uncertainty varies strongly across countries.33 Systematically, some countries
are characterized by higher uncertainty than other countries, therefore, requir-
ing control for country effects. I run fixed-effects regressions to accommodate
this fact. Finally, εB,t stands for the error term.
Controlling for time effects in the above setting is not possible because
the average effect of each of the initial crises on the uncertainty in all the
countries contained in the sample is estimated. As the coefficients for each
of the crises are forced to be the same in the regression in all the potentially-
affected countries, it could be that the coefficients of the time dummies capture
part of the effect that actually comes from the crisis variable. To circumvent
this problem, I interact the crisis variable with the distance between the crisis
variable and the potentially-affected countries. I employ the distance variable
first used by Rose (2004). This creates heterogeneity in the crisis variable
across countries, which is necessary to be able to control for time effects.
33This is illustrated in chapter 2, in which I first introduce the measure of uncertainty.
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Therefore, I run additional regressions based on the following equation:
uncB,t = α0
+ α1d crArg,t−1disArg,B + ... + α6d crTur,t−1disTur,B
+ α7d crB,t−1 + α8macrocntrlsB,t + δB + γt + εB,t (3.10)
where all the abbreviations have the same meaning as in Equation (3.9).
Additionally, the terms disArg,B and γt stand for the distance from initial-crisis
country to the potentially-affected country B and for the time effects, respec-
tively. To estimate Equation (3.10), I also run fixed-effects panel regressions,
additionally controlling for time effects.
Methodology Used to Estimate the Effect of the Uncertainty on the
Probability of a Crisis in Potentially-affected Countries
For the analysis of the effect of uncertainty on the probability of a crisis in a
potentially-affected country, I specify the following estimation equation:
Prob(d crB = 1|xB,tβ0) = G(β0
+ β1
∑
A=Arg,...,Tur
(ctgA,B,t−1 ∗ d crA,t−1)
+ β2uncB,t−1 ∗
∑
A=Arg,...,Tur
(d crA,t−1) + δB + γt + εB,t)
(3.11)
with B = 1, 2, ..., 32; t = 1, 2, ..., 141.
Since this study is interested in the increase of the probability of a crisis,
I employ probit estimations. Hence, G(.) is the standard normal cumulative
distribution function. ctgA,B,t−1 represents the alternative channels of conta-
gion from country A to country B: common creditors, trade, dependence on
a common overexposed fund investor, and finally also the market size of the
crisis country. These are interacted with the crises in the initial-crisis countries
taking into account that it is important to control for their effect in transmit-
ting those crises to country B. I also include the interaction of uncertainty
with the crises because it is the effect of uncertainty – if a crisis in country A
takes place – which is of interest.
Probit models do not lend themselves to consistent estimates of the co-
efficients in a fixed effects regression. Hence, instead of a fixed-effects panel
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estimation, a pooled probit introducing dummies can capture the country ef-
fects and time effects. Additionally, I estimate a linear probability model to
overcome the potential incidental-parameter problem that can arise in the de-
scribed procedure. As a plausibility check, I repeat the regressions with the
continuous return as dependent variable and run simple OLS regressions.
Using the interaction term of the uncertainty measure in B with the sum
of crises variables in countries A as a regressor implies the following risk: It
could be that the coefficient on this term simply picks up the direct effect of
the crises in A on a crisis in B. To ensure that this is not the case, I estimate
a set of regressions, in which I enter the uncertainty variable and the initial
crises variables separately. In these very simple regressions, I use the following
specification:
Prob(d crB = 1|xB,tβ0) = G(β0
+ β1d crA,t−1 + ... + β6d crA,t−1
+ β7uncB,t−1 + β8mgexpB,t−1 + δB + εB,t)
(3.12)
with B = 1, 2, ..., 32; t = 1, 2, ..., 141.
Again, the abbreviations stand for the same variables as before. Further-
more, I put the mean growth expectations explicitly in Equation (3.12) to
emphasize that it is used in this simple regression as a summary of the situa-
tion of country B.
3.3.3 Results
The results of the empirical analysis suggest that the uncertainty channel of
contagion does play a role in spreading crises across markets. First, I find a sig-
nificant and robust effect of the initial crisis on the uncertainty in potentially-
affected countries. Second, I find a significant and robust effect of the uncer-
tainty in the second country on the probability of a crisis there.34
34In the following, I show the results calculating the stock market returns from the MSCI
index, using a return drop of more than 2 standard deviations below the sample mean
as crisis criterion and employing a weighted average of current and following year GDP
forecasts as basis for the uncertainty measure. However, I have run the estimations also
with the return data from IFC, with two variations of the crisis criterion, and with the
current year and the following year forecasts separately. The results of these different sets of
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The Effect of a Crisis in an Initial-crisis Country on the Uncertainty
in a Potentially-affected Country
The analysis of the effect of an initial crisis on disagreement about the funda-
mentals in potentially-affected countries shows an interesting pattern: I find
that the Mexican, Russian, and Thai crises significantly increase disagreement
about the fundamentals in other countries. The literature identifies these crises
as surprise crises.
However, in the case of the three other crises in the sample – the Brazilian,
Turkish, and Argentinean crises – the panel analysis shows a different pattern:
The Turkish and Argentinean crises significantly decrease the uncertainty in
potentially-affected countries. The effect of the Brazilian crisis is less clear.
The literature identifies these crises as anticipated crises.
These results are robust to choosing regional sub-samples, emerging mar-
kets sub-samples, and including a large number of control variables. Table
3.5 summarizes the results of the fixed-effects panel regressions with those
sub-samples.
(Table 3.5 here)
The different columns in Table 3.5 correspond to the regression results from
different sub-samples. Column 1 shows the coefficients of the fixed-effects panel
regression of uncertainty in all potentially-affected countries on the crises in
all the initial crises countries and a set of control variables. Column 2 displays
regression results of the regression of the crises in all initial crises countries
on uncertainty in emerging market economies. Columns 3 to 10, then, show
results for regressions of the regional crises in the sub-samples of all economies
(columns 3, 5, 7, 9) and only the emerging economies (columns 4, 6, 8 and 10)
within Asia (columns 3 to 6), within Eastern Europe (columns 7 and 8) and
within Latin America (columns 9 and 10).
In all regressions, the lag of the 1994 Mexican, the 1998 Russian, and the
1997 Thai crises have a significant and positive effect on the uncertainty in the
analyses are qualitatively the same and quantitatively similar. Therefore, I do not include
them in this chapter.
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potentially-affected countries. Comparing columns 9 and 10 with columns 1
and 2 reveals that the effect of the Mexican crisis is stronger on uncertainty in
Latin American countries (they are all emerging countries, which explains why
columns 9 and 10 are identical) than on the entire sample of countries or the
sub-sample of all emerging economies. A crisis event in Mexico leads to an in-
crease of the standard deviation of growth expectations across country experts
of 0.174 percentage points in Latin American countries. The Mexican crisis
exerts a smaller effect on uncertainty in the sample of all emerging markets,
increasing the standard deviation of growth expectations by 0.059 percentage
points. This effect is slightly bigger than the one observed in the sample of all
countries, where the increase is 0.044 percentage points.
The same pattern holds for the Russian and Thai crises. However, for these
two crises, the difference in the magnitude of the effect within their own region,
compared to the effect on the entire sample of countries, is not as large as for
the Mexican crisis. The effect of the Thai crisis on uncertainty in emerging
Asia is an increase of 0.123 percentage points of the standard deviation, while
its effect on all Asian countries is a bit smaller: 0.112. In the sample of all
emerging markets, the effect of the Thai crisis is 0.085 percentage points and
in the sample of all the countries, the effect is 0.063. While the Russian crisis
increases the standard deviation of growth expectations in Eastern European
countries by 0.145 percentage points, its effect on all emerging and all countries
amounts to 0.086 and 0.048 percentage points only.
These results suggest that the Mexican crisis has the strongest effect on
uncertainty in other countries, in magnitude within its own region among the
three mentioned crises. However, the Mexican crisis has less impact beyond
its own region than have the Russian and the Thai crises. Furthermore, these
results suggest that the Thai crisis has the biggest effect of all three crises in
the developed world.
A closer look on results for the 2002 Argentinean, the 1999 Brazilian, and
the 2001 Turkish crisis reveals a different picture. While the Argentinean crisis
decreases the standard deviation of growth expectation by 0.146 percentage
points in Latin American countries, the effect is weaker in the sample of all
emerging markets and all countries: a decrease of 0.039 and 0.026, respectively.
In case of the Brazilian crisis, only the decrease of 0.027 percentage points of
standard deviation of the growth expectation in the sample of all countries is
significant at the five-percent level, while the effect of this crisis is insignifi-
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cant in all the sub-samples. The Turkish crisis delivers the same pattern as
the Argentinean crisis. However, the Turkish crisis presents one interesting
additional finding. First, estimating the effect of the Turkish crisis in the sub-
sample of Eastern European countries shows that the Turkey crisis yields a
decrease of uncertainty of 0.043 measured in the standard deviation of growth
expectations in those countries. Second, estimating the effect of the Turkish
crisis in the subsamples of emerging Asian countries and all Asian countries,
the effect is much stronger: There the crisis in Turkey results in a decrease of
0.1 and 0.074 percentage points respectively.
These results suggest that the negative effects of the Argentinean and Turk-
ish crises on uncertainty in potentially-affected countries are stronger within
their own regions than beyond. The Turkish crisis shows a bigger effect in Asia
than in Eastern Europe. The effect of the Brazilian crisis is less clear.
The coefficients on the control variables used in the regressions have the
expected signs. In particular, as expected, the lag of the mean of the growth
expectations impacts uncertainty negatively. This variable can be seen as a
summary of the state of the fundamentals and the expectations about it. If
the fundamentals are good – or everyone expects them to be good – then
disagreement about the fundamentals decreases. The lag of the crises in the
potentially-affected countries shows a positive and significant effect on uncer-
tainty. Past stock market volatility also has a strong positive and significant
effect on uncertainty.35 Additionally, I use the ICRG financial, economic, and
political risk indices as summary of the fundamentals following Broner et al.
(2006). The coefficients on these variables are mostly not significant in the
regressions.
To further ensure the robustness of the effects that the above regressions
reveal, I run a second set of regressions, controlling for time effects. As ex-
plained in section 3.3.2, controlling for time effects in the above setting is not
possible. To circumvent this problem, I interact the crisis variable with the
distance between the crisis variable and the potentially-affected countries.36
35By introducing the stock market volatility, I lose India from the sample and also lose a
non-negligible amount of observations. Therefore, I have run all the regressions also without
the stock market variable. The results are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar. For
this reason only the results including the stock market variable are displayed. In regressions
without the stock market volatility, the coefficient on past crisis in country B is slightly
higher.
36By using the distance variable, I lose Slovakia and Taiwan, for which the distances to
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This creates heterogeneity in the crisis variable across countries, making con-
trol of time effects possible. Clearly, the meaning of the explanatory variable
is slightly changed. Now additionally, whether the distance in the sense of
Rose (2004) increases or decreases the effect of a crisis on the uncertainty in
the potentially-affected countries, makes a difference.
I repeat the above fixed-effects panel regression, replacing the lagged crises
variables for the Argentinean, Brazilian, Mexican, Russian, Thai, and Turkish
crisis with the interaction term between those crises variables with the distance
to the potentially-affected countries and control for time effects in addition.
Table 3.6 in Appendix 3.6 displays the results. The overall pattern of effects
remains the same as in the first set of regressions. The effects are still highly
significant. The only exception is the coefficient on the interaction term of the
Russian crisis with the distance variable in the regressions with the samples of
all and of all emerging markets, which become insignificant.
As the effect of the crises in the initial countries on uncertainty becomes
smaller, the question arises whether this stems from the interaction of the crises
with the distance or from the control for time effects. To disentangle these two
cases, I also run regressions with the interaction variables without controlling
for time effects. The results are displayed in Table 3.7 in Appendix 3.6. The
regression results are very similar to the ones where I control for time effects.
This result suggests that the interaction with the distance variable explains
the lower coefficients and thus the weaker effect of the crisis in the initial-crisis
countries on uncertainty; the control for time effects is not driving this result.
Hence, it is safe to say that the effect of the initial-crisis country diminishes
with an increasing distance. Taken together, these regression outcomes confirm
the observations from the first set of regressions. The results are robust against
the inclusion of time effects.
To summarize the findings of the first step of the analysis: The analysis
shows that the Mexican, the Russian, and the Thai crises significantly increase
uncertainty in potentially-affected countries. The effect is stronger within the
region where the crisis takes place. The Argentinean, the Turkish, and, to a
lesser extent, the Brazilian crises decrease uncertainty in potentially-affected
countries. These last three crises have a stronger negative effect within their
region. The effect appears to decrease with increasing distance.
the initial crises countries are not available in the data set underlying Rose (2004).
128 CHAPTER 3. UNCERTAINTY AND SPREAD OF CRISES
These findings are in line with the hypotheses derived from the theoretical
model. Recall that surprise crises increase uncertainty in other countries, while
anticipated crises decrease uncertainty in other countries. The findings regard-
ing the different regional effects are not captured by the theoretical model.
The Effect of the Uncertainty on the Probability of a Crisis in a
Potentially-affected Country
In the second step of the analysis, I show robustly that uncertainty in the
potentially-affected country increases the probability of a crisis there. These
results are summarized in Tables 3.8 to 3.12.
Firstly, I run a pooled probit regression of the crises in the potentially-
affected countries on the interaction of uncertainty in country B, with the
sum of all initial crises countries, controlling for a set of variables including
country and time effects. Apart from the controls for country and time effects,
these variables classify in two categories: 1) domestic control variables and
2) alternative contagion channels, which could influence the likelihood of a
crisis in the potentially-affected countries. Table 3.8 displays the results. The
results of the pooled probit estimations including country and time controls
are displayed in column 1 for the sample of all countries and column 2 for the
sample of all emerging market countries. The estimation results of the linear
probability model are shown in columns 3 and 4. The outcomes of the simple
OLS regressions with the continuous return variable as dependent variable
appear in columns 5 and 6.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.8 show the lag of uncertainty interacted with
the sum of crises in all initial crises countries has a positive and strongly sig-
nificant effect on the probability of a crisis in the potentially-affected country.
The effect is stronger in emerging economies. Introducing the dummies into
the pooled probit regression does not seem to create a severe incidental pa-
rameter problem. The magnitude of the effect is, indeed, smaller in columns 3
and 4 but the effect is still strongly significant and not negligible. The effect
of the uncertainty on the continuous return variable in columns 5 and 6 not
being significant is not problematic. The theoretical model is about crises,
which are extreme events. The regression with the continuous return variable
as regressand is a plausibility check, only. For example, if an increase in un-
certainty increased the return, while simultaneously increasing the probability
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of a crisis, this would worry.
Secondly, I run the regressions with the interaction of uncertainty with
the sum of the crises in Mexico, Russia and Thailand. These are the crises
identified to increase the uncertainty in other countries. The results of these
regressions are summarized in Table 3.9.
(Table 3.9 here)
Clearly, the effects of uncertainty are stronger in the current regression
than in those with all initial crises countries.37 Here, also the coefficients of
the uncertainty term are significant when using the continuous return variable
as regressand.
Calculating marginal effects makes clear that the effect of the uncertainty
on the probability of crises in the potentially-affected countries is not negligible.
Details are shown in Table 3.12.
(Table 3.12 here)
The control variables have the expected signs. With regard to country
characteristics the following variables are controlled for: the lag of the mean
growth expectations, the lag of stock market volatility, and the ICRG risk
indices for economic, financial, and political risk.
With regard to alternative contagion channels, the following variables are
controlled for: the common creditor channel of contagion, the direct trade
channel, contagion from important stock markets, and contagion through com-
mon overexposed fund investors. I use slightly different definitions than the
37This finding goes beyond what is explained by the theoretical model, which would not
distinguish the intensity of an increase or decrease of uncertainty after a surprise crisis or
an anticipated crisis.
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literature to construct the index of common creditors and the index of trade
share with the initial-crisis country. The definitions that I use are more plausi-
ble in the context of stock market drops, rather than the existing indices which
have been developed to study contagion of currency crises. Section 3.3.1 ex-
plains the construction of these variables exactly. I estimate regressions, which
include the channel through overexposed fund investors separately, and show
the results in Table 3.10. This is due to the fact that I have the index of over-
exposed common creditors only for the sample of emerging markets without
Ukraine.38
The market size of the initial-crisis country turns out to be not significant
in the regressions (see Tables 3.8 to 3.10). If not controlling for overexposed
common fund investors, I find that common creditors and trade share have a
high explanatory power for the occurrence of a crises in the potentially-affected
countries (see Tables 3.8 and 3.9). However, if I introduce the control of the
overexposed common fund investor index, these two variables become insignif-
icant, which makes them appear not entirely robust, at least in the emerging
market sample, for which I can test the overexposure channel. Notably, the
overexposure channel cannot significantly contribute to the explanation of the
continuous fund returns in columns 5 and 6 in Table 3.10, while Broner et al.
(2006) find a significant effect. This difference could stem from the severe test
with control for country and time effects that I run in the present analysis.
As explained in section 3.3.2, care must be taken to ensure against only
picking up the direct effect of the crises in the initial-crises countries when
interacting the uncertainty in B with the sum of crises in the initial-crises
countries. The results in Table 3.11 show that the uncertainty has a distinct
positive and strongly significant effect on a crisis event in the same economy.
The possibility of reverse causality is not tackled in this second step of my
empirical analysis. This problem could arise if the crisis in B itself caused
the uncertainty to increase. There are two answers to this concern: First,
the present analysis is interested in the uncertainty that is caused by crises
elsewhere. I show robustly that a crisis in A significantly influences uncertainty
in country B. In this step, reverse causality is unlikely. Hence, this part of the
analysis is not affected by the endogeneity concern.
38I am very thankful to Broner et al. (2006) for making their overexposure index available
to me. Due to the expensive underlying source data, I would not have been able to control
for this relevant contagion channel otherwise.
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The problem arises only in the second step. Here, singling out perfectly
the uncertainty caused by the crisis in country A is not possible. However,
interacting uncertainty in B with the crises in the initial crises countries and,
at the same time, controlling for domestic causes of increased uncertainty pro-
vides the second answer to the endogeneity concern. The interaction allows to
consider exclusively the relevant time periods. Therefore, uncertainty caused
by the crises in the other countries should be especially high. Additionally,
controlling for the fundamentals in country B in the same regressions corrects
for domestic causes of increased uncertainty in B. As a check in the second
step, I estimate a set of regressions, in which I include uncertainty and crisis
indices for the initial crises countries both as separate explanatory variables.
Also in these regressions, the effect of uncertainty is positive and strongly sig-
nificant. In a follow-up check, I run a further set of regressions, including
exclusively either the crises indices in countries A or the uncertainty in B as
explanatory variables. The coefficient of uncertainty does not change signifi-
cantly. Thereby, I make sure that the uncertainty has a separate effect on the
probability of crises in B from the direct effect of the crisis in A.
Instrumental variable estimation is not an answer to the endogeneity con-
cern in the present setup. Instrumenting uncertainty, for example, by its past
realizations does not help. In the case where the instrument reaches far enough
back into the past, the instrument might be realized before the crises in the
initial-crisis country. It would then pick up exactly the part of uncertainty that
is not of interest in this analysis. Therefore, the series of checks conducted in
the present study appear to be the best available option.
These arguments support plausibility and reliability of the results. Further
soundness comes when taking these arguments together with the results of the
analysis on sudden stops in chapter 2. There, I show the strongly significant
effect of uncertainty on the occurrence of a crisis after taking care of the
endogeneity problem.
Together with the findings in section 3.3.3, the sets of regressions in the
current section support the theoretical model. Uncertainty in potentially-
affected countries increases with the occurrence of a surprise crisis in initial-
crises countries. In turn, this increase in uncertainty leads to an increase of the
probability of a crisis in potentially-affected countries. In case of an anticipated
crisis in the first country, the uncertainty in the second country is reduced. In
turn, this decreased uncertainty decreases the probability of a crisis in the
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second country. The fact that the coefficients on the interaction term in Table
3.8 are larger than those in Table 3.9 suggests that the decreasing effect of
a decreasing uncertainty on the crisis probability after an anticipated initial
crisis is weaker than the increasing effect of an increased uncertainty after a
surprise crisis in the initial-crisis country on the crisis probability. However,
the weaker results in Table 3.8 could also stem from the Brazilian crisis not
having a clear-cut effect on the uncertainty in potentially-affected countries.
These empirical results align with the theoretical model. First of all, a large
part of the literature agrees that there was much less international response in
form of crisis in other countries to the Brazilian, the Turkish, and the Argen-
tinean crisis than to the three other crises.39 Additionally, Didier et al. (2006)
and Mondria (2006a) argue that the Brazilian, Turkish, and Argentinean crises
were anticipated by the investors while the Mexican, Thai, and Russian crises
caught them by surprise.
3.4 Policy Implications
The first, obvious implication of my analysis is that investors and governments
should closely monitor fundamentals also of other countries, especially in the
region and in adjacent countries. Surprise crises appear to be especially bad be-
cause they set off mechanisms that worsen the situation further. This chapter
illustrates such a mechanism through the uncertainty about the fundamentals.
Second, once a surprise crisis has hit a first country, governments need to
apply policies that counteract the increase in uncertainty about the funda-
mentals in country B. One venue could be to develop mechanisms for such
situations through which governments could disseminate credibly very precise
information about the state of their economy. In this model, I have not been
concerned with credibility issues, so I can only infer something about a cred-
ible government. In reality, governments might not be credible – they might
be tempted strongly to signal that the fundamentals in their country are very
satisfying. However, one way toward overcoming the credibility problem and
helping private investors receive more precise private signals, would be to al-
low full access to the government accounts to a few independent institutions,
which could then sell the information to private investors. Such a procedure
39See, for example, Kaminsky et al. (2000) or Didier et al. (2006).
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ensures that private investors have private information but with little disper-
sion around the true value of the fundamentals. Another venue would be to
think about subsidies for information-gathering technology.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I illustrate the uncertainty channel of contagion in a coordina-
tion game and then validate the predictions empirically. In particular, I find
that surprise crises in an initial-crisis country such as the Mexican, Thai, or
Russian crises increase the probability of a crisis in other countries. In the case
of an anticipated crisis such as the Brazilian, Turkey, or Argentinean crises,
uncertainty is reduced making crises in potentially-affected countries less likely.
Additionally, the empirical analysis shows that the effects through uncertainty
are stronger in potentially-affected countries within the same region as and
closer to the initial-crisis country.
The results of the present analysis suggest that investors and governments
should closely monitor the fundamentals of neighboring countries to minimize
the risk of a surprise crisis. Second, policy makers should take uncertainty
about the fundamentals into account. Once a surprise crisis happens elsewhere,
policy makers should be ready to counteract the increase in the disagreement
about the fundamentals by adequate policies. Strategies that help private
investors receive precise private signals appear prudent in the light of this
analysis.
The present analysis also confirms the findings of the relevance of other
contagion channels especially through overexposed fund investors, also through
trade links and common creditors. However, on top of these channels, which
have been analyzed by the literature for some time, uncertainty does play a
role in explaining contagion patterns. And, as the analysis of marginal effects
shows, the effect is not negligible.
In this chapter, I have taken the change in dispersion of the private signals
in the second economy as given if a crisis happens in the first country. A
worthwhile future research agenda is to explicitly model the optimal choice
of spending on information-gathering technology. This would result in an
endogenous change in dispersion of the private signals in the second market.
As to the empirical analysis, future research moving to higher frequency
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data, if available, could be worthwhile. This step might allow the exploration
of more convincing ways of determining the direction of causality.
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3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Lemma Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.1 (Monotonicity of P )
Proof. The monotonicity of P in θi can be very easily shown: In
P (θi, IT ) = R · prob(θi ≤ T )− E(1
2
θ2|θi)
R does not depend on θi. In addition,
∂prob(θi ≤ T )
∂θi
=
{
0 if T < θi − 2η and T > θi + 2η
< 0 if θi − 2η < T < θi + 2η
Therefore, the term R · prob(θi ≤ T ) is weakly decreasing in θi. The term
−∂E(
1
2
θ2|θi)
∂θi
< 0
is strictly decreasing in θi. As a consequence, P (θi, IT ) is strictly monotonically
decreasing in θi.
Proof of Lemma 3.2 (Uniqueness of Equilibrium)
Proof. Equation (3.6) can be rewritten as follows:
P (θ?, Iθ?) = R · prob(θj ≤ θ?)− 1
2η
∫ θ?+η
θ?−η
1
2
θ2dθ = 0 (3.13)
This leads to
P (θ?, Iθ?) =
1
2
R− 1
2η
[
1
6
θ3]θ
?+η
θ?−η = 0 (3.14)
This equation defines θ? and can easily be rearranged to equation (3.7).
3.6.2 Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies
The elimination is started at the borders of the dominance ranges. Due to the
strict monotonicity in θi, there exist unambiguous signals θ
1
< θ
0
= θ and
θ1 > θ0 = θ, such that
P (θi, I
θ
0) < 0 for all θi > θ
1
and P (θi, Iθ0) > 0 for all θ
i < θ1
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As θ
0
> θ0, it also holds that θ
1
> θ1. For the case of the upper border of
the multiplicity area, this means: Given that the other agents do not invest
when receiving signals above θ
0
, the investment does not pay for signals above
θ
1
either. Where I find θ
1
by calculating P (θi = θ
1
, I
θ
0). This process can
be iterated. Given that the other agents do not invest when receiving signals
above θ
n
, it does not pay to invest at a signal θ
n+1
with θ
n+1
< θ
n
. The
signals θ
n+1
are found by setting the expected payoff difference to 0, reflecting
indifference between investment and no investment for investor i:
P (θ
n+1
, Iθn) = R · prob(θj ≤ θ
n
)− E(1
2
θ2|θi = θn+1) (3.15)
The sequence θ
n
is decreasing, monotone and bounded. By the common
knowledge of rationality, this process is driven to its limit of θ
?
= limn→∞θ
n
.
Concretely, it is possible to find a value θ
?
such that
P (θ
?
, Iθ?) = 0 (3.16)
θ
?
has the interpretation that above this signal all agents do not invest with
certainty.
At the lower bound of the multiplicity area, the analogue situation occurs,
just with the sequence θn being increasing. There one iterates until one finds:
P (θ?, Iθ?) = 0 (3.17)
That means, one iterates until one finds a maximum (minimum) signal at
which agent i is indifferent between investing and not, and which is at the
same time the threshold of the switching strategy of all other agents, when
starting off at θ
0
= θ (θ0 = θ).
The switching strategies Iθ? and Iθ? are Nash equilibria of the private in-
formation game. According to Milgrom and Roberts (1990), in all games with
strategic complementarity, the highest and the lowest equilibrium that resist
the iterative elimination of dominated strategies are Nash equilibria. Put the
other way round: These Nash equilibria can never be eliminated. If θ
?
= θ?,
there exists an unambiguous signal θ?, below which in equilibrium all agents
will invest and above which no one invests.
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3.6.3 Figures and Tables
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Table 3.1: Country sample
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tio
ns
 
be
lo
w
 
th
e 
sa
m
pl
e 
m
ea
n.
 
Su
bs
eq
ue
nt
 
m
o
nt
hs
 
ar
e 
als
o
 
co
un
te
d 
as
 
cr
isi
s 
m
o
nt
hs
 
un
til 
th
e 
re
tu
rn
 
m
o
ve
s 
ba
ck
 
int
o
 
th
e 
o
ne
 
st
an
da
rd
 
de
via
tio
n 
ba
nd
 
ar
o
un
d 
th
e 
sa
m
pl
e 
m
ea
n.
2 
se
ts
 
o
f c
ris
is 
m
ea
su
re
s:
 
1) 
IF
C
 
inv
es
ta
bl
e,
 
to
ta
l r
et
ur
n 
ind
ice
s,
 
2) 
M
SC
I t
o
ta
l r
et
ur
n 
ind
ice
s.
 
In
 
bo
th
 
ca
se
s 
I 
ha
ve
 
to
 
us
e 
lo
ca
l s
o
ur
ce
s 
fo
r 
Ro
m
an
ia,
 
Sl
o
va
ki
a 
an
d 
Ro
m
an
ia.
 
To
 
co
nv
er
t t
he
se
 
th
re
e 
na
tio
na
l in
di
ce
s 
fro
m
 
na
tio
na
l c
ur
re
nc
y 
to
 
U
S 
$ I
 
us
e 
ex
ch
an
ge
 
ra
te
 
en
d 
o
f 
pe
rio
d 
da
ta
 
fro
m
 
th
e 
IM
F:
 
IF
S.
 
Ex
pl
a
n
a
to
ry
 
V
a
ria
bl
e
:
U
nc
er
ta
int
y 
m
ea
su
re
M
o
nt
hly
 
da
ta
 
o
f t
he
 
w
eig
ht
ed
 
av
er
ag
e 
o
f t
he
 
st
an
da
rd
 
de
via
tio
ns
 
o
f t
he
 
cu
rr
en
t a
nd
 
fo
llo
w
ing
 
ye
ar
 
fo
re
ca
st
 
o
f e
co
no
m
ic 
gr
o
w
th
.
 
Th
e 
st
an
da
rd
 
de
via
tio
n 
is 
ca
lcu
lat
ed
 
fo
r 
th
e 
ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
 
th
at
 
ex
pe
rts
 
fo
r 
th
e 
sp
ec
ific
 
ec
o
no
m
y 
ut
te
r 
at
 
a 
pa
rti
cu
lar
 
po
int
 
in 
tim
e.
 
In
 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
th
e 
st
an
da
rd
 
de
via
tio
n 
o
f t
he
 
cu
rr
en
t y
ea
r 
fo
re
ca
st
s 
is 
w
eig
ht
ed
 
w
ith
 
11
/1
2 
an
d 
th
e 
st
an
da
rd
 
de
via
tio
n 
o
f t
he
 
fo
llw
o
ing
 
ye
ar
 
fo
re
ca
st
s 
w
ith
 
1/
12
.
 
In
 
Fe
br
ua
ry
 
th
e 
cu
rr
en
t y
ea
r 
va
lue
 
re
ce
ive
s 
10
/1
2 
w
eig
ht
 
an
d 
th
e 
fo
llw
ing
 
ye
ar
 
o
ne
 
2/
12
.
 
Th
is 
sc
he
m
e 
co
nt
inu
es
 
un
til 
D
ec
em
be
r 
w
ith
 
a 
w
eig
ht
ing
 
o
f 0
/1
2 
fo
r 
th
e 
cu
rr
en
t y
ea
r 
va
lue
 
an
d 
12
/1
2 
fo
r 
th
e 
fo
llo
w
ing
 
ye
ar
 
va
lue
.
C
o
ns
en
su
s 
Ec
o
no
m
ics
Table 3.2: List of variables
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V
ar
iab
les
M
ea
su
re
s
So
u
rc
es
D
o
m
e
st
ic
 
co
n
tr
o
l v
a
ria
bl
e
s
M
ea
n 
gr
o
w
th 
ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
M
o
nt
hly
 
da
ta
 
o
f t
he
 
w
eig
ht
ed
 
av
er
ag
e 
o
f t
he
 
m
ea
n 
o
f 
th
e 
cu
rr
en
t a
nd
 
fo
llo
w
ing
 
ye
ar
 
fo
re
ca
st
 
o
f G
D
P 
gr
o
w
th
.
 
Th
e 
m
ea
n 
is 
ca
lcu
lat
ed
 
fo
r 
th
e 
ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
 
th
at
 
ex
pe
rts
 
fo
r 
th
e 
sp
ec
ific
 
ec
o
no
m
y 
ut
te
r 
at
 
a 
pa
rti
cu
lar
 
po
int
 
in 
tim
e.
 
Th
e 
w
eig
ht
ing
 
sc
he
m
e 
is 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
as
 
fo
r 
th
e 
st
an
da
rd
 
de
via
tio
n.
C
o
ns
en
su
s 
Ec
o
no
m
ics
St
o
ck
 
m
ar
ke
t v
o
lat
ilit
y 
St
an
da
rd
 
de
via
tio
n 
o
f d
ail
y 
re
tu
rn
s 
ca
lcu
lat
ed
 
fo
r 
a 
tim
e 
w
ind
o
w
 
o
f t
hr
ee
 
m
o
nt
hs
 
fro
m
 
m
o
nt
h 
t-
2 
to
 
t.
C
f. 
cr
isi
s 
m
ea
su
re
.
 
H
o
w
ev
er
 
re
st
ric
te
d 
av
ail
ab
ilit
y 
o
f 
da
ily
 
re
tu
rn
s.
C
ha
ng
es
 
in 
the
 
po
liti
ca
l r
isk
D
iff
er
en
ce
 
in 
po
liti
ca
l r
isk
 
ind
ica
tio
r 
re
lat
ive
 
to
 
pr
ev
io
us
 
m
o
nt
h.
IC
RG
C
ha
ng
es
 
in 
the
 
ec
o
no
m
ic 
ris
k
D
iff
er
en
ce
 
in 
ec
o
no
m
ic 
ris
k 
ind
ica
tio
r 
re
lat
ive
 
to
 
pr
ev
io
us
 
m
o
nt
h.
IC
RG
C
ha
ng
es
 
in 
the
 
fin
an
cia
l r
isk
D
iff
er
en
ce
 
in 
fin
an
cia
l r
isk
 
ind
ica
tio
r 
re
lat
ive
 
to
 
pr
ev
io
us
 
m
o
nt
h.
IC
RG
D
ist
an
ce
 
to
 
ini
tia
l c
ris
is 
co
un
try
C
alc
ula
te
d 
by
 
Ro
se
 
(20
04
)
Ro
se
 
(20
04
)
D
o
m
es
tic
 
lia
bi
lity
 
do
lla
riz
at
io
n
D
ev
elo
pe
d 
co
un
tri
es
: L
o
ca
l a
ss
et
 
po
sit
io
ns
 
in 
fo
re
ign
 
cu
rr
en
cy
 
by
 
BI
S 
re
po
rti
ng
 
ba
nk
s 
as
 
a 
sh
ar
e 
o
f G
D
P.
 
EM
s:
 
D
o
lla
r 
de
po
sit
s 
pl
us
 
ba
nk
 
fo
re
ign
 
bo
rr
o
w
ing
 
as
 
a 
sh
ar
e 
o
f G
D
P.
C
alv
o
,
 
Iz
qu
ier
do
,
 
M
ejia
 
(20
04
): B
IS
,
 
H
o
no
ha
n 
an
d 
Sh
i (2
00
2),
 
C
en
tra
l B
an
ks
 
o
f A
us
tra
lia
,
 
N
ew
 
Ze
ala
nd
,
 
C
o
lum
bi
a,
 
K
o
re
a,
 
Br
az
il, 
IM
F:
 
IF
S
TO
T 
gr
o
w
th
D
ev
elo
pe
d 
co
un
tri
es
: L
o
ca
l a
ss
et
 
po
sit
io
ns
 
in 
fo
re
ign
 
cu
rr
en
cy
 
by
 
BI
S 
re
po
rti
ng
 
ba
nk
s 
as
 
a 
sh
ar
e 
o
f G
D
P.
 
EM
s:
 
D
o
lla
r 
de
po
sit
s 
pl
us
 
ba
nk
 
fo
re
ign
 
bo
rr
o
w
ing
 
as
 
a 
sh
ar
e 
o
f G
D
P.
C
alv
o
,
 
Iz
qu
ier
do
,
 
M
ejia
 
(20
04
): B
IS
,
 
H
o
no
ha
n 
an
d 
Sh
i (2
00
2),
 
C
en
tra
l B
an
ks
 
o
f A
us
tra
lia
,
 
N
ew
 
Ze
ala
nd
,
 
C
o
lum
bi
a,
 
K
o
re
a,
 
Br
az
il, 
IM
F:
 
IF
S
C
re
di
t g
ro
w
th
C
re
di
t t
o
 
pr
iva
te
 
se
to
r,
 
m
o
nt
hly
 
ra
te
 
o
f c
ha
ng
e
IM
F:
 
IF
S
Table 3.3: List of variables (continued)
140 CHAPTER 3. UNCERTAINTY AND SPREAD OF CRISES
Al
te
rn
a
tiv
e 
co
n
ta
gi
o
n
 
ch
a
n
n
el
s
In
de
x 
o
f c
o
m
m
o
n 
cr
ed
ito
rs
D
eg
re
e 
o
f d
ep
en
de
nc
e 
o
n 
the
 
sa
m
e 
cr
ed
ito
rs
 
as
 
the
 
ini
tia
l c
ris
is 
co
un
try
.
 
I c
alc
ula
te
 
the
 
ind
ex
 
as
 
the
 
su
m
 
o
ve
r 
all
 
cr
ed
ito
rs
 
o
f t
he
 
pr
o
du
ct
 
o
f t
he
 
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 
o
f 
co
un
try
 
B 
o
n 
cr
ed
ito
r 
i ti
m
es
 
the
 
im
po
rta
nc
e 
o
f t
he
 
ini
tia
l c
ris
is 
co
un
try
, 
A
, 
fo
r 
cr
ed
ito
r 
i. T
he
 
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 
o
f c
o
un
try
 
B 
o
n 
cr
ed
ito
r 
i is
 
the
 
ra
tio
 
o
f 
th
e 
vo
lum
e 
tha
t c
o
un
try
 
B 
bo
rr
o
w
s 
fro
m
 
cr
ed
ito
r 
i 
re
lat
ive
 
to
 
the
 
to
ta
l b
o
rr
o
w
ing
 
by
 
co
un
try
 
B.
 
Th
e 
im
po
rta
nc
e 
o
f c
o
un
try
 
A
 
to
 
cr
ed
ito
r 
i is
 
the
 
ra
tio
 
o
f 
th
e 
vo
lum
e 
tha
t c
re
dit
o
r 
i le
nd
s 
to
 
co
un
try
 
A 
re
lat
ive
 
to
 
to
ta
l le
nd
ing
 
by
 
cr
ed
ito
r 
i.
BI
S 
qu
at
er
ly 
re
vie
w
, 
co
ns
o
lid
at
ed
 
ba
nk
ing
 
da
ta
,
 
ta
ble
 
9B
.
 
I c
o
ns
tru
ct
 
the
 
m
o
nt
hly
 
tim
es
er
ies
 
fro
m
 
the
 
qu
ar
te
rly
 
o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 
by
 
int
er
po
lat
ion
.
Tr
ad
e 
sh
ar
e
Ex
po
rts
 
fro
m
 
co
un
try
 
B 
to
 
the
 
ini
tia
l c
ris
is 
co
un
try
 
re
lat
ive
 
to
 
to
ta
l e
xp
o
rts
 
by
 
co
un
try
 
B
IM
F:
 
D
ire
ct
ion
 
o
f t
ra
de
 
st
at
ist
ics
St
o
ck
 
m
ar
ke
t s
ize
 
M
ar
ke
t v
alu
e 
o
f I
FC
 
inv
es
ta
ble
 
/ F
TS
E 
ind
ex
IF
C 
inv
es
ta
ble
/ F
TS
E 
ind
ex
In
de
x 
o
f c
o
m
m
o
n 
o
ve
re
xp
o
se
d 
fun
d 
inv
es
to
rs
D
eg
re
e 
o
f d
ep
en
de
nc
e 
o
n 
fun
d 
inv
es
to
rs
 
tha
t a
re
 
o
ve
re
xp
o
se
d 
to
 
the
 
ini
tia
l c
ris
is 
co
un
try
Br
o
ne
r,
 
Ge
los
, 
Re
inh
ar
t (2
00
6)
Table 3.4: List of variables (continued)
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Pa
n
el
 
re
gr
es
sio
n
s 
o
f  
u
n
ce
rt
a
in
ty
 
in
 
B 
w
ith
 
fix
ed
 
ef
fe
ct
s 
o
n
 
th
e 
la
g 
o
f c
ris
is 
in
 
in
iti
a
l c
ris
es
 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
St
ep
 
1 
Ef
fec
t o
f c
ris
es
 
in 
the
 
ini
tia
l c
ris
es
 
co
un
tri
es
 
o
n 
the
 
un
ce
rta
int
y i
n 
o
the
r 
co
un
tri
es
D
ep
en
de
nt
 
Va
ria
ble
 
un
ce
rta
int
y 
in 
co
un
try
 
B 
at
 
t. 
Th
e 
ini
tia
l c
ris
es
 
co
un
tri
es
 
ar
e 
ex
clu
de
d 
as
 
aff
ec
te
d 
co
un
tri
es
.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10
)
all
 
cr
ise
s,
 
all
 
co
un
tri
es
all
 
cr
ise
s,
 
em
er
gin
g 
m
ar
ke
ts
re
gio
na
l 
cr
ise
s,
 
as
ia
re
gio
na
l 
cr
ise
s,
 
em
er
gin
g 
as
ia
re
gio
na
l 
cr
ise
s,
 
as
ia 
+
 
tu
rk
ey
re
gio
na
l 
cr
ise
s,
 
em
er
gin
g 
as
ia 
+
 
tu
rk
ey
re
gio
na
l 
cr
ise
s,
 
ea
st
er
n 
eu
ro
pe
re
gio
na
l 
cr
ise
s,
 
em
er
gin
g 
ea
st
er
n 
eu
ro
pe
re
gio
na
l 
cr
ise
s,
 
lat
in 
am
er
ica
re
gio
na
l 
cr
ise
s,
 
em
er
gin
g 
lat
in 
am
er
ica
-
0.
02
6*
*
-
0.
03
9*
*
-
0.
14
6*
*
*
-
0.
14
6*
*
*
(0.
01
1)
(0.
01
9)
(0.
04
1)
(0.
04
1)
-
0.
02
7*
*
-
0.
02
1
-
0.
04
1
-
0.
04
1
(0.
01
3)
(0.
02
4)
(0.
05
1)
(0.
05
1)
0.
04
4*
*
0.
05
9*
0.
17
4*
*
*
0.
17
4*
*
*
(0.
01
7)
(0.
03
2)
(0.
06
1)
(0.
06
1)
0.
04
8*
*
*
0.
08
6*
*
*
0.
14
5*
*
*
0.
14
5*
*
*
(0.
01
1)
(0.
01
9)
(0.
03
1)
(0.
03
1)
0.
06
3*
*
*
0.
08
5*
*
*
0.
11
2*
*
*
0.
12
3*
*
*
0.
10
8*
*
*
0.
11
6*
*
*
(0.
00
9)
(0.
01
6)
(0.
01
9)
(0.
02
6)
(0.
01
9)
(0.
02
6)
-
0.
03
6*
*
*
-
0.
07
0*
*
*
-
0.
07
4*
*
*
-
0.
10
0*
*
*
-
0.
04
3*
-
0.
04
3*
(0.
00
9)
(0.
01
7)
(0.
01
9)
(0.
02
6)
(0.
02
5)
(0.
02
5)
0.
16
4*
*
*
0.
13
7*
*
*
0.
22
7*
*
*
0.
22
1*
*
*
0.
23
0*
*
*
0.
22
9*
*
*
0.
06
4*
0.
06
4*
0.
13
6*
*
0.
13
6*
*
(0.
01
8)
(0.
02
5)
(0.
03
0)
(0.
03
6)
(0.
03
0)
(0.
03
6)
(0.
03
6)
(0.
03
6)
(0.
05
5)
(0.
05
5)
-
0.
11
9*
*
*
-
0.
12
2*
*
*
-
0.
12
2*
*
*
-
0.
12
2*
*
*
-
0.
12
5*
*
*
-
0.
12
6*
*
*
-
0.
10
3*
*
*
-
0.
10
3*
*
*
-
0.
10
6*
*
*
-
0.
10
6*
*
*
(0.
00
2)
(0.
00
3)
(0.
00
4)
(0.
00
5)
(0.
00
4)
(0.
00
5)
(0.
00
8)
(0.
00
8)
(0.
00
9)
(0.
00
9)
5.
09
2*
*
*
5.
46
8*
*
*
5.
33
2*
*
*
5.
76
4*
*
*
4.
96
8*
*
*
5.
19
0*
*
*
3.
89
6*
*
*
3.
89
6*
*
*
6.
49
0*
*
*
6.
49
0*
*
*
(0.
35
7)
(0.
49
3)
(0.
73
4)
(0.
87
0)
(0.
73
4)
(0.
87
3)
(0.
72
3)
(0.
72
3)
(1.
35
5)
(1.
35
5)
-
0.
00
0
0.
00
2
-
0.
00
4
-
0.
00
6
-
0.
00
3
-
0.
00
6
-
0.
00
2
-
0.
00
2
0.
02
2*
0.
02
2*
(0.
00
4)
(0.
00
6)
(0.
00
6)
(0.
00
8)
(0.
00
6)
(0.
00
8)
(0.
01
3)
(0.
01
3)
(0.
01
1)
(0.
01
1)
-
0.
00
7*
-
0.
01
4*
*
-
0.
00
9
-
0.
00
7
-
0.
00
9
-
0.
00
8
-
0.
00
5
-
0.
00
5
-
0.
02
1
-
0.
02
1
(0.
00
3)
(0.
00
6)
(0.
00
7)
(0.
00
9)
(0.
00
7)
(0.
00
9)
(0.
01
0)
(0.
01
0)
(0.
01
3)
(0.
01
3)
-
0.
00
3
-
0.
00
1
-
0.
01
1*
-
0.
02
2*
*
-
0.
01
0
-
0.
02
1*
*
-
0.
00
3
-
0.
00
3
0.
01
2
0.
01
2
(0.
00
3)
(0.
00
5)
(0.
00
6)
(0.
00
9)
(0.
00
6)
(0.
00
9)
(0.
01
0)
(0.
01
0)
(0.
00
8)
(0.
00
8)
Co
ns
ta
nt
0.
84
2*
*
*
1.
10
0*
*
*
1.
09
5*
*
*
1.
23
2*
*
*
1.
13
1*
*
*
1.
28
9*
*
*
0.
85
0*
*
*
0.
85
0*
*
*
1.
02
9*
*
*
1.
02
9*
*
*
(0.
01
2)
(0.
02
2)
(0.
03
0)
(0.
04
4)
(0.
03
1)
(0.
04
6)
(0.
02
7)
(0.
02
7)
(0.
04
6)
(0.
04
6)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
26
57
12
93
94
4
59
8
94
4
59
8
35
3
35
3
34
2
34
2
N
um
be
r 
o
f c
o
un
try
30
16
9
6
9
6
6
6
4
4
R-
sq
ua
re
d
0.
60
0.
65
0.
70
0.
74
0.
70
0.
74
0.
46
0.
46
0.
45
0.
45
St
an
da
rd
 
er
ro
rs
 
in 
pa
re
nt
he
se
s,
 
*
 
sig
nif
ica
nt
 
at
 
10
%
; *
*
 
sig
nif
ica
nt
 
at
 
5%
; *
*
*
 
sig
nif
ica
nt
 
at
 
1%
lag
 
o
f f
ina
nc
ial
 
ris
k 
ind
ex
lag
 
o
f p
o
liti
ca
l r
isk
 
ind
ex
lag
 
o
f c
ris
is 
in 
Ru
s
lag
 
o
f c
ris
is 
in 
Th
a
lag
 
o
f c
ris
is 
in 
Tu
r
lag
 
o
f m
ea
n 
 
gr
o
w
th 
ex
pe
ct
at
ion
s
lag
 
o
f c
ris
is 
in 
B
lag
 
o
f s
to
ck
 
m
ar
ke
t 
vo
lat
ilit
y
lag
 
o
f c
ris
is 
in 
A
rg
lag
 
o
f c
ris
is 
in 
Br
a
lag
 
o
f c
ris
is 
in 
M
ex
lag
 
o
f e
co
no
m
ic 
ris
k 
ind
ex
Table 3.5: Step 1: Effect of crisis in A on uncertainty in B
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Pa
n
el
 
re
gr
es
si
o
n
s 
o
f  
u
n
ce
rt
a
in
ty
 
in
 
B
 
w
ith
 
fix
e
d 
e
ffe
ct
s 
o
n
 
th
e 
la
g 
o
f c
ri
si
s 
in
 
in
iti
a
l c
ri
se
s 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
St
ep
 
1 
Ef
fec
t o
f c
ris
es
 
in 
the
 
ini
tia
l c
ris
es
 
co
un
tri
es
 
o
n 
the
 
un
ce
rta
int
y 
in 
o
the
r 
co
un
tri
es
D
ep
en
de
nt
 
V
ar
iab
le 
un
ce
rta
int
y 
in 
co
un
try
 
B 
at
 
t. 
Th
e 
ini
tia
l c
ris
es
 
co
un
tri
es
 
ar
e 
ex
clu
de
d 
as
 
aff
ec
te
d 
co
un
tri
es
.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10
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Table 3.6: Step 1: Effect of crisis in A on uncertainty in B, interacted explana-
tory variable, time effects
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Table 3.7: Step 1: Effect of crisis in A on uncertainty in B, interacted explana-
tory variable, no control for time effects
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Table 3.8: Step 2: Effect of uncertainty in B on crisis there, all initial crises
countries
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Table 3.9: Step 2: Effect of uncertainty in B on crisis there, Mexican, Russian
and Thai crises
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Table 3.10: Step 2: Effect of uncertainty in B on crisis there, additional control
for common overexposed fund investors
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Table 3.12: Marginal effect of uncertainty in B on probability of a crisis there
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